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This study aims at unifying the empirical research on the financial part of the monetary transmission 
process in the Eurozone between 1993 and 2002. After endogenously determining structural breaks, we 
select an optimal pass-through model for a series of national retail interest rates for each break-free sub-
period. We apply these models to the pass-through of monetary policy shocks as measured by the overnight 
money market rate as well as to a measure of cost of funds and furthermore allow the pass-through process 
to be characterised by thresholds and asymmetries. We find that structural breaks occur on average well 
before EMU. We confirm the result of previous studies that report increases in size and speed of the pass-
through. This finding holds, however, only when using the monetary policy rate proxy, indicating an 
increase in monetary policy efficiency. When using pass-through measures as an indicator for Eurozone 
banking market integration, the view that the markets are still fragmented is supported, with the possible 
exemption of short-term lending to enterprises. Finally, our analysis of the structural determinants of the 
pass-through process confirms the widely held view that nominal, real, and structural convergence can lead 
to a more homogenous transmission process in the Eurozone. However, full convergence may yet be 
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1. Introduction 
Do structural divergences in the monetary transmission mechanism in various 
member countries of the Eurozone lead to asymmetric effects of a single European 
monetary policy across countries? To answer this question, researchers inside and outside 
the ECB have increasingly focussed on investigating the Eurozone transmission 
mechanism. Traditionally the monetary mechanism can be described to consist of two 
parts: the financial market reaction and the wage-price mechanism. Given the importance 
of bank finance in the Eurozone, credit is considered to play an important role, both, 
through the “interest rate channel” and through the “lending channel” (see e.g. Bernanke 
and Gertler 1995, Kashyap and Stein 1993). With banks as conveyers of monetary 
signals, (divergences in) national banking market structures, (lack of) Eurozone banking 
market integration, and – subsequently – the (country specific) size and the speed of 
interest rate pass-through are key to the influence that monetary policy has on the 
economy. This is the more important as banking markets are often considered to be more 
resistant to convergence than other parts of the transmission mechanism. Consequently, 
the recent empirical literature has increasingly focussed on an explicit empirical analysis 
of the pass-through of monetary policy in the financial sector and its possible 
convergence of the Eurozone monetary mechanism. 
The object of this study is to unify previous research into the Eurozone pass-
through mechanism by addressing five issues: First, we will investigate whether and 
when the pass-through over the whole post ERM-crisis period 1993-2002 has changed. 
Unlike other studies a structural break - if existent - will be determined endogenously 
rather than postulated and then tested. This is done for all available retail lending and 
deposit rates in ten Eurozone countries. Second, and building on our previous work 
(Sander and Kleimeier, 2002) we suggest to use a methodology that takes into 
consideration various pass-through models, in particular those allowing for asymmetric 
adjustment of retail rates. Third, the pass-through is investigated as the impact of 
monetary policy-controlled market interest rates on retail rates as well as the impact of 
cost of funds on retail rates as advocated by industrial organization-inspired studies. We 
will argue that comparing the results of both approaches offers additional insights as the 
pass-through process appears to become more responsive to monetary policy changes as 
compared to changes in the cost of funds. Fourth, we make use of the information that the   2 
pass-through results provide to evaluate the state of Eurozone banking market integration. 
Finally, we will investigate the structural determinants of the pass-through of monetary 
policy impulses. 
The results of this study can be summarized as follows: First, the pass-through 
mechanism in all Eurozone countries and for almost all retail interest rates has undergone 
considerable structural changes in the past decade. It would nevertheless be too simple to 
attribute these changes simply to the introduction of the single currency on January 1, 
1999. In fact, we find most structural breaks occurring much earlier. Second – and in line 
with other pass-through studies – we find that in the post-break part of the investigation 
period both, the size and the speed of the pass-through has gone up. This is, however, 
only true for lending rates and not for deposit rates. Third, this conclusion does generally 
not hold when using cost of funds proxies. Forth, and with the notable exemption of 
short-term corporate loans, the long-term pass-through appears to be incomplete, thus 
supporting the view that credit rationing remains an empirically important phenomenon 
in Eurozone retail banking.
1 Fifth, the size of pass-through typically increases with a 
reduced maturity of lending rates. However, as the pass-through of monetary policy 
impulses has generally increased for all lending rates, the grip that monetary policy has 
now even on long-term lending rates, such as mortgage rates, has also improved. Sixth, 
the pass-through mechanism has become more homogenous across the Eurozone 
countries thus conveying the (statistical) picture that the Eurozone retail lending markets 
may have become more integrated for some but not all retail lending markets. Seventh, 
our structural analysis highlights the importance of the competitive environment in the 
banking market and the role of stable monetary regime. While the latter variables suggest 
that a potential for structural convergence exists, legal and cultural differences are still 
important and may remain so for the nearer future. 
 
2. Eurozone Interest Rate Pass-Through Studies: Quo Vadis? 
Pass-through analyses serve several distinct purposes in the Eurozone-related 
literature. First, they provide a measure for the workings of the financial part of the 
monetary mechanism. As such, the transmission from monetary policy rate onto lending 
and deposit rates is considered and, consequently, either a policy rate or a policy   3 
controlled money market rate
2 is used as exogenous variable. This approached has e.g. 
been followed by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Cottarelli, Ferri, and Generale (1995), 
BIS (1994), and Borio and Fritz (1995) and – more recently – by Sander and Kleimeier 
(2000, 2002), and Toolsema, Sturm and de Haan (2002). 
Second, pass-through analyses are used to investigate the degree of competition or 
imperfection in the banking market. Typically starting with an industrial organization 
approach, such studies view the size and speed of the pass-through mechanism as an 
indicator for market imperfection in the banking market segment under consideration. For 
example, de Bondt (2002) starts from a marginal cost pricing model suggested by 
Rousseas (1985). In this model, the bank interest rate (BR) is set by banks depending on a 
marginal cost price approximated by a market interest rate (M) that is comparable to the 
bank rate under consideration: 
(1) BR  =  θ0 + θM. 
The coefficient θ0 is a constant mark-up on marginal costs, while the size of the 
parameter θ depends on the demand elasticity for banking products, such as deposits and 
loans. A not fully elastic demand and/or some degree of market power will result in a 
value for θ less than unity. A direct consequence is an imperfect pass-through, which can 
therefore be viewed as a result of imperfect competition. Next to market structure and 
market contestability, switching cost and asymmetric information are important causes of 
a θ value below 1. Switching costs are particularly high in markets where long-term 
relationships and repeated transactions are important (see e.g. Sharpe 1997). Asymmetric 
information in the sense of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) manifests itself in moral hazard and 
adverse selection phenomena which may cause banks to set lending rates below market 
clearing levels, thus leading to credit rationing. In contrast to this approach, de Bondt 
(2002) argues that even with moral hazard and adverse selection, lending rate stickiness 
and credit rationing must not a occur. Under the assumption of perfect competition and 
provided banks are able to distinguish between risky and non-risky borrowers (those with 
a default probability of zero), they may price higher default probabilities into the lending 
rates rather than rationing credit. In this case the long-run pass-through coefficient θ 
should exceed 1 and as such empirical studies should find lending rates being very 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 See de Bondt (2002) and de Bondt, Mojon, and Valla (2002) for a different view.   4 
sensitive to changes in market interest rates, i.e. θ should exceed 1. For such an analysis, 
the market interest rate chosen in equation (1) is often taken to reflect the cost of funds or 
the opportunity cost (in the case of deposits) for the banking product under consideration. 
One way of doing this is searching for market rates with matching maturities. However, 
as several maturities can increasingly be found in the same market segment  - such as 
mortgages with fixed rates over various maturities as well as flexible rate mortgages – 
finding matching maturities is no easy task and can be done only approximately. For 
example, de Bondt (2002) bases his selection of cost of funds proxies on correlations 
between bank and market interest rates, while de Bondt, Mojon and Valla (2002) use a 
combination of money market rates and 10-year government bond yields. Because of this, 
cost-of-funds-oriented studies are lacking in comparability and are as such not of much 
use in comparing the workings of the monetary transmission process across rates and 
countries.  
Third, pass-through studies are of use for assessing the degree of financial 
integration in the Eurozone banking market. For example, despite the fact that retail 
interest rates have been converging to some degree, Kleimeier and Sander (2002, 2003) 
argue that the Eurozone retail banking markets, in particular consumer lending and 
mortgage markets, are still not integrated. However, these studies show that integration – 
measured by employing a cointegration-cum-errror-correction-model-approach – 
appeared to have increased after the introduction of the single currency, in particular with 
respect to short-term lending to enterprises. The authors argue that this (statistical) 
picture may mainly be “produced” by a faster and more homogenous pass-through in 
some retail lending markets in the Eurozone. Heinemann and Schüler (2001) have been 
following up on those analyses and argue that integration is a sufficient, though not 
necessary condition for a convergence of pass-through speed. Consequently, they 
advocate to use national differences in the speed of the pass-through as an indicator of 
integration. As the Kleimeier and Sander (2002, 2003) studies answer the question 
whether Eurozone markets for mortgage, consumer lending and short-term lending to 
enterprises are integrated with a short “No, No, and Maybe”, these propositions can and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
2 Within the US context Bernanke and Blinder (1992) have suggested to use the federal funds rate as a 
monetary policy proxy.   5 
will subsequently be investigated in the present study by utilizing a pass-through 
approach. 
Fourth, pass-through studies are forming the base to detect structural differences 
in banking markets and their driving forces, by means of a cross-sectional analysis of the 
structural determinants of the speed and size of the pass-through process.  The key 
reference for such approaches is Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) in an international 
context. For the Eurozone, this approach has been followed by Cottarelli, Ferri, and 
Generale (1995) and Mojon (2000). 
All recent Eurozone pass-through studies make five major points: First, since 
impact (and interim) multipliers are typically below 1, this is pointing to some degree of 
bank interest rate stickiness. Second, regarding a possible full-pass-through in the long-
run there is no clear consensus yet. Third, there are considerable differences in the pass-
through across different bank lending and deposit rates. Fourth, there are severe 
asymmetries across countries, which may have a differential impact of a single monetary 
policy. Fifth, the pass-through has increased in both, size and speed in the recent years, 
probably pointing to the potentially unifying role of the single currency (project). Sixth, 
structural differences in the pass-through are typically attributed to the structural features 
of the financial system and should eventually disappear with structural convergence.  
Nevertheless, the remaining differences in the quantitative and – at times – 
qualitative results of pass-through studies remain high
3. These differences can be 
contributed to three major factors:  
1.  The choice of exogenous market interest rate. 
2.  The length and timing of the investigated periods. 
As ECB retail lending rate statistics are only available from 1993 onward with a more 
or less full coverage, typically the data base is either too limited, or too general, or not 
sufficiently harmonized. Moreover, the sample period from 1993 up to now is subject 
to the risk of a number of structural breaks, such as those caused by the increasing 
implementation of the EU’s 2
nd banking directive, the run up to EMU and finally the 
introduction of the single currency itself, not to mention further regulatory efforts at 
the EU level, financial innovations and technical progress in general. 
                                                            
3 For an overview see Sander and Kleimeier (2002) and de Bondt (2002). 
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3.  The chosen methodology for the pass-through study.  
The basic reference of pass-through studies is Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) who 
utilize an autoregressive distributed lag specification. Later studies recognize that 
when retail and wholesale interest rate are cointegrated in the long run, the pass-
through equation must be extended by an error correction mechanism, which drives 
the rates back toward their long-run equilibrium relationship. Examples of such 
studies are Sander and Kleimeier (2000, 2002), Mojon (2000), Heinemann and 
Schüler (2001), Toolsema, Sturm and de Haan (2002), de Bondt (2002), and de 
Bondt, Mojon, and Valla (2002). Moreover, even if the same approach is chosen, the 
selection of lag-lengths and the estimation process itself can generate substantial 
differences in the results. For example, while most authors follow a conventional two-
stage estimation process with investigation first the long-run cointegration 
relationship and then the pass-through, de Bondt (2002) utilizes a one-step non-linear 
estimation approach. Finally, the nature of the pass-through process may be 
characterized by non-linear asymmetries. Recent research has increasingly shifted 
toward analysing asymmetric adjustment in interest rates (see Tong 1983, Scholnick 
1996 and 1999, Balke and Fomby 1997, Enders and Granger 1998, Baum and 
Karasulu 1998, Ender and Siklos 2000). However, using state-dependent error 
correction models has so far not made its way into the Eurozone pass-through 
literature with the notable exemption of Sander and Kleimeier (2002) and de Bondt, 
Mojon, and Valla (2002). 
4.  The design of the structural analysis, particularly regarding the choice of explanatory 
factors.  
As the object of this study is to unify previous research into the Eurozone pass-through 
mechanism, we suggest to address the three above-mentioned issues as follows: 
1. Pass-through  studies  should  focus on both, the impact of policy-controlled wholesale 
interest rates on retail rates and the industrial organization-inspired cost of funds 
approach. Both approaches should be viewed as complementary and not substitutive 
as comparing the results of both offers additional insights. 
2.  Structural breaks should not be postulated but endogenously determined. In analysing 
the data for the period 1993 to 2002 we show that such breaks are indeed signifying 
the whole period under investigation. Just postulating a breakpoint and then testing   7 
for structural breaks will typically justify a break at many different points in time. For 
example, putting the break point at January 1, 1999 may yield a significant results for 
a structural break test, although the true breakpoint may be somewhat earlier. 
Consequently, changes in the pass-through process may wrongly be attributed to the 
introduction of the single currency, while it may be affected by the impact of earlier 
changes in EU banking market regulation, or because in the run up to EMU important 
expectation effects have been at work, or the reduction of money market rate 
volatility has already made its impact felt. 
3.  We suggest to use a methodology that takes into consideration a wide variety of 
available pass-through models and to select the best model on the base of   
predetermined criteria, as demonstrated by Sander and Kleimeier (2002) and 
described shortly in the following. 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Data Selection 
Our analysis is based on monthly national retail interest rates for Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain
4 that 
have been obtained from the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB collects interest 
rate data for 3 types of consumer loans – overdrafts on cash accounts (N1), mortgage 
loans to households (N2) and consumer loans to households (N3) - and two corporate 
lending rates – short-term loans to enterprises (N4), medium and long-term loans to 
enterprises (N5) – and a final category for other lending rates (N6). Regarding deposits, 
the ECB collects interest rate data for 3 types of deposits – current account deposits (N7), 
time deposits (N8), and savings accounts (N9) – and a final category for other deposit 
rates (N10).
5 Whereas some national series start as early as 1980, data for a larger 
number of EMU member countries are available only since the mid 1990s. Considering 
                                                            
4 Note that Greece has not been included in our study. The reasons are twofold: First, Greece did not join 
EMU until January 2001, and second there are no money market rates available for Greece for the full 
sample period. Furthermore, only rates available in monthly frequency are included. Thus, quarterly series 
available for example for France are not included in the sample. 
5 For details on data, see the ECB’s National Retail Interest Rates – Methodological Notes. From series N6 
and N10 only one rate has been included (N6 for Ireland), all other national series are excluded as they do 
not clearly refer to a national retail interest rate but represent euro denominated instruments or synthetic 
rates based on several different instruments.   8 
potential disturbing effects of the EMS crisis on our results, we decided to focus on the 
period from January 1993 until October 2002.  
In order to model the monetary policy approach of interest pass-through, 
overnight money market rates have been used as a proxy for the central banks’ policy 
rates. These rates are obtained from Datastream. Exceptions are Germany, the 
Netherlands, and Portugal where overnight money market or call money rates have been 
obtained from line 60b of the CD-ROM version of the International Monetary Funds’ 
International Financial Statistics
6. For the cost of funds approach of interest rate pass-
through market interest rates of instruments with different maturities have been obtained 
from Datastream including national interbank rates with 1 month, 3 months, 6 months, 
and 12 months maturities and 10 year government bond yields. 
For the cost of funds approach, a selection of the most appropriate market interest 
rate has to be made. Our choice is presented in table C1 of appendix C. Mortgages are 
typically considered as long-term lending where inflation expectations play an important 
role. This would suggest the use of a market interest rate with a long maturity. De Bondt 
(2002) uses a 5-year interest rate for a Eurozone average mortgage pass-through model. 
De Bondt, Mojon and Valla (2002) use a weighted average of money market rates and 10 
year government bond yields. Following de Bondt (2002) and using correlation between 
market interest rates and mortgage rates to select the pass-through variable suggests in 
most countries a selection of the 10-year government bond yield. However, this result is 
not uniform. Particularly, an increasing use of variable rate mortgages can be observed. 
This is especially true for Ireland where a 3-month interbank rate would be the most 
appropriate choice. Similar results are obtained for Portugal and Spain where a mix of 
fixed and floating rate mortgages are offered. Since we already investigate the pass-
through of short-term money market rates on mortgage rate in the monetary policy 
approach, we choose for the cost of funds approach to investigate the impact of long-term 
interest rates as measured by government bond yield on mortgage rates. 
Regarding consumer credits, Diez-Guardia (2000) postulates that there is no one 
model of a consumer credit in the Eurozone. This would speak against using a common 
rate. Particularly in Austria where the maturities are long-term and Belgium where the 
                                                            
6 Note that national rates are used from January 1993 to December 1998 and rates reported for the euro area 
have been used as off January 1999.   9 
rates are fixed, Table C1 in Appendix C shows the highest correlation to be with 
government bond yields. For the remaining countries the evidence is mixed but in general 
speaks against using government bond yield and favour of shorter-term interbank rates. 
As the monetary policy approach already uses short-term money market rates, we 
conduct for all countries the analysis for 12 months interest rates.  
For short-term corporate loans, lending is for short maturities and with floating 
interest rates. Thus for the majority of cases a one month rate should be selected with the 
exception of Austria. Thus, for the cost of funds approach a common 1 month rate is 
chosen. Medium and long-term corporate loans typically with a maturity over 1 year 
show a mixed picture but are somewhat leaning towards selecting a 6 months rate. This 
appears to be most often due to the fact that interest rates on these loans are floating. 
For deposit rates, the maturity of the market rate with the highest correlation 
seems to increase with the maturity of the deposit type thus leading to a choice of a 1 
month rate for current account deposits and a 3-months rate for time deposits and savings 
accounts. 
  For the analysis of the structural determinants, we collected a large number of 
banking market descriptors from recent publications of the ECB (2000, 2002) and the 
OECD. Moreover, the usual macro-economic and financial development control 
variables have been collected and calculated. The details and sources are available in 
Table B1 of appendix B and motivated more specifically in section 5. 
  
3.2. The Empirical Pass-Through Approach  
3.2.1. Standard Pass-Through 
  Beginning with Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) the pass-through process has often 
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where BRt and Mt are lending and market rates. The optimal lag length is indicated by k* 
and n*, respectively. The impact multiplier is estimates by the coefficient β1, where a 
value of less than 1 indicates sluggish adjustment, also known as lending rate stickiness. 





















In the long run equation (2) therefore has the form of  
t t t u M BR + + = θ θ0 ) 4 (  
If θ is equal to one, we speak of a full pass-through in the long run. Not fully 
elastic credit demand functions and imperfect competition may lead to a less than full 
pass-through. If θ<1 switching costs, information asymmetries and other market 
imperfections are considered to have caused an imperfect pass-through. If θ>1 bank are 
considered not to ration credit supply, but increase lending rates to compensate for higher 
risks (see de Bondt 2002). 
 
3.2.2. The Symmetric Cointegration Approach 
It is important to recognize that time series for interest rates typically exhibit an 
I(1) property.
7 In this case pass-through models like equation (2) are regularly estimated 
in first differences to avoid spurious regression problems. It should be noted that by 
doing so, important information about the long-run relationship is lost. Equation (2) can, 
however, directly be estimated and will contain the long-run information if both interest 
rates are cointegrated in the sense of Engle and Granger (1987). The deviation from the 
long-run equilibrium will then be measured by the estimated error from equation (4) and 
used in the pass-through model as an “error correction term” (ECT). Building on the 
cointegration approach, a proper pass-through measurement should be based on a well 
specified error correction model (ECM) that explicitly incorporates the long-run 
relationship between retail bank rates and market rates provided the series are 
cointegrated as given by equation (5): 
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7 We employ various tests to establish whether or not the interest rate series used in this study exhibit unit 
roots. Given the likely presence of a structural break during the sample period, we conduct standard unit 
root test for the pre and post break periods. For the full period we additionally estimate unit root tests, 
which are valid even in the presence of a structural break. Details on these test statistics can be found in 
Appendix A. Results are reported in Tables B2 and C2 in the Appendix B and C.   11 
For this symmetric cointegration model, the usual Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) testing procedures have to be conducted. If cointegration is 
established, equation (7) will be estimated while searching for optimal lags using the AIC 
criterion over all combination of lags up to a lag length of 4.
8  
 
3.2.3. Asymmetric and Threshold Cointegration 
While most pass-through studies focus on symmetric adjustment, we have 
advocated elsewhere (Sander and Kleimeier 2002) to incorporate threshold and 
asymmetric adjustment mechanisms in pass-through studies. Several reasons can be 
given for this: Interest rate adjustment may in itself be either asymmetric or only 
occurring beyond a certain threshold. As our previous work shows, such adjustment 
patterns are frequent in the Eurozone and should therefore not be ignored. Furthermore, 
using models with asymmetries allows us to detect cointegration in cases where there are 
asymmetries and where other methods would thus fail to detect cointegration and 
wrongly re-direct the researcher to a standard pass-through model.  
As explained in more detail in Appendix A, we consider five different 
specifications for asymmetric adjustment of interest rates. The first model we consider is 
the threshold autoregressive model (TAR
0) developed by Tong (1983). The model makes 
a distinction whether the explained interest rate (retail lending or deposit rate in our case) 
is above or below its equilibrium level. Thus, the TAR
0 allows for asymmetric 
adjustment depending on the sign of equilibrium-deviation. For example, if the money 
market rate decreases without an immediate adjustment in the lending rate, we obtain a 
positive realization of the error term ut. When in this case the autoregressive decay is 
faster than in the case of money market rate increases, then the lending rate adjustment is 
faster downward than upward. The second model (TAR*) is a modification of the TAR
0 
in the sense that the threshold that was formerly implicitly set at zero is now allowed to 
deviate from that value. The rationale behind such a non-zero threshold is that one or 
both variables may only adjust to a dis-equilibrium once it exceeds a certain minimum 
deviation in one direction. For example, the lending rate will adjust fast only when out of 
an equilibrium situation the cost of funds rate drops in a way that the deviation from 
                                                            
8 Details on the methodology for all symmetric model and asymmetric models can be found in Sander and 
Kleimeier (2002) and are also shortly described in Appendix A.   12 
equilibrium exceeds an optimal threshold a0* of, say, 0.25 percentage points. For lower 
deviations or increases in the cost of funds rate, adjustment takes place at a significantly 
slower pace. The third variation is a Band-TAR model (B-TAR*). Such a model has 
often been applied to model interest rate cointegration where infrequent and discrete 
adjustments in the rates occur (e.g. Balke and Fomby 1997, Baum and Karasulu 1998). 
For example, if deviations from equilibrium are small and will therefore not lead to an 
adjustment of the dependent interest rate, one may find no cointegration within a narrow 
band bordered by a0* and –a0* while outside this band cointegration and thus an error 
correction mechanism may be present. In the context of our study, such behaviour could 
be related to the “menu cost” argument of retail rate stickiness such that banks only 
adjust retail rates when deviations are sufficiently large. On the other hand, if it happens 
for example for lending rates that inside the band cointegration is found but not outside, 
this could indicate that banks implicitly insure their customers against excessive 
deviations from equilibrium by smoothing the response of the lending rate. Finally, our 
fourth and fifth models represent momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) models. 
Whereas in the TAR models the autoregressive decay always depends on the degree of 
deviation from equilibrium, one could also imagine situations where the adjustment speed 
depends on how fast the rates move away from or towards equilibrium. Such M-TAR 
models have been successfully applied to the term structure of interest rates by Enders 
and Granger (1998) and Enders and Siklos (2000). According to the latter authors, M-
TAR adjustment can be especially useful when decision makers (in our case banks) are 
viewed as attempting to smooth out large changes in an interest rate. 
 
3.3. The Estimation Procedure 
The objective of the methodology employed in this study is to obtain the optimal 
pass-through model. As such, we initially try to identify break-free time periods. Rather 
than setting a breakpoint exogenously such as defined by interest rates cycle like Mojon 
(2000) or using the introduction of the common currency, like de Bondt (2002), in our 
study the breakpoint is endogenously determined. To this end, a supremum F (supF) test 
is calculated which indicates if and when a break is present in the long-run relationship   13 
given by equation (3).
9 After determining this breakpoint we proceed as follows for each 
country and each retail interest rate: First, the interest rates included in this study are 
tested for unit roots. If interest rates are found to be I(0), we secondly estimate a standard 
pass-through model in levels. If however interest rates are found to be I(1), the long-run 
relationship between retail and market rates can be interpreted as a cointegration 
relationship and can thirdly be estimated to obtain the estimated residuals ût. Fourth, we 
estimate of all five TAR-type models and then, fifth, test for cointegration for each TAR-
type model. In case the cointegration hypothesis could not be rejected we, sixth, perform 
asymmetry test for equality of coefficients for each TAR-type model. Seventh, all steps 
from four to six are repeated with varying lag-length to optimise AIC for each TAR-type, 
before, eighth, the optimal TAR-type model based on the minimum AIC across all model 
specifications is selected. Ninth, if however, we are not able to establish asymmetric 
cointegration based on the optimal TAR-type model, a symmetric model will be 
considered. A failure to establish cointegration here, will tenthly and finally redirect us to 
use the standard pass-through model as a last resort.  
This model will be estimated in first differences as the interest rates have unit 
roots. After the optimum pass-through model is selected, multipliers are obtained for a 
variety of positive and negative interest rate shocks. Two peculiarities of the asymmetric 
models should be noted: First, as the speed of adjustment in asymmetric pass-through 
models depends on the model’s estimated error, multipliers cannot simply be obtained by 
comparing two sets of forecasts - with and without changes in the explanatory variable – 
at any point in time. As in all non-linear models, multipliers obtained this way apply only 
to the particular context. In order to provide “general” or “state-independent” multipliers, 
we calculate them based on an equilibrium situation.
10 Second, since the reaction of the 
retail rates depends on the size and direction of the shock, multipliers are also varying 
with the specific type of the shock. 
                                                            
9 For details on this test see Appendix A. 
10 In particular, we force the change in the monetary policy or cost of funds rate to zero at the end of each 
estimation period and allow the retail bank rate to converge to an equilibrium, before the impact of a shock 
in the monetary policy or cost of funds rate is simulated. The multipliers are then calculated based on the 
resulting retail bank rate’s adjustment. Note that some asymmetric pass-through models may not converge 
to an equilibrium. In such cases, we would only obtain state dependent multipliers. To avoid this, we 
decided to select the next-best converging asymmetric model based on the AIC criterion or – in extreme 
problem cases – the symmetric or standard pass-through model. Such problems were, however, rare. 
Details regarding the finally selected next-best models are given in Tables B6 and C6 of the appendix.   14 
4. The Results of the Pass-Through Analysis 
The Eurozone banking system has undergone dramatic structural changes in the 
past decade. Consequently, the first step in analysing the role of the banking system in 
the monetary transmission process is to identify structural breaks in the long-run relation 
between market and retail rates. Some authors highlight the importance of the 
introduction of the single currency by exogenously imposing and testing for a structural 
break in January 1999. It is however not obvious that the break point should coincide 
with the introduction of the single currency. Rather, after the 1992/93 ERM crises and the 
realignment of exchange rates in particular then so-called non-core countries experienced 
a marked change in the long-term relationship between market rates and retail rates. We 
therefore prefer to determine the unknown timing of the break endogenously for all rates 
and countries. Table 1 reports the results of the rolling Chow tests. In fact, it appears that 
on average breaks occurred already at the end of 1996. As the average breakpoint is 
October 1996 for the monetary policy approach and December 1996 for the cost of funds 
approach
11, this result appears to be relatively insensitive to the choice of the market rate 
selection. Nonetheless, different banking market segments in different countries show 
different breakpoints. It would therefore be too simplistic to exogenously impose a 
breakpoint and could thus result in misleading conclusions about the role of the single 
currency. In particular for Spain and Portugal but also for Italy breakpoints are as early as  
1995 and 1996, possibly showing the impact of the run-up to EMU with reduced money 
market rate volatility and inflation convergence. Another earlier starter is Ireland where 
some breakpoints are already found in December 1993. 
 
4.1. The Average Pass-Through in the Eurozone 
In the next step, we estimated for all national interest rates the optimal pass-
through model according to the methodology described in the previous section for both, 
the monetary policy and cost of funds approach, as well as for both break-free periods. 
This allows us to compare today’s speed, size, and heterogeneity of the pass-through to 
the period prior to the statistically identified structural changes that have occurred in the 
Eurozone. Loosely speaking, our before-after analysis therefore compares the present 
                                                            
11 These averages are calculated by ignoring insignificant breakpoints. 
 Table 1: Structural Breaks in the Long-Run Relationship
country bankrate supF breakpoint supF breakpoint
Austria 2 196.25 July-97 14.41 February-99
3 253.10 September-98 188.86 August-97
4 196.26 August-97 236.56 August-97
7 221.39 November-99 200.23 November-99
8 199.14 March-97 220.36 March-97
Belgium 2 89.26 August-95 60.78 May-98
3 319.18 December-95 182.81 December-95
4.1 48.19 April-95 54.69 March-95
4.2 21.25 January-94 24.45 December-93
5 65.56 October-95 38.12 August-96
8 23.91 December-93 26.79 December-93
9 226.14 December-95 221.73 December-95
Finland 2 105.93 September-96 99.64 March-94
3 101.80 September-96 86.25 September-97
5 56.00 January-96 47.41 April-98
7 49.11 February-97 46.62 February-98
8 170.27 August-97 193.92 November-99
France 4 132.42 June-97 150.03 June-97
5 222.29 March-97 169.78 April-97
8 11.38 January-00 insignificant 8.24 January-00 insignificant
9 112.11 May-98 104.56 May-98
Germany 2 56.62 October-96 36.16 June-95
3 442.05 February-97 480.06 March-97
4 71.72 July-00 81.82 February-03
5 11.22 January-00 insignificant 9.99 January-00 insignificant
8.1 40.30 September-99 22.97 September-99
8.2 22.35 September-99 9.06 January-00 insignificant
9.1 935.80 September-99 732.66 September-99
9.2 36.67 October-95 33.47 November-95
Ireland 1 128.80 December-98 145.26 December-98
2 61.51 August-99 49.53 March-94
4 33.00 November-95 35.15 December-93
5 40.68 December-93 70.41 December-93
6 45.07 January-00 4.66 January-00 insignificant
9.1 149.76 December-93 152.03 December-93
9.2 129.03 December-93 205.33 December-93
Italy 2 69.42 December-97 131.97 May-98
4.1 31.26 February-95 30.09 July-99
4.2 39.91 February-95 21.20 June-94
5 48.08 November-97 43.01 December-96
7 70.21 February-95 44.16 February-95
8 110.97 September-97 102.79 January-97
Netherlands 2 61.82 September-96 41.20 June-95
4 30.02 August-97 66.16 August-98
7 466.47 December-98 466.47 December-98
8.1 64.49 November-95 51.29 November-95
8.2 65.67 December-95 56.09 December-95
Portugal 2 98.82 September-97 58.86 December-95
3 178.60 April-95 73.79 April-98
4.1 100.14 July-94 235.71 October-99
4.2 173.12 February-95 74.02 November-99
8.1 43.22 January-96 13.83 November-00
8.2 47.58 February-96 32.09 July-96
Spain 2 69.89 September-96 69.89 September-96
3 111.60 November-96 103.25 March-94
4 9.52 September-96 12.18 November-96
5 59.41 March-96 60.49 September-94
7 48.46 February-95 99.52 January-95
8 80.42 March-96 113.56 December-93
monetary policy approach cost of funds approach
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pass-through with that of the mid-1990s. The details of this analysis are available 
Appendix B for the monetary policy approach and Appendix C for the cost of funds 
approach. In general, the pass-through of monetary policy actions has increased in size 
and speed. An improved pass-through can on average, however, only be found for 
lending rates but not for deposit rates.  Regarding the cost of funds approach the result 
are less clear cut and where improvements occur the extent of the change is less. Broadly 
speaking, monetary policy actions that target overnight money market rates have 
increased in relevance as compared to the role of cost of funds. In order to investigate this 
overall observation in more detail we look now at individual retail interest rates. Figure 1 
summarizes our analysis as an average of the pass-through in ten Eurozone countries for 
the most common retail rates. 
Starting with the mortgage market, we find an increase in size and speed of the 
pass-through process when using the monetary policy approach. Two points should be 
noted: First, in the long run the pass-through process is still far from complete as long-run 
multipliers of about 0.6 reveal. It is noteworthy that this result does not depend on the 
choice of the market rate proxy and is thus standing in contrast to the studies by de Bondt 
(2002) and de Bondt, Mojon and Valla (2002). Given the partly different approaches and 
timing of the structural breaks, reconciling these differences remains an important task 
for future research. Second, it is striking that the efficiency of the pass-through process 
has increased for the monetary policy proxy while the role of cost of funds has 
diminished in the short-run adjustment up to 6 months. For example, the 3-months 
multiplier is today on average 9 basis points lower than in the pre-break period. Possibly 
the increasing use of flexible rate mortgages is reflected in these results. Consequently 
and as argued by Sellon (2002) in the US context, also in the Eurozone monetary policy 
targeted at short-term market rates has increased its impact on the cost of mortgages.  
In consumer lending, though some improvements have been taking place, the 
pass-through remains among the least perfect but the speed of adjustment has improved 
in post-break period. This, however, is not true when looking at the cost of funds 
approach, which shows a general but slight decrease in speed of adjustment in the post 
break period.  
For corporate loans in general the picture is mixed. Regarding short-term 
corporate loans the already fast and almost complete monetary policy pass-through Figure 1: The Average Pass-Through in the Eurozone
Panel A: Monetary Policy Approach Panel B: Cost of Funds Approach
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impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths long-run  18 
process has improved over time while the cost of funds pass-through mechanism has 
been weakening in the longer term. The opposite picture emerges for longer-term 
corporate loans. Given the nature of these loans it is clear that a market rate with a 
matched maturity is a better explanatory variable. In fact, using the cost of funds 
approach we find improvements in the pass-through for medium and long-term loans. 
Consequently, monetary policy targeted at short-term interest rates has only an improved 
influence on the cost of short-term rather than long-term lending to enterprises. If for 
example the central bank wants to influence the cost of investment borrowing of small 
and medium size enterprises (SME) it appears that she should particularly consider her 
policy’s impact on longer-term market rates. Finally, the pass-through regarding time 
deposits remains incomplete. However, after typically 3 months the long-term multiplier 
of about 0.5 to 0.6 is reached.  
In sum, monetary policy has increased its impact on all retail lending rates except 
longer-term corporate loans while cost of funds influences show similar improvements 
only for medium and long-term corporate loans, implying that the cost of funds as a 
determinant of longer-term borrowing cost for SME have increased in relevance. With 
the possible exception of short-term corporate loans the long run pass-through is 
imperfect, eventually pointing to credit rationing phenomena.  
 
4.2. Asymmetries in the Eurozone Pass-Through 
Pass-through mechanisms are best described by asymmetric models for the 
majority of national retail interest rates. We select these models in with 51% of all cases 
for the cost of funds pass-through and 46% of all cases for the monetary policy pass-
through. In particular, in the post-break period the share of cases where the asymmetric 
model had to be selected increased from 42% to 60% and from 29% to 62%, respectively. 
This does not only strengthen our case in favour of utilizing all proposed asymmetric 
models to obtain the optimal pass-through model but will also have an impact on the 
interim multipliers
12 which are now dependent on the direction and size of the market 
interest rate shock. It should be noted that the asymmetries in direction and responses to 
the size of the interest rate shocks as they are reported in Tables 2 and 3 are qualitatively 
                                                            
12 Recall that the long-run multipliers are either determined by the cointegration regression or in the case of 
no cointegration by a standard symmetric pass-through model.   19 
different from the notion of asymmetry used in the TAR modelling. Specifically, in these 
models asymmetry is defined as a state-dependent error correction process when interest 
rates deviate from their long-run equilibrium relationship. Depending on the type of 
interest shock, this may or may not have a quantitatively important impact on the interim 
multiplier.
13  
In Tables 2 and 3, asymmetries regarding the direction of the shocks are 
illustrated by dividing the multipliers for the positive 1% shock by the multiplier for the 
negative 1% shock. Deviations from 1 indicate asymmetries. For example a ratio of 1.1 
for the 3-months multiplier implies that after 3 months the impact of a positive shock on 
retail rates is 10% higher than that of a negative shock. Thus, at a given time retail rates 
adjust faster to a positive than to a negative shock of the same size. It should, however, be 
recalled that these data are averages and as such primarily reported for illustrative 
reasons, as they could easily be misinterpreted. For example, with some countries being 
faster in upward adjustments and others in downward adjustments, the average would 
still be 1. In such cases, only the high standard deviation can reveal the asymmetric 
pattern, which will therefore also be reported. 
For example, while on average the adjustment of all lending rates appears to have 
become slightly more asymmetric in the post-break period, this result is primarily driven 
by developments in the mortgage and short-term corporate loan markets. The reaction of 
short-term corporate loan rate shows the interesting result that the earlier near symmetry 
has been replaced by a relatively faster reaction to positive shocks, independent of 
whether these shocks are measured by the monetary policy or cost of funds proxy. Given 
that in this area the pass-through was found to be most efficient, one interpretation could 
be that short-term lending is hardly characterized by credit rationing. For mortgages, the 
reaction to monetary policy rate shocks appears on average almost symmetric, but 
looking at individual country results reveals a large number of cases with a relatively 
faster downward adjustment. Interestingly, the opposite is found when using the cost of 
funds proxy where we find four countries for which upward adjustment is relatively 
faster. In sum, it appears that there is no common form of asymmetry – rather,  
                                                            
13 Based on the fact that most of our interim multipliers are smaller than 1, we can indeed interpret a 
positive interest rate shock with a negative ECT and thus a below-equilibrium state. Thus, the two types of 
asymmetry are somewhat comparable. Table 2: Asymmetries in the Pass-Through Process for the Monetary Policy Approach
retail rates period statistic impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths long-run 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths
all pre average 0.20 0.31 0.42 0.49 0.53 0.56 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
std dev 0.17 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.32 0.00 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.06
post average 0.20 0.37 0.48 0.53 0.54 0.57 1.00 1.01 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
std dev 0.17 0.28 0.31 0.33 0.36 0.38 0.00 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.06
all lending pre average 0.20 0.33 0.46 0.54 0.58 0.62 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.00
std dev 0.15 0.23 0.31 0.33 0.34 0.35 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.03 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01
post average 0.22 0.43 0.56 0.62 0.65 0.68 1.00 1.02 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.15 0.26 0.30 0.31 0.34 0.37 0.00 0.16 0.13 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.01
all deposit pre average 0.20 0.28 0.38 0.43 0.46 0.47 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
std dev 0.20 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.09
post average 0.17 0.27 0.35 0.38 0.38 0.40 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99
std dev 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.00 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.09 0.09
2 pre average 0.14 0.22 0.32 0.43 0.52 0.54 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.00
std dev 0.12 0.19 0.26 0.32 0.39 0.34 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.01
post average 0.21 0.45 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.62 1.00 0.97 0.95 0.96 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00
std dev 0.18 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.32 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.08 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.01
3 pre average 0.16 0.27 0.36 0.42 0.46 0.63 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.13 0.24 0.30 0.34 0.35 0.51 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
post average 0.17 0.37 0.49 0.55 0.56 0.60 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.00
std dev 0.12 0.33 0.43 0.51 0.54 0.53 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.00
4 pre average 0.24 0.43 0.58 0.68 0.71 0.74 1.00 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.16 0.22 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.00 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.00
post average 0.24 0.46 0.67 0.77 0.84 0.87 1.00 1.08 1.05 1.03 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.15 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.27 0.36 0.00 0.24 0.19 0.09 0.00 0.06 0.07 0.02
5 pre average 0.22 0.32 0.44 0.49 0.50 0.51 1.00 0.94 0.96 0.97 1.00 1.01 1.01 0.99
std dev 0.19 0.25 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.19 0.15 0.05 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.05
post average 0.24 0.38 0.42 0.46 0.49 0.50 1.00 0.96 0.97 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.98 1.00
std dev 0.14 0.28 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.01
7 pre average 0.06 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.21 0.23 1.00 0.91 0.92 0.96 1.00 1.05 1.03 1.02
std dev 0.08 0.13 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.21 0.14 0.07 0.00 0.11 0.07 0.05
post average 0.04 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.23 0.22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.08 0.14 0.22 0.29 0.32 0.32 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
8 pre average 0.28 0.39 0.52 0.60 0.64 0.64 1.00 0.99 0.97 0.96 1.00 0.97 0.96 0.96
std dev 0.23 0.25 0.21 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.00 0.05 0.09 0.12 0.00 0.10 0.12 0.12
post average 0.26 0.40 0.50 0.53 0.53 0.57 1.00 0.96 0.94 0.94 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.97
std dev 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.31 0.00 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.00 0.11 0.13 0.13
9 pre average 0.14 0.20 0.27 0.30 0.31 0.33 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
post average 0.11 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01
std dev 0.13 0.24 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.02
Note: Asymmetries in multipliers are defined as the multiplier for a +1% change divided by the multiplier for the -1% or +0.25% change respectively.
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multipliers for a +1% change in the monetary policy rate
asymmetries in multipliers
+1% versus -1% shock +1% versus +0.25% shockTable 3: Asymmetries in the Pass-Through Process for the Cost of Funds Approach
retail rates period statistic impact 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths long-run 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths 1 mth 3 mths 6 mths 12 mths
all pre average 0.33 0.43 0.55 0.61 0.63 0.65 1.00 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01 1.01
std dev 0.29 0.25 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.05
post average 0.33 0.42 0.53 0.58 0.60 0.60 1.00 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.00 1.04 1.05 1.06
std dev 0.31 0.27 0.30 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.00 0.12 0.17 0.20 0.00 0.17 0.30 0.37
all lending pre average 0.31 0.46 0.60 0.69 0.72 0.73 1.00 1.00 1.02 1.03 1.00 1.00 1.01 1.01
std dev 0.19 0.25 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.33 0.00 0.09 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.05
post average 0.33 0.45 0.60 0.66 0.71 0.69 1.00 1.05 1.06 1.06 1.00 1.04 1.08 1.10
std dev 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.00 0.13 0.21 0.26 0.00 0.21 0.39 0.47
all deposit pre average 0.35 0.39 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.54 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.95 1.00 1.02 1.01 1.00
std dev 0.39 0.26 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.00 0.04 0.33 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.05 0.04
post average 0.34 0.39 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.47 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.00 1.03 1.01 1.00
std dev 0.40 0.33 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.35 0.00 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.07 0.05
2 pre average 0.24 0.37 0.54 0.59 0.66 0.60 1.00 1.04 1.10 1.13 1.00 0.98 1.02 1.03
std dev 0.21 0.31 0.41 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.00 0.15 0.35 0.45 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.09
post average 0.22 0.31 0.43 0.55 0.67 0.65 1.00 1.06 1.12 1.15 1.00 1.00 1.03 1.04
std dev 0.20 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.44 0.44 0.00 0.15 0.34 0.44 0.00 0.08 0.06 0.09
3 pre average 0.32 0.47 0.43 0.58 0.61 0.63 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.36 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
post average 0.20 0.32 0.46 0.54 0.56 0.56 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.09 0.15 0.22 0.30 0.34 0.35 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
4 pre average 0.33 0.52 0.71 0.81 0.85 0.91 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.97 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.01
std dev 0.17 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
post average 0.42 0.55 0.73 0.75 0.77 0.72 1.00 0.11 1.08 1.07 1.00 1.11 1.20 1.24
std dev 0.26 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.20 0.00 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.00 0.34 0.65 0.80
5 pre average 0.39 0.45 0.62 0.71 0.69 0.67 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.22 0.18 0.20 0.23 0.20 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
post average 0.44 0.53 0.71 0.75 0.77 0.76 1.00 1.06 1.01 0.99 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.01
std dev 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.28 0.00 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.03
7 pre average 0.10 0.17 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
post average 0.10 0.18 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.28 1.00 0.97 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.10 0.16 0.20 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.10
8 pre average 0.51 0.50 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.70 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.98 1.00 1.04 1.01 1.01
std dev 0.44 0.20 0.27 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.06
post average 0.50 0.54 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.66 1.00 1.01 1.00 0.97 1.00 1.05 1.03 1.00
std dev 0.47 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.00 0.11 0.09 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.10 0.07
9 pre average 0.17 0.25 0.32 0.33 0.35 0.37 1.00 0.99 0.73 0.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.16 0.21 0.21 0.28 0.29 0.26 0.00 0.05 0.66 0.25 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
post average 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 1.00 1.01 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
std dev 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
Note: Asymmetries in multipliers are defined as the multiplier for a +1% change divided by the multiplier for the -1% or +0.25% change respectively.
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multipliers for a +1% change in the cost of funds rate
asymmetries in multipliers
+1% versus -1% shock +1% versus +0.25% shock  22 
asymmetries may depend on specific patterns and circumstances, which require further 
investigation. 
A second type of asymmetry reflects the impact of large versus small shocks onto 
retail interest rates as measured by the multipliers. The last columns of Tables 2 and 3 
give the relative multiplier for a large +1% versus a small +0.25% interest rate shock. 
Thus a coefficient larger than 1 implies that the rate under investigation reacts more 
strongly to large interest rate shocks. While the overall picture is one of symmetry, we 
directly highlight the impact on mortgage and short-term corporate loan rates. Here, the 
size of the monetary policy interest rate shocks does not matter unless it alters the cost of 
funds where large increases tend to be passed on faster than small ones. This result could 
well be in line with the menu cost argument.  
 
4.3. Pass-Through and European Banking Market Integration 
Pass-through studies are increasingly regarded as important for assessing the 
degree of financial integration in the Eurozone banking market. Although retail interest 
rates have been somewhat converging, this is not necessarily an indication of an 
integrated market as argued for example by the European Commission’s Economic and 
Financial Committee in a special report (2002) and in a recent ECB study by Cabral, 
Dierick, and Vesala (2002). Kleimeier and Sander (2002, 2003) have shown that 
Eurozone retail banking markets are still not integrated when cointegration is considered 
as an integration indicator. In the context of the present study, we re-investigated the 
Kleimeier-Sander proposition on integration of retail banking markets by calculating the 
coefficient of variation for multiplier across countries for major retail interest rates. 
Figure 2 presents a visualisation of this analysis, which generally is supporting the “No –
No – Maybe” proposition with respect to the integration of mortgage, consumer lending, 
and short-term corporate lending markets.  
Mortgage and consumer lending rates show a highly heterogeneous response to 
monetary policy and cost of funds rate. For consumer lending rates, the response to 
monetary policy rates is, however, most heterogeneous and shows even signs of 
increasing heterogeneity. In line with the increasing signs for a more integrated short-
term corporate lending market, the pass-through is not only the fastest - as discussed in 
the  previous  sections  -  but  also  the  by  far  most  homogeneous  one.  Moreover,  this  Figure 2: Cross Country Variations in the Pass-Through Process
Panel A: Monetary Policy Approach Panel B: Cost of Funds Approach
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homogeneity is increasing even further in the post-break period. Although improvements 
in the latter sense are also visible for longer-term corporate loans, the heterogeneity with 
respect to monetary policy impulses is still higher than for short-term loans. However a 
more homogeneous picture is conveyed when using the cost of funds approach.  
 
5. Analysis of the Pass-Through Determinants  
According to the pioneering paper by Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) five groups 
of determinants of lending rate stickiness can be identified: competition within the 
banking system, extent of money market development, openness of the economy, 
banking system ownership, and degree of development of the financial system. 
Additionally control variables including macro control variables such as inflation rates 
are also incorporated. Following up on this paper, Mojon (2000) advocates for a 
European context to focus on four determinants: (1) the monetary policy regime, the 
competitive environment of banks, as measured by (2) competition in banking and (3) 
competition from direct finance, and (4) rigidity of bank costs. 
For our study, we therefore include both, macro-economic determinants and 
control variables, and variables describing the banking market. First, regarding macro-
economic determinants, it has long been advocated that money market rate volatility is a 
key determinant for bank interest rate margins (Saunders and Schumacher, 2000) and the 
pass-through (Cottarelli and Kourelis 1994, Mojon 2000, de Bondt, Mojon and Valla 
2002). As a first impression, Figure 3 compares the average pre- and post-break money 
market rate volatility and 3-months multiplier for all countries and selected retail interest 
rates. Whereas there appears to be a tendency of lower volatility to coincide with a faster 
pass-through with respect to the monetary policy approach, the evidence for the cost of 
funds approach is not clear as a number of multipliers have decreased in size over time. 
In particular for the monetary policy approach, this variable is thus considered to be 
important in “producing” convergence by means of a single monetary policy. Further 
macro-economic control variables used are structural inflation, economic growth, and 
financial development. Financial development is typically measured by a ratio of 
financial assets or liabilities to GDP with the view that the higher the ratio, the higher the 
degree of financial system development, and thus leading to a faster pass-through. The 
two,  most  common measures of financial  development are broad money to GDP, which  Figure 3: The Impact of Money Market Volatility On Interest-Rate Passthrough
Panel A: Monetary Policy Approach
Panel B: Cost of Funds Approach
For each series the first and second (blue) bar represent average standard deviations of the money market rate whereas the third and fourth (red) bars indicate average 3-
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is supposed to reflect financial deepening on the asset side, and private credit to GDP, 
which is the most comprehensive indicator of financial activities of intermediaries. The 
latter variable has also often be used in studies investigating the financial development-
economic growth link (see e.g. Levine et. al. 2000).  
Secondly, we have collected a large number of variables describing the financial 
structure of the Eurozone. A first subset of indicators is addressing the market structure 
and includes size and concentration variables for total bank assets and specifically for 
loans and deposits. A second subset provides data on bank profitability and bank health 
such as return on assets, net interest margin, loan provisions and operating cost. The third 
subset collects data that provides information about the availability of alternative finance, 
and a fourth subset focuses on indicators of foreign bank activities.  
In preliminary investigations it has become clear that a variety of these variables 
are able to explain parts of the pass-through mechanism. This is, however, only true for 
the monetary policy approach on which we will therefore focus in the following
14. 
Nevertheless also for this approach – as typical for cross-section studies - the overall fit 
of the regression is often lower than the correlation between some explanatory variables, 
thus leading to multicollinearity problems. Instead of using too highly correlated 
individual variables, we have therefore opted to develop a composite indicator, which 
captures the most important determinants. Based a number of exploratory regressions and 
following the theoretical and empirical work by Cecchetti (1999) and Kashyap and Stein 
(1997), we compose the indicator out of 4 dimensions: Internal competition, alternative 
finance, bank health, and importance of small banks. As Kashyap and Stein (1997) argue, 
small unhealthy banks are more heavily effected by monetary policy shocks. For 
example, after a monetary tightening large and healthy banks could react by turning to 
non-deposit financing in the capital market while the loan supply curve of small and less 
credit-worthy banks will shift leftwards. Whether this will lead to a fast increase in 
lending rates depends on both, the elasticity of the loan demand curve and the degree of 
lending rate stickiness or credit rationing in the credit market. For any given monetary 
shock, the less elastic the demand for loans, i.e. the less alternative finance is available, 
                                                            
14 Two further arguments favour this focus on the monetary policy approach over the cost of funds 
approach: First, as argued earlier, the retail interest rates across Europe are very heterogeneous, i.e. with 
respect to the maturity structure of the loans or deposits. Thus selecting a common cost of funds rates   27 
the larger will be the increase in lending rates. This contradicts the view that more 
alternative finance – such as high stock market capitalization  - will lead to a more 
competitive banking market and thus faster pass-through. In fact, it appears that our 
indicators for the availability of alternative finance are negatively correlated with the 
pass-through multipliers thus supporting the loan demand-side view. Against this 
background, we hypothesise that monetary policy is most effective in an environment 
with high competition, small and unhealthy banks, and limited availability of alternative 
finance (at least for the categories of loans investigated here). To measure this effect, we 
define our composite index “effectiveness” as follows: 
 
effectiveness = (internal competition + alternative finance + bank size and health) / 3 
with 
internal competition = (CR5assets + Herfindahlloans ) / 2 
alternative finance = (publicly traded firms + stock market capitalization + 
                                             intermediated liabilities) / 3 
bank size and health = (loan provisions + operating cost + number of banks) / 3 
 
For building the index each included variable was transformed into an index number 
ranging from 0 to 1 with 1 indicating the highest expected impact on the pass-through 
multipliers. To properly account for our hypothesis developed above, the index has to 
either proportionally or inversely reflect the size of the variable. For example, a high 
concentration ratio results in a low index number but a low market capitalization results 
in a high index number.  
Furthermore, for external competition we have constructed an index, which is 
composed out of the number of foreign bank branches, and subsidiaries plus the share of 
non-resident intermediated liabilities (loans).  
  For investigating the Cecchetti hypothesis that the legal system is an important 
determinant of monetary policy effectiveness which may obstruct the convergence 
process in the Eurozone, we also use the legal family dummies provided by Cecchetti 
(1999), in particular a dummy for the German legal system (used for Austria and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
common to countries will be rather arbitrary. Second, as the pass-through analysis has shown, the monetary 
policy rate appears to be more important for the transmission of monetary policy than the cost of funds rate.   28 
Germany), for the Scandinavian legal system (used for Finland), and for the English legal 
system (used for Ireland). Finally, to investigate differential effect across lending 
markets, we also include dummies for individual lending rates, in paricular N2 (mortgage 
rates), N3 (rates on consumer loan) and N5 (rates on long-term loans to enterprises), thus 
using N4 (rates on short and medium term loans to enterprises) as a benchmark.  
  Table 4 summarizes the results of our analysis of structural determinants of the 
interest rate pass-through of monetary policy. We report the impact of the independent 
variables on a series of multipliers for different types of monetary policy shocks on 
lending rates. Overall, our composite index of effectiveness has the expected positive 
sign and is highly significant for all multipliers except the impact multiplier. It also 
appears that the role of our effectiveness index is becoming more important in the first 
months of the pass-through process. To get an idea about the workings of this index, note 
that its average value is 0.35 and that it ranges from 0.18 to 0.65. Thus, a gain of 0.10 in 
the index will typically lead to an increase in the interim multipliers of about 0.20. We 
tried this indicator in a variety of specifications and the reported result appears to be quite 
robust. As far as external competition is concerned, the parameter has the wrong sign but 
is also practically not statistically significant.  
With respect to the macro-economic determinants and controls, we can confirm 
the positive role of reduced money market rate volatility on particularly the speed of the 
pass-through with this variable being especially relevant in the first six months of the 
pass-through process. A similar observation can be made for structural inflation: The 
higher the inflation, the slower the pass-through in the first six months. During this time, 
economic growth seems of no importance. However, in the longer term, higher growth is 
positively related to the pass-through. Financial development, when measured by the 
share of private credit in GDP, plays a positive role for the pass-through process, but on a 
statistically significant level on in the first few months. 
While the overall results are generally supporting the view that nominal, real, and 
structural convergence could go some way towards a more uniform pass-through process, 
the inclusion of the legal system dummies confirms the Cecchetti-proposition that “unless 
legal structures are harmonized across Europe, financial structures will remain diverse, 
and so will monetary transmission mechanisms.” In particular, the dummy for the 
German  legal system  shows a  highly significant  negative effect on the pass-through for Table 4: Structural Determinants of the Interest-Rate Pass-Through for Retail Lending Rates


























Macroeconomic determinants and controls
money market rate volatility -0.082 -0.156 -0.156 -0.156 -0.180 -0.165 -0.180 -0.137 -0.134 -0.137 -0.084 -0.099 -0.084 -0.057
-2.355 -3.000 -3.000 -3.000 -3.030 -2.640 -3.030 -2.156 -2.080 -2.156 -1.205 -1.372 -1.205 -0.802
structural inflation -0.050 -0.061 -0.061 -0.061 -0.076 -0.093 -0.076 -0.066 -0.072 -0.066 -0.047 -0.048 -0.047 -0.070
-2.192 -1.792 -1.792 -1.792 -1.947 -2.272 -1.947 -1.592 -1.696 -1.592 -1.024 -1.024 -1.024 -1.498
growth -0.011 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.043 0.060 0.043 0.094 0.108 0.094 0.139 0.135 0.139 0.176
-0.400 0.162 0.162 0.162 0.925 1.211 0.925 1.876 2.125 1.876 2.526 2.388 2.526 3.137
financial development 0.055 0.571 0.571 0.571 0.528 0.568 0.528 0.387 0.473 0.387 0.331 0.405 0.331 0.517
0.397 2.763 2.763 2.763 2.242 2.281 2.242 1.538 1.842 1.538 1.193 1.418 1.193 1.825
Banking market structure indicators 
composite index of "effectiveness" 0.584 2.089 2.089 2.089 2.370 2.250 2.370 2.175 2.232 2.175 1.948 1.963 1.948 2.502
1.313 3.156 3.156 3.156 3.140 2.821 3.140 2.696 2.712 2.696 2.192 2.144 2.192 2.755
external competition -0.561 -0.315 -0.315 -0.315 -0.861 -0.997 -0.861 -0.924 -0.916 -0.924 -0.797 -0.841 -0.797 -0.846
-1.782 -0.673 -0.673 -0.673 -1.613 -1.767 -1.613 -1.619 -1.574 -1.619 -1.267 -1.298 -1.267 -1.318
Dummies for legal systems
German system -0.334 -0.841 -0.841 -0.841 -1.008 -1.016 -1.008 -0.921 -0.951 -0.921 -0.810 -0.850 -0.810 -0.979
-2.629 -4.449 -4.449 -4.449 -4.677 -4.460 -4.677 -3.996 -4.045 -3.996 -3.192 -3.252 -3.192 -3.774
Scandinavian system -0.238 -0.207 -0.207 -0.207 -0.365 -0.443 -0.365 -0.451 -0.476 -0.451 -0.419 -0.422 -0.419 -0.210
-1.955 -1.141 -1.141 -1.141 -1.762 -2.027 -1.762 -2.042 -2.108 -2.042 -1.719 -1.681 -1.719 -0.844
English system 0.587 0.536 0.536 0.536 0.662 0.599 0.662 0.338 0.239 0.338 -0.091 -0.045 -0.091 -0.206
2.115 1.299 1.299 1.299 1.407 1.205 1.407 0.672 0.465 0.672 -0.164 -0.079 -0.164 -0.364
Dummies for retail interest rates
N2 - mortgage rates -0.073 -0.155 -0.155 -0.155 -0.241 -0.242 -0.241 -0.264 -0.248 -0.264 -0.268 -0.255 -0.268 -0.301
-1.617 -2.323 -2.323 -2.323 -3.172 -3.009 -3.172 -3.246 -2.987 -3.246 -2.997 -2.759 -2.997 -3.290
N3 - consumer lending rates -0.041 -0.068 -0.068 -0.068 -0.141 -0.162 -0.141 -0.168 -0.166 -0.168 -0.207 -0.192 -0.207 -0.177
-0.774 -0.856 -0.856 -0.856 -1.557 -1.694 -1.557 -1.739 -1.682 -1.739 -1.937 -1.750 -1.937 -1.628
N5 - medium and long-term loans to enterprises -0.016 -0.122 -0.122 -0.122 -0.199 -0.184 -0.199 -0.215 -0.192 -0.215 -0.223 -0.207 -0.223 -0.265
-0.305 -1.601 -1.601 -1.601 -2.276 -1.997 -2.276 -2.304 -2.023 -2.304 -2.173 -1.960 -2.173 -2.523
constant 0.459 -0.164 -0.164 -0.164 0.123 0.178 0.123 0.214 0.109 0.214 0.125 0.106 0.125 -0.214
1.391 -0.334 -0.334 -0.334 0.219 0.301 0.219 0.358 0.179 0.358 0.191 0.156 0.191 -0.318
adjusted R





Note: The table reports the results of an OLS regression on a sample of 65 observations. The reported numbers for each variable represent in the top row the estimated coefficients and in the second row,
the corresponding t-statistic in italics.
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all types of multipliers and shocks. Moreover, some lending rates show a significantly 
lower pass-through independent of all structural determinants, thus reflecting a certain 
immunity, particularly of mortgages and long-term corporate loan rates, against structural 
changes.  
Regarding asymmetries, we find them present but not dramatic. For example, for 
the three months multiplier, the coefficient of the effectiveness index is lower for the 
negative and for the small shock, suggesting slower pass-through under these 
circumstances. It is also interesting to note that the German legal dummy is somewhat 
more negative in the case of interest rate reduction, also indicating a lower pass-through. 
 
6. Conclusions and Outlook 
The objective of is study is to contribute to a more uniform analysis of the 
Eurozone pass-through process. While we believe that our results go some way in 
unifying the Eurozone pass-through research, it is still necessary to realize that the 
database is still limited and very heterogeneous, both across countries and within the 
individual interest rate categories, often comprising fixed term loans of various maturities 
with flexible rate loans into one category. As the database expands and improves, results 
following the proposed approach should become more reliable and eventually converge. 
With these reservations in mind, our study makes a number of contributions to the 
literature. 
First, we have argued that many differences in the result of pass-through studies 
could be reconciled if the timing of structural breaks would be endogenously determined 
rather than postulated. In particular, setting the breakpoint equal with the introduction no 
the single currency could be misleading. Rather, in quite some cases, structural breaks 
come much earlier. On the one hand this has the important consequence that the database 
is longer and that the results are thus becoming more reliable. On the other hand, the 
well-known fact that reduced money market rate volatility will lead to a more speedy 
pass-through may explain the structural changes – at least for some countries – better 
than some mysterious “EMU effect”. Second, we find it important to distinguish clearly 
between approaches that focus on the pass-through of monetary policy shocks as 
measured by the overnight money market rate and between industrial organization-
inspired approaches that use a measure of cost of funds. Third, we have conducted both   31 
types of analysis by always selecting an optimal pass-through model for all sub-periods 
and all national retail interest rates. Forth, while we are able to confirm the results of 
previous studies that report increases in size and speed of the pass-through, we show that 
these findings, however, do not hold unanimously when using the cost of funds approach. 
In other words, while there are some indications for an increase in monetary policy 
efficiency in the Eurozone, the conclusions of cost of funds-based studies that relate an 
increase in pass-through to an increase in competition are not generally supported here. 
Fifth, by identifying a number of banking markets with a less than perfect long-run pass-
through, our results also indicate that credit rationing has remained an important feature 
in European retail banking. Sixth, when using pass-through measures as an indicator for 
Eurozone banking market integration, the view that the markets are still fragmented is 
supported, with the eventual exemption of lending to enterprises. Finally, our analysis of 
the structural determinants of the pass-through process reveals that on the one hand some 
convergence can be achieved by means of nominal, real, and structural convergence. 
Nevertheless, legal and cultural differences may preclude full convergence. 
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Appendix A: Methodology
15  
Our analysis starts with an estimation of the degree of integration I(d) for each 
interest rate series. Note that if a structural break at an a priori unknown point in time is 
present in a time series, standard unit root tests proposed by Engle and Granger (1987) 
have very little power. Banerjee, Lumsdaine, and Stock (1992) propose better specified 
test statistics, which are consistent even in the presence of structural breaks. These will 
additional be employed here for the full sample period whereas the standard unit root 
tests are applied to the pre- and post-break period only. 
Standard unit root tests can be conducted as F or t-tests based on regressions on 
levels as well as first differences of the underlying interest rate series. Both regressions 
include next to lagged observations of the interest rate y in question also a trend variable 
T: 
(Α1)    ∆yt = a + b yt-1 + c ∆yt-1 + d T + εt 
(Α2)    ∆2yt = a + b ∆yt-1 + c ∆2yt-1  + d T + εt 
The null hypothesis states that the series follow random walks. For the t-statistic, this 
corresponds to a null hypothesis of H0: b=0 and for the F-statistic to a null hypothesis of 
H0: b=d=0. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of a random walk if the calculated t or F 
values are smaller in absolute terms than the critical values.  
Tests, which are well specified even in the presence of a structural break include 
recursive tests, sequential mean or sequential trend shift tests. Based on equations (A1) 
and (A2), recursive minimum τ-statistics can be calculated in order to test the null-
hypothesis of b=0. This unit root test is based on a series of sub-samples which comprise 
data from t = 1 to k, t = 1 to k+1, until t = 1 to T with k equal to one quarter of the total 
sample. The recursive min-τ is found as the smallest t(k/T) over all sub-samples. To 
reject the null-hypothesis, the calculated min τ-value which has to be smaller than the 
critical value. 
Furthermore, sequential unit root tests that distinguish between a shift in the mean 
or the trend of a series can be calculated based on the following regressions for levels and 
first differences: 
                                                            
15 This section draws heavily on Sander and Kleimeier (2002). 
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(Α3)    ∆yt = a + b yt-1 + c ∆yt-1 + d T + f D + εt 
(Α4)    ∆2yt = a + b ∆yt-1 + c ∆2yt-1  + d T + f D+ εt 
where D indicates a dummy variable. For the mean-shift tests, D is coded as 1 if t > k and 
0 otherwise. For the trend-shift tests, D is coded as t if t > k and 0 otherwise. Here, both 
minimum τ-tests regarding H0: b=0 and maximum F-tests regarding H0: b=d=0 can be 
calculated and compared to the critical values. In particular, a series of regressions is run 
on the full sample where k is chosen to move through the mid-80% of the total sample. 
Similar to the recursive test, a minimum τ-value is calculated as the smallest t(k/T) over 
all sub-samples. 
Regarding the determination of the presence and timing of a structural break in 
the long-run relationship of equation (4), we estimate a supremum F (supF) test as first 
proposed by Quandt (1960) and recently investigated by Andrews (1993), Diebold and 
Chen (1996) and Hansen (1992). This test can be interpreted as a rolling test where 
standard Chow tests are conducted for a series of different break points b, which move 
through the mid-80% of the sample. SupF equals the largest Chow F-statistic and is 
compared to critical values as reported by Hansen (1992). The sequence of F-statistics 
can give an indication about the timing of the break. If a break is present, the 
cointegration and pass-through analysis is conducted for the pre- and post-break period 
separately. 
For the symmetric pass-through model, cointegration is based on the Durbin-
Watson (DW), Dickey-Fuller (DF) and augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) testing 
procedures. Note that in the presence of a structural break, these standard cointegration 
tests have low power, i.e. the rejection frequency of the ADF test is clearly reduced (e.g. 
Gregory et al., 1996). Thus, the endogenous estimation of the timing of the structural 
break is clearly of importance as an exogenously determined break can lead to incorrect 
conclusions regarding cointegration. In particular, the DF tests are based on the estimated 
residuals of the cointegration regression of equation (4).  To do so, equation (A5) needs 
to be estimated  
(A5)        ∆ut =  -δ0 ut-1 + εt 
where the t-statistic for the estimated coefficient δ 0 provides an indication regarding the 









1 0 ) 6 (  
where the optimal lag length c* is found based on the minimum Akaike information 
criterion (AIC) criteria with a maximum of four lags. 
  For the asymmetric models, cointegration tests are based on modifications of the 
ADF test. For the TAR
0 model, an appropriate test procedure is to set a Heaviside 
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Using this definition, we test for cointegration by estimating equation (A8), which 
represents a modification of the ADF test. The null of no cointegration is rejected if the 
estimated F-statistic for H0: ρ1 = ρ2 = 0 is significant based on critical values provided by 
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with the optimal lag length m* determined via the minimum AIC criteria for models with 
up to 4 lags. When cointegration is established, an F-test for equality of ρ1 and ρ2 
indicates the presence of asymmetry. 
  For the TAR* model, the Heaviside indicator in conjunction with equation (A8)
16 






















Following Chan’s (1993), the optimal threshold a0* is found by searching over the mid-
80% of the distribution of ut and selecting the model for which the residual sum of 
squares is minimized. Cointegration and asymmetry testing proceeds with the above 
described F-tests. 
  For the B-TAR* model, the Heaviside indicator is now defined as  
                                                            
16 For both, the TAR* and the following B-TAR* model, the optimal lag length m* of the TAR
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Procedures for optimal lag length m* and optimal threshold a0* are corresponding to 
those of the TAR* and the F-tests for cointegration and asymmetry are applied to all 
three coefficients ρj. 
  Finally, Enders and Granger (1998) propose an M-TAR model where the 
Heaviside indicator depends as follows on the change in error correction term, ∆ut. 
Similar to the TAR
0 and TAR* specifications, M-TAR model can either be estimated 
with a threshold a0 = 0 leading to the M-TAR
0 specification or be optimised at a0 = a0* > 
0 leading to the M-TAR* specification.
17 The Heaviside indicator in conjunction with 





















                                                            
17 When optimising the threshold in the M-TAR* model, the optimal lag length m* from the M-TAR
0 is 
used. Appendix B: Results of the Monetary Policy Approach variables source calculation
macro-economic variables
money market rate volatility Datastream's overnight money market rates and IMF's IFS line 60b for Germany, 
the Netherlands and Portugal
standard deviation of monthly rate for retail-rate- and country-
specific period
structural inflation IFS line 64 for CPI % change over corresponding period of previous year average inflation rate as % p.a. for retail rate- and country-
specific period 
growth Eurostat average annual growth rate of real GDP for retail-rate- and 
country-specific period
GDP IFS: line 99B for GDP, line 99Z for population average annual GDP per capita for retail-rate- and country-
specific period: 99b / 99z
broad money to GDP IFS: line 34a for currency in circulation , line 34b for demand deposits, line 35 for 
other deposits; line 99b for GDP
broad money / GDP = (34a+34b+35) / 99b
bank loans to GDP IFS: line 22d for bank loans to private sector, line 99b for GDP credit / GDP = 22d / 99b
internal competition variables
number of banks per 1m inhabitants ECB (Dec 2000) table 3.1
CR5 total asset share of 5 largest credit institutions ECB (Dec 2000) table 2.1 and ECB (Nov 2002) table 6 for 1995-1996: ECB (Dec 2000), for 1997-1999: average 
ECB (Dec 2000) and (Nov 2002), and for 2000-2001: ECB 
(Nov 2002)
Herfindahl index total asset ECB (Dec 2000) table 2.1 and ECB (Nov 2002) table 6 for 1995-1996: ECB (Dec 2000), for 1997-1999: average 
ECB (Dec 2000) and (Nov 2002), and for 2000-2001: ECB 
(Nov 2002)
Herfindahl index total loans ECB (Dec 2000) table 2.4
Herfindahl index total deposits ECB (Dec 2000) table 2.6
alternative finance variables
number of publically traded firms per 1m inhabitants ECB (Nov 2002) table 4.2, IFS line 99z for population
market capitalization of listed shares per GDP (*1000) ECB (Nov 2002) table 4.2, IFS line 99z for population
intermediated assets (deposits) of households and firms as percent of total 
intermediated and nonintermediated assets (deposits)
ECB (Nov 2002) table 1 
intermediated liabilities (loans) of households and firms as percent of total 
intermediated and nonintermediated liabilities (loans\)
ECB (Nov 2002) table 1 
bank health and profitability variables
return on assets (net income as % of total assets) SourceOECD Bank Profitability Statistics 7 / (14+15+16+17+18)
loan provisions as % of total assets (year end total) SourceOECD Bank Profitability Statistics, except for Finland where item 8 (net 
provisions) is used
8b / (14+15+16+17+18) 
net interest margin (interest income minus interest expense) as % of total 
assets (year end total)
SourceOECD Bank Profitability Statistics 1-2 / (14+15+16+17+18)
operating cost as % of total assets (year end total) SourceOECD Bank Profitability Statistics 6 / (14+15+16+17+18)
external competition
number of branches and subsidiaries of foreign institutions as percent of total 
banks
ECB (Nov 2002) table 3.2 excluding money market funds
assets of EEA foreign branches as % of GDP ECB (Nov 2002) table 16
assets of EEA foreign subsidiaries as % of GDP ECB (Nov 2002) table 19
assets of EEA foreign branches and subsidiaries as % of GDP ECB (Nov 2002) tables 16, 19
assets of non-EEA foreign branches as % of GDP ECB (Nov 2002) table 22
assets of non-EEA foreign subsidiaries as % of GDP ECB (Nov 2002) table 25
assets of non-EEA foreign branches and subsidiaries as % of GDP ECB (Nov 2002) tables 22, 25
assets of EEA and non-EEA foreign branches and subsidiaries as % of GDP ECB (Nov 2002) tables 16, 19, 22, 25
non-resident intermediated liababilities to total intermediated liabilities ECB (Nov 2002) table 1
non-resident intermediated assets to total intermediated assets ECB (Nov 2002) table 1
legal systems
germanic legal system Cecchetti (1999) dummy equal to 1 for Austria and Germany
scandinavian legal system Cecchetti (1999) dummy equal to 1 for Finland
british legal system Cecchetti (1999) dummy equal to 1 for Ireland
Table B1: Variables used in the structural analysis of the pass-through process Table B2: Monetary Policy Approach - Unit Root Tests Allowing for the Presense of a Structural Break 
mean shift trend shift recursive
country bankrate min  τ (level) min τ (diff) I(?) max F(level) max F(diff) I(?) min τ (level) min τ (diff) I(?) max F(level) max F(diff) I(?) min τ (level) min τ (diff) I(?)
Austria 2 -3.847 -3.267 2 11.780 10.457 2 -3.681 -2.906 2 0.010 10.457 2 -2.287 -3.274 1
3 -3.550 -4.367 1 9.710 21.458 1 -3.640 -4.150 1 5.243 21.458 1 -2.161 -4.632 1
4 -4.148 -3.571 2 12.731 13.122 2 -3.911 -3.236 2 0.010 13.122 2 -2.281 -3.622 1
7 -2.430 -7.039 1 8.738 62.578 1 -2.607 -7.016 1 8.052 62.578 1 -2.548 -7.911 1
8 -3.149 -4.197 1 9.095 18.165 1 -3.303 -3.865 1 0.010 18.165 1 -2.157 -4.262 1
pr -3.420 -6.226 1 12.128 28.798 1 -2.976 -6.185 1 8.346 28.384 1 -3.319 -6.152 0
Belgium 2 -2.418 -5.158 1 9.545 19.570 1 -2.407 -5.163 1 8.646 21.929 1 -1.461 -5.806 1
3 -2.028 -6.448 0 22.716 28.484 0 -1.946 -6.448 1 9.434 32.617 1 -1.970 -7.251 1
4.1 -2.255 -7.221 1 6.110 37.747 1 -2.129 -7.209 1 0.010 37.574 1 -2.177 -7.980 1
4.2 -2.465 -6.406 1 7.275 26.998 1 -2.417 -6.396 1 0.010 27.008 1 -2.421 -7.098 1
5 -2.339 -6.050 1 7.497 26.247 1 -2.473 -6.049 1 7.671 28.313 1 -2.260 -6.829 1
8 -2.582 -6.618 1 8.571 29.804 1 -2.553 -6.611 1 0.010 29.868 1 -2.935 -7.385 0
9 -1.443 -7.093 1 9.663 34.575 1 -1.441 -7.093 1 10.557 36.769 1 -1.616 -7.993 1
pr -2.191 -7.314 1 9.363 34.623 1 -2.129 -7.309 1 0.010 35.652 1 -2.301 -8.150 1
Finland 2 -2.978 -4.369 2 9.462 15.663 2 -2.817 -4.360 1 8.510 15.631 1 -2.727 -4.752 0
3 -2.856 -6.803 1 9.793 32.817 1 -2.741 -6.790 1 9.607 32.965 1 -2.657 -7.501 0
5 -3.375 -7.756 1 11.954 47.262 1 -3.307 -7.747 1 10.390 46.061 1 -3.192 -8.605 0
7 -4.891 -6.979 0 20.915 51.950 0 -4.897 -6.972 0 19.012 38.212 0 -5.724 -7.684 0
8 -3.994 -4.262 0 17.390 22.881 0 -3.998 -4.260 0 17.403 24.778 0 -4.619 -4.770 0
pr -3.106 -9.338 1 9.784 59.202 1 -2.994 -9.330 1 0.010 58.528 1 -3.425 -10.336 0
France 4 -3.083 -7.485 1 11.587 44.349 1 -3.041 -7.474 1 8.853 44.657 1 -2.998 -8.223 0
5 -2.935 -8.087 1 10.667 45.326 1 -3.043 -8.084 1 7.304 50.552 1 -1.831 -8.796 1
8 -4.263 -6.358 0 26.126 29.587 0 -4.120 -6.351 0 20.427 34.645 0 -4.689 -7.069 0
9 -3.333 -6.760 1 11.856 33.172 1 -3.440 -6.760 1 11.990 32.587 1 -2.165 -7.631 1
pr -3.443 -6.270 1 15.724 27.733 1 -3.373 -6.259 0 15.385 30.650 0 -3.749 -6.899 0
Germany 2 -2.799 -4.926 1 10.704 18.062 1 -2.831 -4.929 1 7.374 19.783 1 -2.556 -5.570 1
3 -2.089 -6.313 1 6.486 25.844 1 -2.134 -6.308 1 4.710 28.147 1 -1.329 -6.894 1
4 -3.336 -5.644 1 11.535 24.490 1 -3.000 -5.565 1 4.482 23.959 1 -2.831 -5.131 0
5 -2.071 -3.710 1 4.804 17.963 1 -2.055 -3.711 1 0.010 17.963 1 -2.192 -4.238 1
8.1 -2.780 -5.472 1 8.224 22.376 1 -2.533 -5.409 1 4.632 22.066 1 -2.937 -5.222 0
8.2 -2.742 -5.507 1 7.986 23.465 1 -2.370 -5.478 1 4.202 23.186 1 -2.698 -5.336 0
9.1 -3.290 -5.767 1 10.306 29.210 1 -3.292 -5.746 1 9.779 24.877 1 -3.999 -6.020 0
9.2 -2.705 -4.759 1 8.571 17.488 1 -2.495 -4.739 1 6.606 17.332 1 -2.666 -5.039 0
pr -3.267 -6.365 1 11.338 31.277 1 -2.764 -6.327 1 6.282 30.913 1 -3.232 -6.152 0
Ireland 1 -9.576 -6.228 0 75.824 28.460 0 -9.572 -6.216 0 61.791 26.299 0 -10.685 -6.957 0
2 -7.041 -6.427 0 60.905 28.856 0 -7.039 -6.420 0 49.033 29.753 0 -7.864 -7.286 0
4 -7.171 -6.436 0 47.408 29.206 0 -7.172 -6.427 0 35.329 28.433 0 -8.150 -7.240 0
5 -7.228 -5.427 0 44.244 23.189 0 -7.228 -5.420 0 38.818 21.140 0 -8.228 -6.102 0
6 -3.127 -9.408 1 15.843 60.210 1 -2.674 -9.411 1 7.754 61.728 1 -2.985 -10.701 0
9.1 -20.201 -9.686 0 316.652 65.481 0 -20.195 -9.686 0 359.792 66.501 0 -22.340 -11.005 0
9.2 -16.871 -8.902 0 193.988 58.383 0 -16.863 -8.896 0 186.860 54.533 0 -18.583 -10.137 0
pr -3.993 -6.462 0 25.142 30.055 0 -3.736 -6.458 0 14.301 29.236 0 -4.160 -7.342 0Table B2: Monetary Policy Approach - Unit Root Tests Allowing for the Presense of a Structural Break 
mean shift trend shift recursive
country bankrate min  τ (level) min τ (diff) I(?) max F(level) max F(diff) I(?) min τ (level) min τ (diff) I(?) max F(level) max F(diff) I(?) min τ (level) min τ (diff) I(?)
Italy 2 -2.316 -6.964 1 14.439 36.316 1 -3.476 -6.527 0 20.301 36.316 0 -2.437 -6.026 1
4.1 -1.866 -3.229 2 5.137 10.757 2 -1.874 -3.227 1 5.630 15.392 1 -1.998 -3.683 1
4.2 -1.964 -3.897 2 5.295 14.162 2 -1.974 -3.892 1 6.697 16.667 1 -2.036 -4.440 1
5 -2.344 -6.494 1 11.643 36.953 1 -3.617 -6.221 1 13.163 36.953 1 -2.507 -6.079 1
7 -1.616 -4.651 1 7.372 19.079 1 -1.629 -4.650 1 8.563 24.138 1 -1.400 -5.235 1
8 -2.316 -4.657 1 7.740 22.113 1 -3.169 -4.272 1 7.790 22.113 1 -1.633 -4.702 1
pr -1.562 -6.434 1 5.268 31.543 1 -1.535 -6.431 1 5.452 36.386 1 -1.600 -7.246 1
Netherlands 2 -2.676 -5.184 1 9.884 20.064 1 -2.659 -5.188 1 6.725 20.714 1 -2.473 -5.845 1
4 -3.369 -5.779 1 15.671 24.878 1 -3.234 -5.697 0 14.191 24.852 0 -3.798 -5.459 0
7 -4.043 -7.507 0 25.482 37.614 0 -4.089 -7.509 0 25.715 36.986 0 -3.514 -8.315 0
8.1 -2.434 -4.577 2 10.627 15.548 2 -2.288 -4.573 1 12.605 16.836 1 -2.493 -5.169 1
8.2 -2.150 -4.541 2 6.558 15.848 2 -2.108 -4.544 1 7.295 19.212 1 -2.243 -5.161 1
pr -3.249 -5.394 1 12.524 22.506 1 -2.798 -5.351 1 11.711 22.126 1 -3.331 -5.177 0
Portugal 2 -2.578 -3.857 2 7.818 13.674 2 -2.608 -3.849 2 7.823 12.990 2 -1.504 -4.266 1
3 -2.111 -9.034 1 6.843 62.296 1 -2.118 -9.035 1 5.149 65.541 1 -1.875 -10.191 1
4.1 -2.134 -6.215 1 9.224 30.760 1 -2.631 -6.207 1 10.380 28.977 1 -2.069 -6.952 1
4.2 -2.480 -9.935 1 6.682 72.033 1 -2.858 -9.932 1 6.709 69.327 1 -2.492 -11.172 1
8.1 -2.637 -6.373 1 6.272 28.392 1 -2.732 -6.363 1 6.634 27.782 1 -2.252 -7.045 1
8.2 -2.424 -4.497 1 10.925 16.981 1 -2.498 -4.496 1 10.890 17.149 1 -1.824 -5.062 1
pr -4.001 -10.834 1 14.674 79.978 1 -4.220 -10.832 0 15.550 80.656 0 -3.757 -12.155 0
Spain 2 -2.250 -3.853 2 8.235 14.108 2 -2.260 -3.851 1 8.141 14.130 1 -2.003 -4.201 1
3 -2.040 -8.123 1 9.594 46.920 1 -2.144 -8.121 1 6.328 58.732 1 -1.754 -9.096 1
4 -2.802 -5.783 1 10.325 33.499 1 -2.797 -5.774 1 11.309 30.040 1 -3.039 -6.356 0
5 -2.386 -5.784 1 8.740 26.561 1 -2.512 -5.774 1 8.848 28.817 1 -2.122 -6.343 1
7 -2.546 -4.940 1 7.480 20.993 1 -2.569 -4.917 1 7.575 22.140 1 -1.705 -5.276 1
8 -2.019 -3.780 2 6.283 10.700 2 -2.052 -3.776 1 6.473 13.730 1 -1.821 -4.231 1
pr -2.761 -8.080 1 7.222 45.671 1 -2.756 -8.076 1 7.252 45.262 1 -2.738 -9.022 0
Note: Monetary policy rates are abreviated with "pr". I(?) indicates the degree of integration at the 10% significance level. "level" and "diff" indicate analysis for series in levels and first differences,
respectively. The critical values for 100 observations are as follows: -4.62 (2.5%), -2.88 (5%), -2.57 (10%) for the recursive min τ test; -5.07 (2.5%), -4.80 (5%), -4.54 (10%) for the mean-shift min τ 
test; 20.83 (2.5%), 18.62 (5%), 16.20 (10%) for the mean-shift max F test; -4.76 (2.5%), -4.48 (5%), -4.20 (10%) for the trend-shift min τ test; and 16.30 (5%), 13.64 (10%) for the trend-shift max F
testTable B3: Monetary Policy Approach - Unit Root Tests 
I(?) I(?) I(?) I(?)
country bankrate start end t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5% t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5%
Austria 2 Apr-95 Jul-97 -1.461 -2.769 1 2 3.158 3.947 2 2 -1.266 -3.972 1 1 1.669 7.937 1 1
2 Aug-97 Oct-02 -1.437 -2.558 2 2 1.035 3.298 2 2 -0.812 -4.074 1 1 0.566 8.306 1 1
3 Apr-95 Sep-98 -1.617 -4.406 1 1 3.095 9.742 1 1 -1.728 -4.924 1 1 2.993 12.129 1 1
3 Oct-98 Oct-02 -1.843 -2.641 1 2 1.743 3.494 2 2 -0.633 -3.530 1 1 0.468 6.231 1 2
4 Apr-95 Aug-97 -0.708 -3.297 1 1 3.430 5.655 1 2 -1.260 -4.071 1 1 1.750 8.309 1 1
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 -1.550 -2.931 1 1 1.202 4.297 2 2 -0.802 -4.029 1 1 0.558 8.120 1 1
7 Apr-95 Nov-99 -2.302 -6.199 1 1 2.797 19.223 1 1 -2.192 -5.272 1 1 2.813 13.957 1 1
7 Dec-99 Oct-02 -1.703 -4.341 1 1 1.458 9.518 1 1 -2.162 -3.731 1 1 8.051 6.982 0 0
8 Apr-95 Mar-97 -1.753 -3.892 1 1 1.743 7.857 1 1 -1.479 -3.484 1 1 1.455 6.069 1 2
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 -1.626 -3.362 1 1 1.365 5.800 1 2 -0.832 -4.398 1 1 0.694 9.687 1 1
Belgium 2 Jan-93 May-98 -1.752 -4.435 1 1 1.708 9.840 1 1 -2.081 -6.150 1 1 2.497 18.932 1 1
2 Jun-98 Oct-02 -0.387 -3.542 1 1 0.920 6.402 1 2 -1.076 -3.087 1 1 0.580 4.819 2 2
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 -2.425 -2.700 1 2 3.299 3.682 2 2 -2.591 -4.362 0 1 3.358 9.527 1 1
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 -6.749 -6.864 0 0 24.445 23.566 0 0 -1.574 -4.334 1 1 1.251 9.397 1 1
4.1 Jan-93 Apr-95 -2.943 -4.349 0 0 4.410 9.469 1 1 -2.285 -3.673 1 1 2.612 6.758 1 1
4.1 May-95 Oct-02 -2.858 -5.095 0 1 4.366 13.021 1 1 -2.604 -5.304 0 1 4.032 14.065 1 1
4.2 Jan-93 Dec-94 -2.676 -3.066 0 1 3.591 4.701 2 2 -2.259 -3.335 1 1 2.597 5.596 1 2
4.2 Feb-94 Oct-02 -3.008 -6.077 0 0 8.088 18.493 0 0 -4.254 -5.218 0 0 11.764 13.848 0 0
5 Jan-93 Oct-95 -2.060 -3.758 1 1 2.130 7.324 1 1 -2.534 -4.210 1 1 3.217 8.867 1 1
5 Nov-95 Oct-02 -2.679 -5.217 0 1 3.849 13.634 1 1 -1.644 -4.452 1 1 1.387 9.960 1 1
8 Jan-94 Oct-02 -2.666 -6.274 0 1 4.516 20.020 1 1 -4.409 -5.072 0 0 12.702 13.095 0 0
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 -2.128 -3.972 1 1 2.277 7.894 1 1 -2.591 -4.362 0 1 3.358 9.527 1 1
9 Jan-96 Oct-02 -7.864 -7.655 0 0 35.220 29.304 0 0 -1.574 -4.334 1 1 1.251 9.397 1 1
Finland 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 -2.221 -2.889 1 1 2.516 4.707 2 2 -2.338 -5.660 1 1 3.106 16.024 1 1
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 -1.746 -3.581 1 1 1.637 6.647 1 1 -2.651 -9.073 0 1 3.545 41.161 1 1
3 Jan-93 Sep-96 -2.332 -4.979 1 1 3.020 12.518 1 1 -2.338 -5.660 1 1 3.106 16.024 1 1
3 Oct-96 Oct-02 -1.639 -3.845 1 1 1.344 7.442 1 1 -2.651 -9.073 0 1 3.545 41.161 1 1
5 Jan-93 Jan-96 -2.350 -4.477 1 1 3.409 10.071 1 1 -1.900 -3.191 1 1 1.821 5.588 1 2
5 Feb-96 Oct-02 -2.073 -7.518 1 1 2.342 28.307 1 1 -2.729 -11.193 0 1 3.751 63.005 1 1
7 Jan-93 Feb-97 -3.865 -5.305 0 0 9.905 14.076 0 0 -2.609 -6.314 0 1 3.777 20.030 1 1
7 Mar-97 Oct-02 -2.496 -5.300 1 1 3.253 14.187 1 1 -2.490 -8.522 1 1 3.176 36.370 1 1
8 Jan-93 Aug-97 -2.976 -2.905 0 0 5.295 4.498 2 2 -2.863 -7.511 0 1 4.702 28.211 1 1
8 Sep-97 Oct-02 -2.366 -5.030 1 1 3.166 12.664 1 1 -2.149 -6.503 1 1 2.377 21.146 1 1
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 -2.795 -5.604 0 1 4.697 15.716 1 1 -3.306 -4.966 0 0 6.264 12.334 0 1
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 -2.795 -5.604 0 1 4.697 15.716 1 1 -3.306 -4.966 0 0 6.264 12.334 0 1
5 Jan-93 Mar-97 -2.115 -6.088 1 1 2.644 18.570 1 1 -3.205 -4.805 0 0 5.796 11.550 0 1
5 Apr-97 Oct-02 -2.382 -5.885 1 1 3.597 17.321 1 1 -0.984 -3.335 1 1 0.699 5.566 1 2
8 Jan-93 Oct-02 -4.689 -7.069 0 0 12.958 25.022 0 0 -3.749 -6.899 0 0 8.889 23.821 0 0
9 Jan-93 May-98 -2.161 -5.703 1 1 2.346 16.267 1 1 -3.477 -5.506 0 0 7.362 15.166 0 0
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 -2.589 -5.142 0 1 4.166 13.223 1 1 -0.833 -2.910 1 1 0.525 4.233 2 2
Germany 2 Jan-93 Oct-96 -1.822 -3.340 1 1 1.800 6.020 1 2 -2.572 -6.112 0 1 5.949 18.681 0 1
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 -2.376 -4.249 1 1 2.824 9.091 1 1 -1.397 -4.303 1 1 1.324 9.317 1 1
3 Jan-93 Feb-97 -2.355 -5.034 1 1 2.944 12.669 1 1 -2.287 -6.395 1 1 6.483 20.448 0 1
3 Mar-97 Oct-02 -1.818 -4.382 1 1 2.848 9.614 1 1 -1.353 -4.070 1 1 1.201 8.285 1 1
4 Jan-93 Jul-00 -0.094 -5.515 1 1 14.811 15.278 0 0 -1.288 -7.049 1 1 10.249 24.851 0 0
4 Aug-00 Oct-02 -2.504 -2.546 2 2 3.142 3.853 2 2 -3.018 -2.448 0 0 4.567 3.080 2 2
5 Nov-96 Oct-02 -2.192 -4.238 1 1 2.405 8.982 1 1 -1.395 -4.219 1 1 1.265 8.921 1 1
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 -2.920 -5.495 0 0 8.654 15.121 0 0 -3.050 -6.744 0 0 10.389 22.751 0 0
sample
bank rate short-term policy rateTable B3: Monetary Policy Approach - Unit Root Tests 
I(?) I(?) I(?) I(?)
country bankrate start end t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5% t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5%
sample
bank rate short-term policy rate
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 -1.951 -3.057 1 1 3.586 4.677 2 2 -2.626 -3.628 0 1 6.021 6.587 0 1
8.2 Jan-93 Sep-99 -2.611 -5.663 0 1 6.958 16.042 0 0 -3.050 -6.744 0 0 10.389 22.751 0 0
8.2 Oct-99 Oct-02 -2.571 -3.399 0 1 4.849 5.783 1 2 -2.626 -3.628 0 1 6.021 6.587 0 1
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 -3.082 -5.742 0 0 9.524 16.500 0 0 -3.050 -6.744 0 0 10.389 22.751 0 0
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 -1.900 -2.182 2 2 3.169 2.389 2 2 -2.626 -3.628 0 1 6.021 6.587 0 1
9.2 Jan-93 Oct-95 -2.218 -3.001 1 1 2.639 5.094 2 2 -1.967 -5.333 1 1 4.378 14.253 1 1
9.2 Nov-95 Oct-02 -2.257 -3.740 1 1 2.575 7.155 1 1 -1.978 -4.741 1 1 1.962 11.274 1 1
Ireland 1 Jan-93 Dec-98 -11.041 -5.437 0 0 66.145 15.936 0 0 -4.767 -5.171 0 0 11.667 16.127 0 0
1 Jan-99 Oct-02 -1.087 -3.471 1 1 1.028 6.054 1 2 -1.255 -4.751 1 1 0.790 12.930 1 1
2 Jan-93 Aug-99 -8.653 -6.254 0 0 39.355 21.103 0 0 -3.282 -5.968 0 0 5.543 18.969 0 1
2 Sep-99 Oct-02 -1.467 -3.835 1 1 1.108 7.355 1 1 -1.270 -3.175 1 1 4.766 5.048 2 2
4 Jan-93 Nov-95 -8.927 -4.449 0 0 49.055 11.137 0 0 -4.244 -4.226 0 0 11.166 11.033 0 0
4 Dec-95 Oct-02 -2.043 -4.691 1 1 2.134 11.003 1 1 -1.699 -4.750 1 1 1.449 11.287 1 1
5 Jan-94 Oct-02 -2.558 -4.996 1 1 3.438 12.531 1 1 -1.984 -5.553 1 1 1.975 15.416 1 1
6 Feb-94 Oct-02 -2.088 -5.647 1 1 2.209 15.981 1 1 -1.981 -5.508 1 1 1.969 15.171 1 1
9.1 Jan-94 Oct-02 -5.965 -12.608 0 0 19.570 80.396 0 0 -1.984 -5.553 1 1 1.975 15.416 1 1
9.2 Jan-94 Oct-02 -2.369 -6.358 1 1 2.808 20.295 1 1 -1.984 -5.553 1 1 1.975 15.416 1 1
Italy 2 Jan-95 Dec-97 -2.867 -5.218 0 1 10.246 13.763 0 1 -1.527 -5.351 1 1 1.178 14.705 1 1
2 Jan-98 Oct-02 -2.432 -4.492 1 1 4.865 10.397 1 1 -1.542 -4.536 1 1 1.790 10.322 1 1
4.1 Jan-93 Feb-95 -0.520 -3.869 1 1 5.113 7.580 1 1 -1.344 -7.624 1 1 4.795 29.429 1 1
4.1 Mar-95 Oct-02 -1.475 -2.834 1 2 1.277 4.205 2 2 -1.302 -5.679 1 1 0.847 16.133 1 1
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 -1.423 -4.795 1 1 6.545 12.166 0 0 -1.344 -7.624 1 1 4.795 29.429 1 1
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 -1.9544 -3.3691 1 1 1.9894 5.7049 1 2 -1.3018 -5.6785 1 1 0.8473 16.1329 1 1
5 Jan-95 Nov-97 -3.2655 -3.5478 0 0 8.9570 6.2974 0 0 -1.6978 -5.3785 1 1 1.5433 14.6298 1 1
5 Dec-97 Oct-02 -2.669 -5.774 0 1 5.212 16.679 1 1 -1.799 -4.606 1 1 2.641 10.614 1 1
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 -0.624 -3.781 1 1 1.971 7.219 1 1 -1.344 -7.624 1 1 4.795 29.429 1 1
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 -0.879 -4.600 1 1 0.552 10.583 1 1 -1.302 -5.679 1 1 0.847 16.133 1 1
8 Feb-95 Sep-97 -2.491 -3.001 1 1 3.518 4.929 2 2 -1.687 -5.278 1 1 1.506 14.079 1 1
8 Oct-97 Oct-02 -2.614 -3.141 0 1 3.979 4.960 2 2 -1.572 -4.655 1 1 2.106 10.840 1 1
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 -1.510 -3.641 1 1 1.179 7.242 1 1 -2.843 -3.942 0 1 6.320 7.772 0 1
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 -2.112 -4.469 1 1 2.403 10.438 1 1 -0.931 -4.371 1 1 1.071 9.577 1 1
4 Jan-93 Aug-97 -1.086 -5.097 1 1 13.647 12.998 0 0 -1.319 -4.540 1 1 7.748 10.333 0 0
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 -0.945 -4.111 1 1 0.829 8.487 1 1 -0.887 -3.864 1 1 0.744 7.465 1 1
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 -5.760 -7.662 0 0 21.668 30.068 0 0 -2.675 -4.465 0 1 11.437 10.107 0 0
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 -4.459 -5.052 0 0 10.275 12.774 0 0 -1.056 -3.865 1 1 2.064 7.699 1 1
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 -2.016 -2.708 1 2 2.129 4.175 2 2 -2.454 -3.431 1 1 5.279 5.887 1 2
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 -2.498 -4.108 1 1 3.174 8.548 1 1 -1.594 -4.433 1 1 1.271 9.850 1 1
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 -2.498 -4.108 1 1 3.174 8.548 1 1 -1.594 -4.433 1 1 1.271 9.850 1 1
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 -2.302 -4.303 1 1 2.706 9.564 1 1 -1.480 -4.447 1 1 1.100 9.927 1 1
Portugal 2 Jan-93 Sep-97 -2.892 -3.456 0 0 5.337 5.975 1 2 -4.691 -8.395 0 0 11.001 35.899 0 0
2 Oct-97 Oct-02 -2.837 -2.633 0 2 4.931 3.493 2 2 -1.886 -3.589 1 1 1.892 6.451 1 2
3 Jan-93 Apr-95 -3.200 -5.453 0 0 5.209 15.203 1 1 -3.719 -5.512 0 0 6.926 15.787 0 0
3 May-95 Oct-02 -1.282 -8.446 1 1 1.543 35.670 1 1 -1.220 -5.200 1 1 1.635 13.587 1 1
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-94 -2.368 -2.983 1 1 2.811 4.579 2 2 -2.860 -4.331 0 1 4.092 10.158 1 1
4.1 Aug-94 Oct-02 0.012 -5.825 1 1 6.378 16.980 0 1 -2.668 -6.643 0 1 6.366 22.105 0 1
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 -2.660 -4.409 0 1 4.034 9.844 1 1 -3.630 -5.249 0 0 6.630 14.510 0 0
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 -1.254 -10.687 1 1 2.927 57.108 1 1 -1.066 -6.069 1 1 1.312 18.416 1 1
8.1 Jan-93 Jan-96 -2.120 -4.233 1 1 2.522 8.960 1 1 -3.913 -6.568 0 0 7.655 22.151 0 0Table B3: Monetary Policy Approach - Unit Root Tests 
I(?) I(?) I(?) I(?)
country bankrate start end t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5% t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5%
sample
bank rate short-term policy rate
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 -2.132 -4.363 1 1 4.759 9.596 1 1 -1.664 -4.790 1 1 2.204 11.565 1 1
8.2 Jan-93 Feb-96 -1.993 -2.413 2 2 2.410 3.384 2 2 -3.946 -6.665 0 0 7.787 22.826 0 0
8.2 Mar-96 Oct-02 -2.719 -4.762 0 1 9.909 11.549 0 0 -1.727 -4.723 1 1 2.324 11.197 1 1
Spain 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 -1.780 -2.833 1 2 2.277 4.016 2 2 -2.178 -5.262 1 1 2.426 13.849 1 1
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 -2.723 -2.468 0 2 4.093 3.179 2 2 -1.203 -8.182 1 1 1.019 34.046 1 1
3 Jan-93 Nov-96 -2.017 -5.294 1 1 2.365 14.045 1 1 -2.242 -5.582 1 1 2.731 15.764 1 1
3 Dec-96 Oct-02 -3.186 -7.689 0 0 6.975 29.734 0 0 -1.853 -6.227 1 1 2.657 19.439 1 1
4 Jan-93 Sep-96 -2.224 -4.203 1 1 4.206 8.999 1 1 -2.178 -5.262 1 1 2.426 13.849 1 1
4 Oct-96 Oct-02 -2.524 -5.247 1 1 5.058 13.850 1 1 -1.203 -8.182 1 1 1.019 34.046 1 1
5 Jan-93 Mar-96 -1.912 -4.225 1 1 3.593 8.966 1 1 -1.935 -5.057 1 1 2.222 12.901 1 1
5 Apr-96 Oct-02 -2.897 -5.610 0 0 8.476 15.737 0 0 -1.876 -8.213 1 1 3.236 33.725 1 1
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 -0.338 -3.534 1 1 0.979 7.981 1 1 -2.144 -4.000 1 1 2.429 8.484 1 1
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 -0.550 -4.570 1 1 1.599 10.457 1 1 -1.158 -8.078 1 1 0.744 32.845 1 1
8 Jan-93 Mar-96 -2.004 -1.506 2 2 2.173 1.275 2 2 -1.935 -5.057 1 1 2.222 12.901 1 1
8 Apr-96 Oct-02 -2.758 -4.525 0 1 6.185 10.301 0 1 -1.876 -8.213 1 1 3.236 33.725 1 1
Notes: This table presents the results of standard unit root tests for the break-free periods identified in table 1. Critical values for 100 observations are -2.88 (5%), -2.57(10) for the t test and 6.49 (5%), 5.47 (10%) for the F testTable B4: Monetary Policy Approach - Symmetric Cointegration
intercept t slope t
country bankrate start end coeff statistic coeff statistic DW DF ADF coint?
Austria 2 Apr-95 Jul-97 3.4329 9.1138 0.9698 9.5264 0.8958 -2.6468  yes
2 Aug-97 Oct-02 3.9195 22.6600 0.5210 11.1060 0.1712 -2.0533  no
3 Apr-95 Sep-98 3.3331 6.3717 1.4020 9.7019 0.4799 -2.2861  yes
3 Oct-98 Oct-02 5.0164 41.4887 0.5477 16.9933 0.5887 -4.0388  yes
4 Apr-95 Aug-97 3.6612 8.6979 1.0233 8.9698 0.7587 -2.3634  yes
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 4.2836 24.6719 0.5244 11.1501 0.2026 -2.3229 -1.7361 no
7 Apr-95 Nov-99 -0.0415 -0.8506 0.1457 10.3446 0.4863 -2.9513  yes
7 Dec-99 Oct-02 0.1528 7.3677 0.0359 6.9826 0.4683 -2.8633  yes
8 Apr-95 Mar-97 0.9447 3.7414 0.6490 9.6543 0.9255 -2.6175  yes
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 1.2046 13.0267 0.3904 15.4853 0.4342 -2.9760  yes
Belgium 2 Jan-93 Aug-95 8.5510 28.4699 -0.0987 -2.2905 0.3506 -1.5894 -1.7388 no
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 3.7398 11.6604 0.6242 7.0612 0.1694 -2.2117 -2.4299 no
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 11.3927 25.7662 0.0556 0.8442 0.1972 -1.7993 -2.2856 no
4.1 Jan-93 Apr-95 4.3221 14.5067 0.4261 10.3563 0.8698 -3.0320  yes
4.1 May-95 Oct-02 1.6738 8.7652 0.8041 15.4898 0.4650 -3.3892 -3.5142 yes
5 Jan-93 Oct-95 8.9038 22.9230 -0.0689 -1.2121 0.3883 -1.8200  yes
5 Nov-95 Oct-02 5.7292 14.7740 0.1865 1.7372 0.1374 -2.1029 -2.4929 no
8 Jan-94 Oct-02 0.1076 1.0691 0.8126 32.6113 0.7162 -5.6053 -3.3161 yes
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 2.9741 15.2740 0.2842 9.7968 1.0290 -3.5501 -3.5821 yes
Finland 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 4.5864 14.0718 0.7122 12.6629 0.7381 -3.1155  yes
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 3.9741 14.3837 0.3816 5.0029 0.2347 -1.6893  no
3 Jan-93 Sep-96 5.7841 15.8507 0.7350 11.6716 1.0149 -3.8655 -2.1603 yes
3 Oct-96 Oct-02 5.1413 17.9393 0.3840 4.8533 0.2520 -1.9023  no
5 Jan-93 Jan-96 3.4855 9.2417 0.7366 11.9605 1.0452 -3.5500 -3.4727 yes
5 Feb-96 Oct-02 2.8912 11.1607 0.5198 7.3315 0.7057 -4.2126 -2.4622 yes
7 Mar-97 Oct-02 0.5163 7.1873 0.0967 4.8580 0.2584 -2.0032 -2.4071 no
8 Jan-93 Aug-97 2.1083 9.4965 0.7043 17.2024 1.2556 -5.0769  yes
8 Aug-97 Oct-02 4.6525 21.1005 -0.3099 -5.1076 0.3001 -2.6034  no
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 4.8721 18.6753 0.5620 13.3520 0.5563 -2.8726  yes
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 2.4324 13.1789 0.7205 14.1534 0.6775 -4.4415  yes
5 Jan-93 Mar-97 5.2010 30.3196 0.5135 18.9509 0.8772 -3.6690  yes
5 Apr-97 Oct-02 2.6345 11.5793 0.6903 10.9448 0.3131 -3.3018 -2.8421 yes
9 Jan-93 May-98 3.2416 38.7642 0.1428 9.9280 0.2602 -2.7794  no
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 2.5924 14.3808 0.1004 2.0519 0.2300 -1.8193  no
Germany 2 Jan-93 Oct-96 6.3009 20.0849 0.1938 3.3855 0.1075 -0.9273 -1.7159 no
2 Nov-96 Oct-02 4.0842 14.8633 0.4500 5.9747 0.1186 -1.7005 -2.6382 no
3 Jan-93 Feb-97 9.6737 81.6547 0.6797 30.5762 0.1950 -0.8943  no
3 Mar-97 Oct-02 10.2153 52.3050 0.1084 2.0414 0.0423 -1.9454 -1.6679 no
4 Jan-93 Jul-00 5.1258 81.2941 0.8051 58.0826 0.4043 -3.0677  yes
4 Aug-00 Oct-02 7.4679 66.8565 0.3037 11.1896 0.6201 -3.2412 -2.9678 yes
5 Nov-96 Oct-02 4.6817 21.4872 0.4600 7.7034 0.1070 -1.7747 -2.2592 no
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 -0.0269 -0.9147 0.7585 119.3886 1.1815 -6.2995 -5.0291 yes
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 -0.3594 -2.5995 0.7947 23.2603 0.3646 -2.6625 -1.7668 no
8.2 Jan-93 Sep-99 0.2018 7.2381 0.8076 134.0141 1.4471 -7.0839 -5.5747 yes
8.2 Oct-99 Oct-02 -0.1506 -1.5800 0.8683 36.8674 0.4453 -2.6558 -1.5987 yes
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 -0.0735 -1.8198 0.7653 87.6862 0.6591 -4.1794 -3.2647 yes
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 0.7080 8.2656 0.3396 16.0434 0.2350 -1.4014 -2.9856 no
9.2 Jan-93 Oct-95 1.9646 8.9299 0.5228 14.3445 0.2402 -1.8785 -2.2143 no
9.2 Nov-95 Oct-02 0.9043 9.8282 0.6549 25.7705 0.3521 -2.3480  no
Ireland 1 Jan-99 Oct-02 8.0849 66.7260 0.8596 26.6923 1.1887 -5.2178  yes
2 Sep-99 Oct-02 1.5789 12.2547 0.9000 27.4178 1.8466 -5.9289  yes
4 Dec-95 Oct-02 6.9971 65.3543 0.5266 23.3889 0.4949 -3.3913  yes
5 Jan-94 Oct-02 6.5784 47.8037 0.4044 14.5468 0.2736 -2.7536 -2.0374 no
6 Feb-94 Oct-02 0.6569 4.2356 0.9923 31.5656 0.8820 -5.3936  yes
9.2 Jan-94 Oct-02 -0.4970 -7.8602 0.2478 19.3969 0.5071 -3.8344  yes
Italy 2 Jan-93 Dec-97 4.5882 11.2741 0.8811 19.2323 0.9027 -2.9663  yes
2 Jan-98 Oct-02 3.1701 20.0312 0.8174 21.6588 0.6504 -3.5071  yes
4.1 Jan-93 Feb-95 2.4044 6.5507 1.0902 27.6963 1.4416 -4.0051  yes
4.1 Mar-95 Oct-02 2.4235 25.7409 1.0090 68.1652 0.6104 -4.2739 -2.7522 yes
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 0.7186 2.8249 0.9375 34.3650 1.8006 -4.5531  yes
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 0.2780 4.3651 0.9249 92.3843 1.0614 -6.3682 -4.3752 yes
5 Jan-95 Nov-97 1.7207 4.2274 0.9622 21.1500 1.3068 -5.0378  yes
5 Dec-97 Oct-02 2.5343 23.8391 0.6809 27.1264 1.7274 -6.6292 -3.5689 yes
sampleTable B4: Monetary Policy Approach - Symmetric Cointegration
intercept t slope t
country bankrate start end coeff statistic coeff statistic DW DF ADF coint?
sample
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 0.1751 0.6340 0.5980 20.1866 1.0422 -3.6391  yes
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 -0.7479 -12.7042 0.6234 67.3513 0.6428 -4.3317 -3.0202 yes
8 Feb-95 Sep-97 -1.6721 -4.0462 1.0232 22.4960 1.1131 -6.0773  yes
8 Oct-97 Oct-02 1.3789 17.0369 0.4746 25.4721 0.8922 -4.2725  yes
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 6.2196 23.1664 0.2321 4.5089 0.1350 -1.0556 -1.4411 no
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 4.5599 19.9455 0.3780 5.9286 0.1500 -1.6639 -2.1168 no
4 Jan-93 Aug-97 0.0093 0.1281 1.0708 71.5862 1.0171 -4.2834  yes
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 0.5961 4.6112 0.9881 28.1694 1.0428 -4.6260 -2.5367 yes
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 0.5377 48.5542 0.0305 12.5227 0.3759 -3.9828 -3.0828 yes
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 0.3693 10.3367 0.0157 1.6808 0.1325 0.0652  no
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 3.6293 10.9606 0.2707 4.6567 0.1671 -1.2932 -2.3319 no
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 1.5865 13.3327 0.5350 15.8228 0.3172 -3.1349 -2.7930 no
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 5.5120 12.8454 0.0259 0.3409 0.1421 -1.2086 -1.7500 no
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 3.0297 14.6195 0.2792 4.7405 0.0879 -1.4684 -1.9835 no
Portugal 2 Jan-93 Sep-97 6.4853 14.4580 0.6859 15.0393 0.7543 -4.3555  yes
2 Oct-97 Oct-02 1.5413 5.5742 1.1049 16.0953 0.2082 -2.9090  no
3 Jan-93 Apr-95 18.3564 21.6011 -0.1510 -2.1020 1.3463 -3.6266 -3.4786 yes
3 May-95 Oct-02 4.0242 13.2433 1.5509 27.3453 0.6461 -4.0503  yes
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-94 15.7443 12.3755 0.2624 2.6551 0.4346 -1.5620  yes
4.1 Aug-94 Oct-02 2.1889 9.6213 1.5234 38.9777 0.2071 -2.3527  no
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 12.0456 17.7959 0.3290 5.8270 1.0876 -4.0609  yes
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 0.1597 0.7822 1.5125 40.6220 0.4222 -3.6215 -2.5245 yes
8.1 Jan-93 Jan-96 3.7944 6.0544 0.5485 9.7648 0.7377 -4.0826  yes
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 0.1189 1.1275 0.8624 39.5946 0.3106 -2.7013 -2.6887 no
8.2 Jan-93 Feb-96 4.2499 5.8569 0.4544 6.9408 0.5051 -3.5582  yes
Spain 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 5.2241 11.1681 0.6691 14.0122 1.2017 -4.3334  yes
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 2.1797 19.1736 0.8595 33.2411 0.8579 -4.6550  yes
3 Jan-93 Nov-96 9.0951 21.0881 0.6060 13.6226 1.1198 -4.1452  yes
4 Jan-93 Sep-96 2.3580 4.0527 0.8482 14.2798 1.1812 -4.2834  yes
4 Oct-96 Oct-02 1.8525 14.9191 0.7783 27.5579 1.5559 -6.7590  yes
5 Jan-93 Mar-96 6.1148 12.4497 0.6487 13.3447 1.2544 -4.2154  yes
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 2.2691 5.5274 0.3436 8.8797 0.9107 -2.6280  yes
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 0.1835 3.3766 0.5040 51.1873 1.5678 -7.9653 -4.4805 yes
8 Jan-93 Mar-96 3.9964 8.7839 0.4173 9.2674 0.7273 -2.8645  yes
8 Apr-96 Oct-02 0.0504 0.4024 0.7562 28.3786 1.2296 -5.9763 -3.3536 yes
Note: Results are only reported for bankrates that are found to be I(1) based on Table B2. Cointegration is considered to exist if
(1) at least two test statitics are significant at the 10% level, or (2) if at least one test statistic is significant at the 5% level. Critical
values to reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration for 100 observations are: 0.511 (1%), 0.386 (5%), 0.322 (10%) for the
Durbin-Watson (DW) test; 4.07 (1%), 3.37 (5%), 3.03 (10%) for the Dickey-Fuller (DF) test; and 3.77 (1%), 3.17 (5%), 2.84
(10%) for the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. Table B5: Monetary Policy Approach - Determination of Optimal Pass-Through Model                   .
Engle optimal
best TAR coint test  -Granger pass-through




MTAR* (min AIC) H0: Σ  ρ j=0 H0: ρ 1=ρ 2 H0: ρ 1=ρ 3 H0: ρ 2=ρ 3 coint? coint? model
Austria 2 Apr-95 Jul-97 11.94 9.51 11.11 12.59 6.73 MTAR* 8.90 8.58 yes,asym yes MTAR*
2 Aug-97 Oct-02 16.07 3.61 -25.02 20.58 19.56 BTAR* 30.12 0.21 69.64 67.36 yes,asym no BTAR*
3 Apr-95 Sep-98 44.68 44.28 44.90 45.34 36.37 MTAR* 6.20 9.92 yes,asym yes MTAR*
3 Oct-98 Oct-02 7.81 -3.29 -2.71 7.74 5.93 TAR* 29.56 17.85 yes,asym yes TAR*
4 Apr-95 Aug-97 16.79 13.50 15.15 17.45 10.85 MTAR* 4.93 7.76 no yes SYM
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 25.57 16.32 7.65 27.28 22.71 BTAR* 13.76 0.38 25.39 22.35 yes,asym no BTAR*
7 Apr-95 Nov-99 -145.79 -146.08 -145.37 -152.75 -158.00 MTAR* 10.37 12.60 yes,asym yes MTAR*
7 Dec-99 Oct-02 -162.72 -166.81 -165.27 -162.89 -165.86 TAR* 7.68 5.04 yes,asym yes TAR*
8 Apr-95 Mar-97 -12.16 -16.26 -20.43 -11.29 -18.31 BTAR* 7.90 13.20 0.40 6.15 yes,asym yes BTAR*
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 -39.10 -47.66 -47.37 -39.00 -48.94 MTAR* 12.98 11.75 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Belgium 2 Jan-93 Aug-95 24.37 23.92 22.04 24.33 23.18 BTAR* 3.77 3.48 0.04 3.47 no no STD
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 144.76 143.68 143.06 144.81 142.00 MTAR* 4.89 2.89 no no STD
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 40.67 39.72 34.29 39.84 34.21 MTAR* 5.02 5.84 no no STD
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL
4.1 Jan-93 Apr-95 26.15 25.12 25.44 28.39 20.26 MTAR* 8.52 10.99 yes,asym yes MTAR*
4.1 May-95 Oct-02 121.11 120.69 120.95 120.92 117.11 MTAR* 8.35 4.01 yes,asym yes MTAR*
4.2 Feb-94 Oct-02 STD_LL
5 Jan-93 Oct-95 45.99 43.88 36.45 45.97 39.39 BTAR* 4.40 10.64 0.10 10.72 no yes SYM
5 Nov-95 Oct-02 160.43 153.72 161.06 160.31 157.63 TAR* 9.90 6.51 yes,asym no TAR*
8 Jan-94 Oct-02 136.83 135.42 128.58 134.82 128.64 BTAR* 8.37 8.63 0.05 9.34 yes,asym yes BTAR*
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 40.64 39.45 35.37 40.73 34.49 MTAR* 4.67 5.68 no yes SYM
9 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL
Finland 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 118.12 117.10 117.83 117.30 115.26 MTAR* 2.15 2.54 no yes SYM
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 96.52 92.45 93.11 93.06 78.66 MTAR* 11.73 20.72 yes,asym no MTAR*
3 Jan-93 Sep-96 116.71 112.68 113.07 103.84 103.84 MTAR0 9.12 14.61 yes,asym yes MTAR0
3 Oct-96 Oct-02 129.38 122.33 120.86 129.42 112.89 MTAR* 11.50 17.85 yes,asym no MTAR*
5 Jan-93 Jan-96 80.89 77.60 77.42 77.91 76.20 MTAR* 9.20 5.02 yes,asym yes MTAR*
5 Feb-96 Oct-02 200.72 199.13 198.56 196.01 191.63 MTAR* 8.89 9.93 yes,asym yes MTAR*
7 Jan-93 Feb-97 STD_LL
7 Mar-97 Oct-02 -88.32 -88.48 -88.70 -88.86 -93.35 MTAR* 4.44 5.02 no no STD
8 Jan-93 Aug-97 141.44 140.12 140.20 140.97 139.03 MTAR* 4.63 2.19 no yes SYM
8 Aug-97 Oct-02 54.38 53.84 49.13 55.11 51.52 BTAR* 3.56 6.96 0.68 8.49 no no STD
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 118.79 116.61 107.97 118.70 114.99 BTAR* 6.31 6.17 1.67 10.60 yes,asym yes BTAR*
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 85.99 80.96 82.02 78.81 78.81 MTAR0 20.33 11.16 yes,asym yes MTAR0
5 Jan-93 Mar-97 77.56 77.29 76.39 77.77 66.11 MTAR* 9.38 11.66 yes,asym yes MTAR*
5 Apr-97 Oct-02 116.61 111.91 99.52 118.60 115.85 BTAR* 11.00 0.41 24.34 19.17 yes,asym yes BTAR*
8 Jan-93 Oct-02 STD_LL
9 Jan-93 May-98 -0.14 -7.00 -6.57 -0.46 -6.72 TAR* 7.77 7.07 yes,asym no TAR*
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 -1.21 -3.70 -1.78 -1.46 -5.07 MTAR* 3.92 3.86 no no STD
Germany 2 Jan-93 Oct-96 12.46 9.46 8.16 11.64 9.12 BTAR* 3.51 2.94 1.50 5.96 no no STD
2 Nov-96 Oct-02 79.31 77.88 76.71 79.14 36.22 MTAR* 34.07 57.68 yes,asym no MTAR*
3 Jan-93 Feb-97 -22.27 -23.96 -23.52 -23.03 -27.76 MTAR* 3.32 6.35 no no STD
3 Mar-97 Oct-02 25.20 18.52 25.36 25.70 14.61 MTAR* 10.43 12.43 yes,asym no MTAR*
4 Jan-93 Jul-00 27.46 25.71 16.03 26.65 23.65 BTAR* 6.52 12.05 0.43 13.93 yes,asym yes BTAR*
4 Aug-00 Oct-02 -63.98 -65.46 -64.24 -64.21 -68.12 MTAR* 13.30 4.48 yes,asym yes MTAR*
sample period AIC of different TAR-type models
cointegration based on best TAR
asymmetry testsTable B5: Monetary Policy Approach - Determination of Optimal Pass-Through Model                   .
Engle optimal
best TAR coint test  -Granger pass-through




MTAR* (min AIC) H0: Σ  ρ j=0 H0: ρ 1=ρ 2 H0: ρ 1=ρ 3 H0: ρ 2=ρ 3 coint? coint? model
sample period AIC of different TAR-type models
cointegration based on best TAR
asymmetry tests
5 Nov-96 Oct-02 -26.98 -33.51 -34.70 -30.75 -35.34 MTAR* 7.94 9.31 yes,asym no MTAR*
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 -49.01 -53.45 -55.24 -49.50 -52.02 BTAR* 5.04 3.70 2.37 9.12 no no STD
8.2 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL
8.2 Oct-99 Oct-02 -74.36 -76.67 -78.36 -74.55 -79.43 MTAR* 5.57 5.35 no yes SYM
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 -89.85 -93.31 -93.94 -92.81 -95.90 MTAR* 5.22 6.34 no no STD
9.2 Jan-93 Oct-95 -17.92 -19.12 -18.41 -19.75 -20.27 MTAR* 3.25 2.09 no no STD
9.2 Nov-95 Oct-02 -23.46 -23.98 -24.52 -25.39 -30.13 MTAR* 8.41 7.34 yes,asym no MTAR*
Ireland 1 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL
1 Jan-99 Oct-02 7.46 0.57 2.18 6.78 -1.02 MTAR* 13.68 11.70 yes,asym yes MTAR*
2 Jan-93 Aug-99 STD_LL
2 Sep-99 Oct-02 -11.90 -14.75 -19.61 -12.29 -13.18 BTAR* 6.60 10.15 1.87 6.73 yes,asym yes BTAR*
4 Jan-93 Nov-95 STD_LL
4 Dec-95 Oct-02 70.00 69.61 67.72 69.56 67.98 BTAR* 5.49 4.20 0.38 3.91 no yes SYM
5 Jan-94 Oct-02 118.70 118.19 117.35 118.67 116.62 MTAR* 3.33 2.05 no no STD
6 Feb-94 Oct-02 251.59 250.15 248.45 251.15 246.47 MTAR* 11.70 5.31 yes,asym yes MTAR*
9.1 Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL
9.2 Jan-94 Oct-02 16.12 14.64 13.78 16.32 13.83 BTAR* 6.78 3.78 0.33 4.42 yes,asym yes BTAR*
Italy 2 Jan-93 Dec-97 STD_LL
2 Jan-98 Oct-02 77.12 74.55 75.50 78.12 74.22 MTAR* 11.79 4.17 yes,asym yes MTAR*
4.1 Jan-93 Feb-95 12.91 12.56 6.54 13.14 11.18 BTAR* 3.94 7.90 1.27 7.86 no yes SYM
4.1 Mar-95 Oct-02 165.81 164.68 164.03 164.22 158.84 MTAR* 6.04 7.10 yes,asym yes MTAR*
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 -0.26 -3.20 -2.93 0.29 -0.39 TAR* 4.88 4.64 no yes SYM
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 140.38 139.59 139.33 140.34 139.30 MTAR* 8.41 1.14 yes,sym yes SYM
5 Jan-95 Nov-97 STD_LL
5 Dec-97 Oct-02 52.99 43.59 43.06 48.80 44.49 BTAR* 11.40 2.41 6.43 13.52 yes,asym yes BTAR*
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 STD_LL
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 STD_LL
8 Feb-95 Sep-97 16.13 15.14 11.76 16.93 15.05 BTAR* 8.41 4.80 0.99 5.96 yes,asym yes BTAR*
8 Oct-97 Oct-02 19.67 16.54 16.13 18.68 12.99 MTAR* 6.42 6.61 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 15.31 12.20 9.06 15.07 9.40 BTAR* 4.75 0.28 6.59 7.92 no no STD
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 62.27 59.12 60.56 62.36 29.08 MTAR* 24.64 41.24 yes,asym no MTAR*
4 Jan-93 Aug-97 20.34 17.34 16.49 19.51 18.68 BTAR* 8.71 3.04 0.32 6.26 yes,asym yes BTAR*
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 29.07 28.29 22.53 28.86 27.79 BTAR* 5.30 8.35 0.09 8.61 no yes SYM
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 -277.03 -282.35 -282.13 -275.64 -286.19 MTAR* 8.38 10.77 yes,asym yes MTAR*
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 -196.89 -197.21 -199.13 -196.59 -196.59 BTAR* 1.61 4.72 0.31 4.13 no no STD
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 -5.39 -6.90 -6.40 -5.75 -7.92 MTAR* 4.79 2.22 no no STD
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 39.32 35.23 34.02 39.59 22.42 MTAR* 14.25 18.63 yes,asym no MTAR*
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 11.70 11.44 10.78 11.59 9.35 MTAR* 3.88 2.03 no no STD
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 62.07 58.68 60.67 62.49 -3.54 MTAR* 57.36 100.89 yes,asym no MTAR*
Portugal 2 Jan-93 Sep-97 165.16 160.99 161.23 165.38 156.55 MTAR* 8.23 9.62 yes,asym yes MTAR*
2 Oct-97 Oct-02 100.92 87.54 70.32 101.54 97.55 BTAR* 25.29 0.04 44.34 43.50 yes,asym no BTAR*
3 Jan-93 Apr-95 68.84 62.61 63.19 62.17 57.65 MTAR* 11.30 12.58 yes,asym yes MTAR*
3 May-95 Oct-02 349.24 346.11 347.86 349.31 345.98 MTAR* 10.30 3.34 yes,asym yes MTAR*Table B5: Monetary Policy Approach - Determination of Optimal Pass-Through Model                   .
Engle optimal
best TAR coint test  -Granger pass-through




MTAR* (min AIC) H0: Σ  ρ j=0 H0: ρ 1=ρ 2 H0: ρ 1=ρ 3 H0: ρ 2=ρ 3 coint? coint? model
sample period AIC of different TAR-type models
cointegration based on best TAR
asymmetry tests
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-94 34.14 33.66 33.65 34.71 33.00 MTAR* 0.53 1.06 no yes SYM
4.1 Aug-94 Oct-02 262.09 260.89 261.40 261.83 258.41 MTAR* 5.72 3.67 yes,asym no MTAR*
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 39.80 37.70 38.32 41.65 40.58 TAR* 3.14 3.17 no yes SYM
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 247.69 245.59 245.71 247.80 230.12 MTAR* 11.96 18.46 yes,asym yes MTAR*
8.1 Jan-93 Jan-96 78.11 77.90 59.87 77.90 77.71 BTAR* 9.50 14.74 0.06 21.85 yes,asym yes BTAR*
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 72.91 72.36 67.46 72.98 70.59 BTAR* 6.64 7.51 0.69 7.48 yes,asym no BTAR*
8.2 Jan-93 Feb-96 83.59 77.52 85.11 80.39 70.51 MTAR* 8.57 13.17 yes,asym yes MTAR*
8.2 Mar-96 Oct-02 STD_LL
Spain 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 119.00 117.16 118.23 119.85 114.86 MTAR* 5.97 5.24 yes,asym yes MTAR*
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 84.53 83.63 79.16 83.38 79.98 BTAR* 9.73 7.45 0.41 7.29 yes,asym yes BTAR*
3 Jan-93 Nov-96 126.44 124.82 125.24 126.61 122.66 MTAR* 5.18 3.56 no yes SYM
3 Dec-96 Oct-02 STD_LL
4 Jan-93 Sep-96 134.36 133.65 127.85 134.37 132.80 BTAR* 4.67 7.69 0.00 7.84 no yes SYM
4 Oct-96 Oct-02 116.16 113.62 109.10 115.97 112.14 BTAR* 10.31 3.75 2.52 9.86 yes,asym yes BTAR*
5 Jan-93 Mar-96 94.72 92.59 92.07 95.32 94.02 BTAR* 2.82 3.89 1.08 3.28 no yes SYM
5 Apr-96 Oct-02 STD_LL
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 38.06 36.65 34.60 34.78 34.65 BTAR* 2.28 3.27 1.22 4.18 no yes SYM
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 107.33 105.56 105.63 107.11 101.41 MTAR* 14.46 5.92 yes,asym yes MTAR*
8 Jan-93 Mar-96 75.27 73.45 73.34 75.30 69.84 MTAR* 4.60 5.27 no yes SYM
8 Apr-96 Oct-02 151.32 149.53 133.49 150.42 147.76 BTAR* 12.06 21.66 0.28 20.73 yes,asym yes BTAR*
Notes: The critical values for the cointegration and asymmetry tests of the best TAR model are listed in Enders and Siklos (2000). The critical values vary depending on the type of TAR model, the
sample size, and the lag length of the model. As approximate benchmarks, one can consider test statistics of 6.0 or higher for the cointegration test and test statistics of 2.5 and higher for the
asymmetry tests to allow the rejection of the null hypotheses. - In case of no cointegration of any form, a standard pass-through model is estimated in first differences (STD). In case of I(0)
bankrates, a standard pass-through model is estimated in levels (STD_LL).Table B6: Monetary Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
Austria 2
(1) Apr-95 Jul-97 MTAR* 0.0652 0.9698 0.2183 0.5580 0.8722 0.9819 0.2183 0.5580 0.8722 0.9819
2 Aug-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2350 0.1906 0.5210 0.3658 0.5641 0.6225 0.6164 0.3658 0.5641 0.6225 0.6164
3
(3) Apr-95 Sep-98 MTAR
0 0.3906 0.3124 1.4020 0.6376 0.7829 0.9047 0.9584 0.6376 0.8833 1.0263 1.0809
3 Oct-98 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1707 0.2578 0.5477 0.4583 0.6670 0.7151 0.5662 0.4583 0.6160 0.6755 0.5667
4 Apr-95 Aug-97 SYM 0.0267 1.0233 0.1217 0.3789 0.7101 0.9833 0.1217 0.3789 0.7101 0.9833
4
(3) Sep-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.2244 0.2364 0.5244 0.4382 0.7034 0.6638 0.6068 0.4382 0.6770 0.6436 0.5948
7 Apr-95 Sep-99 MTAR* 0.0385 0.0109 0.1437 0.0520 0.0806 0.0822 0.0910 0.0520 0.0787 0.0868 0.0947
7 Oct-99 Oct-02 TAR* -0.0141 0.0162 0.0251 0.0364 0.0439 0.0348 0.0376 0.0364 0.0439 0.0348 0.0376
8
(3) Apr-95 Mar-97 SYM 0.1311 0.6490 0.2404 0.3987 0.5307 0.6228 0.2404 0.3987 0.5307 0.6228
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0883 0.1381 0.3904 0.2950 0.4980 0.4343 0.4070 0.2950 0.5232 0.4704 0.4207
Belgium 2 Jan-93 Aug-95 STD 0.0170 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 STD 0.1110 0.1373 0.1323 0.1371 0.1373 0.1373 0.1323 0.1371 0.1373 0.1373
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.0072 0.0085 0.0083 0.0084 0.0085 0.0085 0.0083 0.0084 0.0085 0.0085
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0911 0.2134 0.1433 0.1903 0.2090 0.2132 0.1433 0.1903 0.2090 0.2132
4.1 Jan-93 Apr-95 MTAR* 0.2670 0.4111 0.4261 0.4189 0.3425 0.3921 0.4079 0.4189 0.3425 0.3921 0.4079
4.1 May-95 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.2426 -0.0116 0.8041 -0.0146 0.2171 0.6675 1.1320 -0.0146 0.1437 0.5818 1.1278
4.2
(2) Feb-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2722 0.8420 0.4564 0.6654 0.7872 0.8367 0.4564 0.6654 0.7872 0.8367
5 Jan-93 Oct-95 SYM -0.0147 -0.0689 -0.0312 -0.0521 -0.0641 -0.0685 -0.0312 -0.0521 -0.0641 -0.0685
5 Nov-95 Oct-02 TAR* -0.9208 0.0841 0.1865 0.1003 0.1285 0.1556 0.1778 0.1003 0.1285 0.1556 0.1778
8
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2020 0.2195 0.8126 0.2591 0.4859 0.4835 0.4657 0.2591 0.5775 0.7113 0.8054
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 SYM 0.1002 0.2842 0.1388 0.2018 0.2486 0.2775 0.1388 0.2018 0.2486 0.2775
9 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL -0.0116 -0.0448 -0.0202 -0.0313 -0.0393 -0.0438 -0.0202 -0.0313 -0.0393 -0.0438
Finland 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 SYM 0.0490 0.7122 0.0850 0.1334 0.1776 0.2350 0.0850 0.1334 0.1776 0.2350
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3942 0.0132 0.3816 0.0210 0.0472 0.0942 0.1772 0.0210 0.0472 0.0942 0.1772
3
(3) Jan-93 Sep-96 SYM 0.0696 0.7350 0.0978 0.1553 0.2318 0.3559 0.0978 0.1553 0.2318 0.3559
3 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3664 0.0268 0.3840 0.0327 0.0575 0.0918 0.1506 0.0327 0.0575 0.0918 0.1506
5 Jan-93 Jan-96 MTAR* -0.1189 0.4494 0.7366 0.5053 0.8723 0.7920 0.7113 0.5053 0.8048 0.7011 0.7568
5 Feb-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1289 0.0688 0.5198 0.0531 0.1889 0.3697 0.5214 0.0531 0.2277 0.3994 0.5256
7 Jan-93 Feb-97 STD_LL 0.0147 0.0759 0.0266 0.0439 0.0591 0.0713 0.0266 0.0439 0.0591 0.0713
7 Mar-97 Oct-02 STD -0.0069 -0.0085 -0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0085
8 Jan-93 Aug-97 SYM 0.0355 0.7043 0.1217 0.3592 0.6672 0.7901 0.1217 0.3592 0.6672 0.7901
8 Aug-97 Oct-02 STD 0.0019 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 BTAR* 0.7960 0.0648 0.5620 0.4575 0.3832 0.4446 0.4838 0.4575 0.3832 0.4446 0.4838
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 MTAR
0 0.2095 0.7205 0.8013 0.7695 0.7374 0.7232 0.8013 0.9316 0.8657 0.7229
5 Jan-93 Mar-97 MTAR* 0.2415 0.0398 0.5135 0.1272 0.2120 0.3476 0.4803 0.1272 0.4037 0.5351 0.5576
5
(3) Apr-97 Oct-02 TAR* 0.2277 0.3369 0.6903 0.5711 0.5251 0.5699 0.6122 0.5711 0.5685 0.6100 0.6399
8
(2) Jan-93 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.8201 0.9441 0.9278 0.9438 0.9441 0.9441 0.9278 0.9438 0.9441 0.9441
9 Jan-93 May-98 TAR* 0.3204 0.0268 0.1428 0.0191 0.0246 0.0298 0.0394 0.0191 0.0246 0.0298 0.0394
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 STD 0.0341 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349
Germany 2 Jan-93 Oct-96 STD 0.0613 0.1361 0.0950 0.1237 0.1340 0.1360 0.0950 0.1237 0.1340 0.1360
2 Nov-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1515 0.5405 0.4500 0.7230 0.6863 0.5256 0.4521 0.7230 0.7565 0.6069 0.4641
3 Jan-93 Feb-97 STD 0.2528 0.3998 0.3458 0.3925 0.3995 0.3998 0.3458 0.3925 0.3995 0.3998
3 Mar-97 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0580 0.0912 0.1084 0.1181 0.1287 0.1276 0.1232 0.1181 0.1287 0.1276 0.1232
4
(3) Jan-93 Jul-00 MTAR* 0.1669 0.1642 0.8051 0.3932 0.6427 0.7280 0.7652 0.3932 0.6535 0.7350 0.7688
4 Aug-00 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0486 -0.0100 0.3037 0.4384 0.3344 0.2926 0.2746 0.4384 0.2764 0.2401 0.2433
5
(2) Nov-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1334 0.3467 0.4600 0.5186 0.5620 0.5795 0.4955 0.5186 0.5777 0.6010 0.5030
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.3719 0.7202 0.5517 0.6808 0.7157 0.7202 0.5517 0.6808 0.7157 0.7202
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 STD 0.3726 0.6127 0.5186 0.5982 0.6118 0.6127 0.5186 0.5982 0.6118 0.6127
8.2 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.4624 0.7786 0.6502 0.7574 0.7772 0.7786 0.6502 0.7574 0.7772 0.7786
8.2 Oct-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.4963 0.8683 0.7594 0.8773 0.8697 0.8683 0.7594 0.8773 0.8697 0.8683
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.2324 0.6904 0.3865 0.5567 0.6514 0.6871 0.3865 0.5567 0.6514 0.6871
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 STD 0.0875 0.2059 0.1379 0.1834 0.2016 0.2058 0.1379 0.1834 0.2016 0.2058
9.2 Jan-93 Oct-95 STD 0.2721 0.5425 0.4077 0.5090 0.5383 0.5424 0.4077 0.5090 0.5383 0.5424
9.2(3) Nov-95 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1134 0.3552 0.6549 0.6541 0.7550 0.7455 0.7248 0.6541 0.7068 0.7019 0.6911
Ireland 1 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL 0.3035 0.7020 0.4757 0.6291 0.6887 0.7016 0.4757 0.6291 0.6887 0.7016
1 Jan-99 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1720 0.3068 0.8596 0.8125 0.9263 0.9263 0.8650 0.8125 0.7855 0.8585 0.8589
2 Jan-93 Aug-99 STD_LL 0.2722 0.6279 0.4264 0.5633 0.6161 0.6275 0.4264 0.5633 0.6161 0.6275
2 Sep-99 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0830 0.3673 0.9000 0.9112 0.9375 0.9484 0.8980 0.9112 0.8456 0.9330 0.9005
4 Jan-93 Sep-95 STD_LL 0.3965 0.6500 0.5512 0.6350 0.6491 0.6500 0.5512 0.6350 0.6491 0.6500
4 Oct-95 Oct-02 SYM 0.2603 0.5334 0.3833 0.4801 0.5196 0.5323 0.3833 0.4801 0.5196 0.5323
5
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD 0.2047 0.2131 0.2128 0.2131 0.2131 0.2131 0.2128 0.2131 0.2131 0.2131
6
(1) Feb-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.2488 0.9923 0.3599 0.4970 0.6418 0.8164 0.3599 0.4970 0.6418 0.8164
9.1
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0578 0.0925 0.0795 0.0907 0.0924 0.0925 0.0795 0.0907 0.0924 0.0925
9.2
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0680 0.1420 0.2478 0.1643 0.2617 0.2545 0.2507 0.1643 0.2617 0.2545 0.2507
Italy 2 Jan-95 Dec-97 STD_LL 0.3099 1.0614 0.5293 0.7947 0.9667 1.0495 0.5293 0.7947 0.9667 1.0495
2 Jan-98 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.3327 0.3654 0.8174 0.5209 0.7212 0.7987 0.8167 0.5209 0.7139 0.7971 0.8167
4.1 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.3114 1.0902 0.6485 1.1102 1.2133 1.0742 0.6485 1.1102 1.2133 1.0742
4.1 Mar-97 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3882 0.1585 0.9579 0.3690 0.6091 0.7625 0.8647 0.3690 0.3925 0.4921 0.6802
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.4334 0.9375 0.7942 1.0419 0.9494 0.9381 0.7942 1.0419 0.9494 0.9381
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 SYM 0.2123 0.9249 0.4527 0.8458 1.0525 0.9252 0.4527 0.8458 1.0525 0.9252
5 Jan-95 Nov-97 STD_LL 0.4264 1.0570 0.6808 0.9231 1.0285 1.0557 0.6808 0.9231 1.0285 1.0557
5 Dec-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.1860 0.4624 0.6809 0.8157 0.7530 0.6914 0.6795 0.8157 0.7530 0.6914 0.6795
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 STD_LL 0.2043 0.5609 0.3341 0.4692 0.5373 0.5593 0.3341 0.4692 0.5373 0.5593
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.1633 0.6244 0.2839 0.4387 0.5496 0.6123 0.2839 0.4387 0.5496 0.6123
8
(3) Feb-95 Sep-97 STD 0.3027 0.6929 0.4732 0.6233 0.6805 0.6925 0.4732 0.6233 0.6805 0.6925
8
(3) Oct-97 Oct-02 STD 0.0552 0.1249 0.0859 0.1127 0.1227 0.1248 0.0859 0.1127 0.1227 0.1248
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 STD 0.2648 0.3767 0.3435 0.3738 0.3766 0.3767 0.3435 0.3738 0.3766 0.3767
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0643 0.1157 0.3780 0.4249 0.6238 0.5389 0.4022 0.4249 0.6567 0.5899 0.4134
4 Jan-93 Aug-97 BTAR* 0.1830 0.4379 1.0708 0.6216 0.8372 1.0674 1.0637 0.6216 1.1589 1.1404 1.0687
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 SYM 0.3979 0.9881 0.7151 0.9181 0.9793 0.9880 0.7151 0.9181 0.9793 0.9880
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 MTAR* 0.0089 0.0114 0.0305 0.0086 0.0134 0.0182 0.0241 0.0086 0.0253 0.0270 0.0287
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 STD -0.0459 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 STD 0.3842 0.5036 0.4753 0.5020 0.5036 0.5036 0.4753 0.5020 0.5036 0.5036
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0574 0.3250 0.5350 0.3501 0.5462 0.6246 0.5462 0.3501 0.5031 0.6110 0.5529
sample period multiplier for a +1% monetary policy shock multiplier for a -1% monetary policy shockTable B6: Monetary Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
sample period multiplier for a +1% monetary policy shock multiplier for a -1% monetary policy shock
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.3716 0.5135 0.4743 0.5105 0.5134 0.5135 0.4743 0.5105 0.5134 0.5135
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1834 0.2208 0.2792 0.2647 0.3428 0.3522 0.3066 0.2647 0.3428 0.3522 0.3066
Portugal 2 Jan-93 Sep-97 MTAR* -0.6829 0.0219 0.6859 0.0864 0.2158 0.4351 0.7554 0.0864 0.2158 0.4351 0.7554
2
(3) Oct-97 Oct-02 TAR* 0.2878 0.0540 1.1049 0.6158 0.7190 0.7301 0.7472 0.6158 0.9812 1.0031 1.0079
3
(1) Jan-93 Apr-95 MTAR* 0.1516 -0.1472 -0.1510 0.0306 0.1087 -0.0856 -0.1290 0.0306 0.0585 -0.1299 -0.1226
3 May-95 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.9915 0.1921 1.5509 0.9128 1.1626 1.3891 1.5230 0.9128 1.0654 1.3471 1.5158
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-94 SYM 0.0035 0.2624 0.0316 0.0775 0.1298 0.1943 0.0316 0.0775 0.1298 0.1943
4.1 Aug-94 Oct-02 MTAR* -1.3197 0.2212 1.5234 0.2754 0.7281 0.9152 1.0704 0.2754 0.7281 0.9152 1.0704
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.1459 0.3290 0.2794 0.3258 0.3289 0.3290 0.2794 0.3258 0.3289 0.3290
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.6212 0.4992 1.5125 0.5330 0.7883 0.9787 1.2155 0.5330 0.9832 1.1415 1.2999
8.1
(3) Jan-93 Jan-96 SYM 0.1951 0.5485 0.3375 0.4857 0.5423 0.5487 0.3375 0.4857 0.5423 0.5487
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0070 0.1655 0.8624 0.7257 0.7217 0.7217 0.7217 0.7257 0.8690 0.8646 0.8646
8.2 Jan-93 Feb-96 MTAR* -1.0878 0.0654 0.4544 0.1675 0.3046 0.4448 0.5512 0.1675 0.3046 0.4448 0.5512
8.2 Mar-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.1668 0.6965 0.2936 0.4634 0.5940 0.6766 0.2936 0.4634 0.5940 0.6766
Spain 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 MTAR* -0.2269 0.1144 0.6691 0.1945 0.3654 0.6821 0.9705 0.1945 0.3165 0.6136 0.9516
2
(3) Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.2479 0.1393 0.8595 0.2912 0.5245 0.7419 0.8807 0.2912 0.5307 0.7500 0.8845
3 Jan-93 Nov-96 SYM 0.1560 0.6060 0.2839 0.4470 0.5520 0.5999 0.2839 0.4470 0.5520 0.5999
3 Dec-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.3340 0.8028 0.5291 0.7095 0.7843 0.8021 0.5291 0.7095 0.7843 0.8021
4 Jan-93 Sep-96 SYM 0.2378 0.8482 0.3823 0.5691 0.7180 0.8198 0.3823 0.5691 0.7180 0.8198
4 Oct-96 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2060 0.3899 0.7783 0.6929 0.9918 0.8488 0.9054 0.6929 0.9946 0.8643 0.9177
5 Jan-93 Mar-96 SYM 0.1095 0.6487 0.2096 0.3669 0.5088 0.6152 0.2096 0.3669 0.5088 0.6152
5 Apr-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2061 0.7475 0.3554 0.5419 0.6694 0.7362 0.3554 0.5419 0.6694 0.7362
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.0383 0.3436 0.0807 0.1603 0.2460 0.3197 0.0807 0.1603 0.2460 0.3197
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1543 0.0937 0.5040 0.1937 0.3556 0.5032 0.5312 0.1937 0.3555 0.5031 0.5312
8 Jan-93 Mar-96 SYM 0.0151 0.4173 0.0558 0.1782 0.3639 0.4906 0.0558 0.1782 0.3639 0.4906
8
(3) Apr-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.2257 0.1039 0.7562 0.3236 0.4628 0.5480 0.6463 0.3236 0.5570 0.6250 0.6872
Note: Multipliers are standardized by dividing the calculated multiplier by the interest rate shock.
Regarding averages reported in Figure 1 and 2 and Tables 1 or 3 note:
(1) Multipliers are excluded due to short sample period.                 
(2) Multipliers are included in the pre- as well as in the post-break averages.
(3) The optimal pass-through model does not converge. The next best, converging model has been chosen instead.Table B6: Monetary Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run
Austria 2
(1) Apr-95 Jul-97 MTAR* 0.0652 0.9698
2 Aug-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2350 0.1906 0.5210
3
(3) Apr-95 Sep-98 MTAR
0 0.3906 0.3124 1.4020
3 Oct-98 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1707 0.2578 0.5477
4 Apr-95 Aug-97 SYM 0.0267 1.0233
4
(3) Sep-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.2244 0.2364 0.5244
7 Apr-95 Sep-99 MTAR* 0.0385 0.0109 0.1437
7 Oct-99 Oct-02 TAR* -0.0141 0.0162 0.0251
8
(3) Apr-95 Mar-97 SYM 0.1311 0.6490
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0883 0.1381 0.3904
Belgium 2 Jan-93 Aug-95 STD 0.0170 0.0173
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 STD 0.1110 0.1373
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.0072 0.0085
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0911 0.2134
4.1 Jan-93 Apr-95 MTAR* 0.2670 0.4111 0.4261
4.1 May-95 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.2426 -0.0116 0.8041
4.2
(2) Feb-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2722 0.8420
5 Jan-93 Oct-95 SYM -0.0147 -0.0689
5 Nov-95 Oct-02 TAR* -0.9208 0.0841 0.1865
8
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2020 0.2195 0.8126
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 SYM 0.1002 0.2842
9 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL -0.0116 -0.0448
Finland 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 SYM 0.0490 0.7122
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3942 0.0132 0.3816
3
(3) Jan-93 Sep-96 SYM 0.0696 0.7350
3 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3664 0.0268 0.3840
5 Jan-93 Jan-96 MTAR* -0.1189 0.4494 0.7366
5 Feb-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1289 0.0688 0.5198
7 Jan-93 Feb-97 STD_LL 0.0147 0.0759
7 Mar-97 Oct-02 STD -0.0069 -0.0085
8 Jan-93 Aug-97 SYM 0.0355 0.7043
8 Aug-97 Oct-02 STD 0.0019 0.0017
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 BTAR* 0.7960 0.0648 0.5620
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 MTAR
0 0.2095 0.7205
5 Jan-93 Mar-97 MTAR* 0.2415 0.0398 0.5135
5
(3) Apr-97 Oct-02 TAR* 0.2277 0.3369 0.6903
8
(2) Jan-93 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.8201 0.9441
9 Jan-93 May-98 TAR* 0.3204 0.0268 0.1428
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 STD 0.0341 0.0349
Germany 2 Jan-93 Oct-96 STD 0.0613 0.1361
2 Nov-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1515 0.5405 0.4500
3 Jan-93 Feb-97 STD 0.2528 0.3998
3 Mar-97 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0580 0.0912 0.1084
4
(3) Jan-93 Jul-00 MTAR* 0.1669 0.1642 0.8051
4 Aug-00 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0486 -0.0100 0.3037
5
(2) Nov-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1334 0.3467 0.4600
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.3719 0.7202
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 STD 0.3726 0.6127
8.2 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.4624 0.7786
8.2 Oct-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.4963 0.8683
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.2324 0.6904
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 STD 0.0875 0.2059
9.2 Jan-93 Oct-95 STD 0.2721 0.5425
9.2(3) Nov-95 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1134 0.3552 0.6549
Ireland 1 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL 0.3035 0.7020
1 Jan-99 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1720 0.3068 0.8596
2 Jan-93 Aug-99 STD_LL 0.2722 0.6279
2 Sep-99 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0830 0.3673 0.9000
4 Jan-93 Sep-95 STD_LL 0.3965 0.6500
4 Oct-95 Oct-02 SYM 0.2603 0.5334
5
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD 0.2047 0.2131
6
(1) Feb-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.2488 0.9923
9.1
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0578 0.0925
9.2
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0680 0.1420 0.2478
Italy 2 Jan-95 Dec-97 STD_LL 0.3099 1.0614
2 Jan-98 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.3327 0.3654 0.8174
4.1 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.3114 1.0902
4.1 Mar-97 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3882 0.1585 0.9579
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.4334 0.9375
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 SYM 0.2123 0.9249
5 Jan-95 Nov-97 STD_LL 0.4264 1.0570
5 Dec-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.1860 0.4624 0.6809
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 STD_LL 0.2043 0.5609
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.1633 0.6244
8
(3) Feb-95 Sep-97 STD 0.3027 0.6929
8
(3) Oct-97 Oct-02 STD 0.0552 0.1249
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 STD 0.2648 0.3767
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0643 0.1157 0.3780
4 Jan-93 Aug-97 BTAR* 0.1830 0.4379 1.0708
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 SYM 0.3979 0.9881
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 MTAR* 0.0089 0.0114 0.0305
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 STD -0.0459 -0.0464
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 STD 0.3842 0.5036
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0574 0.3250 0.5350
sample period
1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
0.2183 0.5580 0.8722 0.9819 0.2183 0.5580 0.8722 0.9819
0.3658 0.5641 0.6225 0.6164 0.3658 0.5641 0.6225 0.6164
0.6376 0.7829 0.9047 0.9584 0.6376 0.8457 0.9807 1.0350
0.4583 0.6160 0.6755 0.5667 0.4583 0.6160 0.6755 0.5667
0.1217 0.3789 0.7101 0.9833 0.1217 0.3789 0.7101 0.9833
0.4382 0.6770 0.6436 0.5948 0.4382 0.6770 0.6436 0.5948
0.0520 0.0645 0.0715 0.0815 0.0520 0.0787 0.0867 0.0946
0.0364 0.0439 0.0348 0.0376 0.0364 0.0439 0.0348 0.0376
0.2404 0.3987 0.5307 0.6228 0.2404 0.3987 0.5307 0.6228
0.2950 0.4765 0.4416 0.4098 0.2950 0.5232 0.4704 0.4207
0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173
0.1323 0.1371 0.1373 0.1373 0.1323 0.1371 0.1373 0.1373
0.0083 0.0084 0.0085 0.0085 0.0083 0.0084 0.0085 0.0085
0.1433 0.1903 0.2090 0.2132 0.1433 0.1903 0.2090 0.2132
0.4189 0.3425 0.3921 0.4079 0.4189 0.3425 0.3921 0.4079
-0.0146 0.2171 0.6675 1.1320 -0.0146 0.1437 0.5818 1.1278
0.4564 0.6654 0.7872 0.8367 0.4564 0.6654 0.7872 0.8367
-0.0312 -0.0521 -0.0641 -0.0685 -0.0312 -0.0521 -0.0641 -0.0685
0.1003 0.1285 0.1556 0.1778 0.1003 0.1285 0.1556 0.1778
0.2591 0.7467 0.8433 0.8157 0.2591 0.7467 0.8433 0.8157
0.1388 0.2018 0.2486 0.2775 0.1388 0.2018 0.2486 0.2775
-0.0202 -0.0313 -0.0393 -0.0438 -0.0202 -0.0313 -0.0393 -0.0438
0.0850 0.1334 0.1776 0.2350 0.0850 0.1334 0.1776 0.2350
0.0210 0.0472 0.0942 0.1772 0.0210 0.0472 0.0942 0.1772
0.0978 0.1553 0.2318 0.3559 0.0978 0.1553 0.2318 0.3559
0.0327 0.0575 0.0918 0.1506 0.0327 0.0575 0.0918 0.1506
0.5053 0.8724 0.7514 0.7140 0.5053 0.8048 0.6986 0.7585
0.0531 0.1889 0.3697 0.5214 0.0531 0.2277 0.3994 0.5256
0.0266 0.0439 0.0591 0.0713 0.0266 0.0439 0.0591 0.0713
-0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0085
0.1217 0.3592 0.6672 0.7901 0.1217 0.3592 0.6672 0.7901
0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
0.4575 0.3832 0.4446 0.4838 0.4575 0.3832 0.4446 0.4838
0.8013 0.7695 0.7374 0.7232 0.8013 0.9316 0.8657 0.7229
0.1272 0.2120 0.3476 0.4803 0.1272 0.2120 0.3476 0.4803
0.5711 0.5251 0.5699 0.6122 0.5711 0.5251 0.5699 0.6122
0.9278 0.9438 0.9441 0.9441 0.9278 0.9438 0.9441 0.9441
0.0191 0.0246 0.0298 0.0394 0.0191 0.0246 0.0298 0.0394
0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349
0.0950 0.1237 0.1340 0.1360 0.0950 0.1237 0.1340 0.1360
0.7230 0.7565 0.6069 0.4641 0.7230 0.7565 0.6069 0.4641
0.3458 0.3925 0.3995 0.3998 0.3458 0.3925 0.3995 0.3998
0.1181 0.1287 0.1276 0.1232 0.1181 0.1287 0.1276 0.1232
0.3932 0.6193 0.7104 0.7561 0.3932 0.6535 0.7350 0.7688
0.4384 0.3344 0.2926 0.2664 0.4384 0.2764 0.2432 0.2541
0.5186 0.5777 0.6010 0.5030 0.5186 0.5777 0.6010 0.5030
0.5517 0.6808 0.7157 0.7202 0.5517 0.6808 0.7157 0.7202
0.5186 0.5982 0.6118 0.6127 0.5186 0.5982 0.6118 0.6127
0.6502 0.7574 0.7772 0.7786 0.6502 0.7574 0.7772 0.7786
0.7594 0.8773 0.8697 0.8683 0.7594 0.8773 0.8697 0.8683
0.3865 0.5567 0.6514 0.6871 0.3865 0.5567 0.6514 0.6871
0.1379 0.1834 0.2016 0.2058 0.1379 0.1834 0.2016 0.2058
0.4077 0.5090 0.5383 0.5424 0.4077 0.5090 0.5383 0.5424
0.6541 0.7550 0.7455 0.7248 0.6541 0.7068 0.7019 0.6911
0.4757 0.6291 0.6887 0.7016 0.4757 0.6291 0.6887 0.7016
0.8125 0.9263 0.9263 0.8650 0.8125 0.7855 0.8585 0.8589
0.4264 0.5633 0.6161 0.6275 0.4264 0.5633 0.6161 0.6275
0.9112 0.9375 0.9500 0.8963 0.9112 0.8456 0.9330 0.9005
0.5512 0.6350 0.6491 0.6500 0.5512 0.6350 0.6491 0.6500
0.3833 0.4801 0.5196 0.5323 0.3833 0.4801 0.5196 0.5323
0.2128 0.2131 0.2131 0.2131 0.2128 0.2131 0.2131 0.2131
0.3599 0.4970 0.6418 0.8164 0.3599 0.4970 0.6418 0.8164
0.0795 0.0907 0.0924 0.0925 0.0795 0.0907 0.0924 0.0925
0.1643 0.2617 0.2545 0.2507 0.1643 0.2617 0.2545 0.2507
0.5293 0.7947 0.9667 1.0495 0.5293 0.7947 0.9667 1.0495
0.5209 0.7139 0.7971 0.8167 0.5209 0.7139 0.7971 0.8167
0.6485 1.1102 1.2133 1.0742 0.6485 1.1102 1.2133 1.0742
0.3690 0.6091 0.7625 0.8647 0.3690 0.3925 0.4921 0.6802
0.7942 1.0419 0.9494 0.9381 0.7942 1.0419 0.9494 0.9381
0.4527 0.8458 1.0525 0.9252 0.4527 0.8458 1.0525 0.9252
0.6808 0.9231 1.0285 1.0557 0.6808 0.9231 1.0285 1.0557
0.8157 0.7530 0.6914 0.6795 0.8157 0.7530 0.6914 0.6795
0.3341 0.4692 0.5373 0.5593 0.3341 0.4692 0.5373 0.5593
0.2839 0.4387 0.5496 0.6123 0.2839 0.4387 0.5496 0.6123
0.4732 0.6233 0.6805 0.6925 0.4732 0.6233 0.6805 0.6925
0.0859 0.1127 0.1227 0.1248 0.0859 0.1127 0.1227 0.1248
0.3435 0.3738 0.3766 0.3767 0.3435 0.3738 0.3766 0.3767
0.4249 0.6238 0.5389 0.4022 0.4249 0.6567 0.5899 0.4134
0.6216 0.8372 1.1672 1.0586 0.6216 1.1589 1.1404 1.0687
0.7151 0.9181 0.9793 0.9880 0.7151 0.9181 0.9793 0.9880
0.0086 0.0134 0.0182 0.0241 0.0086 0.0253 0.0270 0.0287
-0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464
0.4753 0.5020 0.5036 0.5036 0.4753 0.5020 0.5036 0.5036
0.3501 0.5462 0.6446 0.5460 0.3501 0.5031 0.6110 0.5529
multiplier for a -0.5% monetary policy shock multiplier for a +0.5% monetary policy shockTable B6: Monetary Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run
sample period
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.3716 0.5135
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1834 0.2208 0.2792
Portugal 2 Jan-93 Sep-97 MTAR* -0.6829 0.0219 0.6859
2
(3) Oct-97 Oct-02 TAR* 0.2878 0.0540 1.1049
3
(1) Jan-93 Apr-95 MTAR* 0.1516 -0.1472 -0.1510
3 May-95 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.9915 0.1921 1.5509
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-94 SYM 0.0035 0.2624
4.1 Aug-94 Oct-02 MTAR* -1.3197 0.2212 1.5234
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.1459 0.3290
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.6212 0.4992 1.5125
8.1
(3) Jan-93 Jan-96 SYM 0.1951 0.5485
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0070 0.1655 0.8624
8.2 Jan-93 Feb-96 MTAR* -1.0878 0.0654 0.4544
8.2 Mar-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.1668 0.6965
Spain 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 MTAR* -0.2269 0.1144 0.6691
2
(3) Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.2479 0.1393 0.8595
3 Jan-93 Nov-96 SYM 0.1560 0.6060
3 Dec-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.3340 0.8028
4 Jan-93 Sep-96 SYM 0.2378 0.8482
4 Oct-96 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2060 0.3899 0.7783
5 Jan-93 Mar-96 SYM 0.1095 0.6487
5 Apr-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2061 0.7475
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.0383 0.3436
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1543 0.0937 0.5040
8 Jan-93 Mar-96 SYM 0.0151 0.4173
8
(3) Apr-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.2257 0.1039 0.7562
Note: Multipliers are standardized by dividing the calculated multiplier by the interest rate shock.
Regarding averages reported in Figure 1 and 2 and Tables 1 or 3 note:
(1) Multipliers are excluded due to short sample period.                 
(2) Multipliers are included in the pre- as well as in the post-break averages.
(3) The optimal pass-through model does not converge. The next best, converging model has been chosen instead.
1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
multiplier for a -0.5% monetary policy shock multiplier for a +0.5% monetary policy shock
0.4743 0.5105 0.5134 0.5135 0.4743 0.5105 0.5134 0.5135
0.2647 0.3428 0.3522 0.3066 0.2647 0.3428 0.3522 0.3066
0.0864 0.2158 0.4351 0.7554 0.0864 0.2158 0.4351 0.7554
0.6158 0.7190 0.7301 0.7472 0.6158 0.8960 0.9072 0.9162
0.0306 0.0585 -0.1299 -0.1172 0.0306 0.0585 -0.1299 -0.1172
0.9128 1.1626 1.3891 1.5230 0.9128 1.1626 1.3891 1.5230
0.0316 0.0775 0.1298 0.1943 0.0316 0.0775 0.1298 0.1943
0.2754 0.7281 0.9152 1.0704 0.2754 0.7281 0.9152 1.0704
0.2794 0.3258 0.3289 0.3290 0.2794 0.3258 0.3289 0.3290
0.5330 0.9832 1.1415 1.2999 0.5330 0.9832 1.1415 1.2999
0.3375 0.4857 0.5423 0.5487 0.3375 0.4857 0.5423 0.5487
0.7257 0.6718 0.6712 0.6712 0.7257 0.8408 0.8421 0.8421
0.1675 0.3046 0.4448 0.5512 0.1675 0.3046 0.4448 0.5512
0.2936 0.4634 0.5940 0.6766 0.2936 0.4634 0.5940 0.6766
0.1945 0.3654 0.6822 0.9705 0.1945 0.3165 0.6136 0.9516
0.2912 0.5245 0.7419 0.8807 0.2912 0.5307 0.7500 0.8845
0.2839 0.4470 0.5520 0.5999 0.2839 0.4470 0.5520 0.5999
0.5291 0.7095 0.7843 0.8021 0.5291 0.7095 0.7843 0.8021
0.3823 0.5691 0.7180 0.8198 0.3823 0.5691 0.7180 0.8198
0.6929 0.9400 0.8843 0.9016 0.6929 0.9400 0.8843 0.9016
0.2096 0.3669 0.5088 0.6152 0.2096 0.3669 0.5088 0.6152
0.3554 0.5419 0.6694 0.7362 0.3554 0.5419 0.6694 0.7362
0.0807 0.1603 0.2460 0.3197 0.0807 0.1603 0.2460 0.3197
0.1937 0.3556 0.5032 0.5312 0.1937 0.3555 0.5031 0.5312
0.0558 0.1782 0.3639 0.4906 0.0558 0.1782 0.3639 0.4906
0.3236 0.4628 0.5480 0.6463 0.3236 0.5570 0.6250 0.6872Table B6: Monetary Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run
Austria 2
(1) Apr-95 Jul-97 MTAR* 0.0652 0.9698
2 Aug-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2350 0.1906 0.5210
3
(3) Apr-95 Sep-98 MTAR
0 0.3906 0.3124 1.4020
3 Oct-98 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1707 0.2578 0.5477
4 Apr-95 Aug-97 SYM 0.0267 1.0233
4
(3) Sep-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.2244 0.2364 0.5244
7 Apr-95 Sep-99 MTAR* 0.0385 0.0109 0.1437
7 Oct-99 Oct-02 TAR* -0.0141 0.0162 0.0251
8
(3) Apr-95 Mar-97 SYM 0.1311 0.6490
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0883 0.1381 0.3904
Belgium 2 Jan-93 Aug-95 STD 0.0170 0.0173
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 STD 0.1110 0.1373
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.0072 0.0085
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0911 0.2134
4.1 Jan-93 Apr-95 MTAR* 0.2670 0.4111 0.4261
4.1 May-95 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.2426 -0.0116 0.8041
4.2
(2) Feb-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2722 0.8420
5 Jan-93 Oct-95 SYM -0.0147 -0.0689
5 Nov-95 Oct-02 TAR* -0.9208 0.0841 0.1865
8
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2020 0.2195 0.8126
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 SYM 0.1002 0.2842
9 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL -0.0116 -0.0448
Finland 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 SYM 0.0490 0.7122
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3942 0.0132 0.3816
3
(3) Jan-93 Sep-96 SYM 0.0696 0.7350
3 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3664 0.0268 0.3840
5 Jan-93 Jan-96 MTAR* -0.1189 0.4494 0.7366
5 Feb-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1289 0.0688 0.5198
7 Jan-93 Feb-97 STD_LL 0.0147 0.0759
7 Mar-97 Oct-02 STD -0.0069 -0.0085
8 Jan-93 Aug-97 SYM 0.0355 0.7043
8 Aug-97 Oct-02 STD 0.0019 0.0017
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 BTAR* 0.7960 0.0648 0.5620
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 MTAR
0 0.2095 0.7205
5 Jan-93 Mar-97 MTAR* 0.2415 0.0398 0.5135
5
(3) Apr-97 Oct-02 TAR* 0.2277 0.3369 0.6903
8
(2) Jan-93 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.8201 0.9441
9 Jan-93 May-98 TAR* 0.3204 0.0268 0.1428
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 STD 0.0341 0.0349
Germany 2 Jan-93 Oct-96 STD 0.0613 0.1361
2 Nov-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1515 0.5405 0.4500
3 Jan-93 Feb-97 STD 0.2528 0.3998
3 Mar-97 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0580 0.0912 0.1084
4
(3) Jan-93 Jul-00 MTAR* 0.1669 0.1642 0.8051
4 Aug-00 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0486 -0.0100 0.3037
5
(2) Nov-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1334 0.3467 0.4600
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.3719 0.7202
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 STD 0.3726 0.6127
8.2 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.4624 0.7786
8.2 Oct-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.4963 0.8683
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.2324 0.6904
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 STD 0.0875 0.2059
9.2 Jan-93 Oct-95 STD 0.2721 0.5425
9.2(3) Nov-95 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1134 0.3552 0.6549
Ireland 1 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL 0.3035 0.7020
1 Jan-99 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1720 0.3068 0.8596
2 Jan-93 Aug-99 STD_LL 0.2722 0.6279
2 Sep-99 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0830 0.3673 0.9000
4 Jan-93 Sep-95 STD_LL 0.3965 0.6500
4 Oct-95 Oct-02 SYM 0.2603 0.5334
5
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD 0.2047 0.2131
6
(1) Feb-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.2488 0.9923
9.1
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0578 0.0925
9.2
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0680 0.1420 0.2478
Italy 2 Jan-95 Dec-97 STD_LL 0.3099 1.0614
2 Jan-98 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.3327 0.3654 0.8174
4.1 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.3114 1.0902
4.1 Mar-97 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3882 0.1585 0.9579
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.4334 0.9375
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 SYM 0.2123 0.9249
5 Jan-95 Nov-97 STD_LL 0.4264 1.0570
5 Dec-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.1860 0.4624 0.6809
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 STD_LL 0.2043 0.5609
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.1633 0.6244
8
(3) Feb-95 Sep-97 STD 0.3027 0.6929
8
(3) Oct-97 Oct-02 STD 0.0552 0.1249
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 STD 0.2648 0.3767
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0643 0.1157 0.3780
4 Jan-93 Aug-97 BTAR* 0.1830 0.4379 1.0708
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 SYM 0.3979 0.9881
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 MTAR* 0.0089 0.0114 0.0305
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 STD -0.0459 -0.0464
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 STD 0.3842 0.5036
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0574 0.3250 0.5350
sample period
1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
0.2183 0.5580 0.8722 0.9819 0.2183 0.5580 0.8722 0.9819
0.3658 0.5641 0.6225 0.6164 0.3658 0.5641 0.6225 0.6164
0.6376 0.7829 0.9047 0.9584 0.6376 0.7829 0.9047 0.9584
0.4583 0.6160 0.6755 0.5667 0.4583 0.6160 0.6755 0.5667
0.1217 0.3789 0.7101 0.9833 0.1217 0.3789 0.7101 0.9833
0.4382 0.6770 0.6436 0.5948 0.4382 0.6770 0.6436 0.5948
0.0520 0.0645 0.0715 0.0815 0.0520 0.0645 0.0715 0.0815
0.0364 0.0439 0.0348 0.0376 0.0364 0.0439 0.0348 0.0376
0.2404 0.3987 0.5307 0.6228 0.2404 0.3987 0.5307 0.6228
0.2950 0.4765 0.4416 0.4098 0.2950 0.4765 0.4416 0.4098
0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173 0.0173
0.1323 0.1371 0.1373 0.1373 0.1323 0.1371 0.1373 0.1373
0.0083 0.0084 0.0085 0.0085 0.0083 0.0084 0.0085 0.0085
0.1433 0.1903 0.2090 0.2132 0.1433 0.1903 0.2090 0.2132
0.4189 0.3425 0.3921 0.4079 0.4189 0.3425 0.3921 0.4079
-0.0146 0.2171 0.6675 1.1320 -0.0146 0.2171 0.6675 1.1320
0.4564 0.6654 0.7872 0.8367 0.4564 0.6654 0.7872 0.8367
-0.0312 -0.0521 -0.0641 -0.0685 -0.0312 -0.0521 -0.0641 -0.0685
0.1003 0.1285 0.1556 0.1778 0.1003 0.1285 0.1556 0.1778
0.2591 0.7467 0.8433 0.8157 0.2591 0.7467 0.8433 0.8157
0.1388 0.2018 0.2486 0.2775 0.1388 0.2018 0.2486 0.2775
-0.0202 -0.0313 -0.0393 -0.0438 -0.0202 -0.0313 -0.0393 -0.0438
0.0850 0.1334 0.1776 0.2350 0.0850 0.1334 0.1776 0.2350
0.0210 0.0472 0.0942 0.1772 0.0210 0.0472 0.0942 0.1772
0.0978 0.1553 0.2318 0.3559 0.0978 0.1553 0.2318 0.3559
0.0327 0.0575 0.0918 0.1506 0.0327 0.0575 0.0918 0.1506
0.5053 0.8048 0.6986 0.7585 0.5053 0.8048 0.6986 0.7585
0.0531 0.2277 0.3994 0.5256 0.0531 0.2277 0.3994 0.5256
0.0266 0.0439 0.0591 0.0713 0.0266 0.0439 0.0591 0.0713
-0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0082 -0.0085 -0.0085 -0.0085
0.1217 0.3592 0.6672 0.7901 0.1217 0.3592 0.6672 0.7901
0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017 0.0017
0.4575 0.3832 0.4446 0.4838 0.4575 0.3832 0.4446 0.4838
0.8013 0.7695 0.7374 0.7232 0.8013 0.9316 0.8657 0.7229
0.1272 0.2120 0.3476 0.4803 0.1272 0.2120 0.3476 0.4803
0.5711 0.5251 0.5699 0.6122 0.5711 0.5251 0.5699 0.6122
0.9278 0.9438 0.9441 0.9441 0.9278 0.9438 0.9441 0.9441
0.0191 0.0246 0.0298 0.0394 0.0191 0.0246 0.0298 0.0394
0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349
0.0950 0.1237 0.1340 0.1360 0.0950 0.1237 0.1340 0.1360
0.7230 0.7565 0.6069 0.4641 0.7230 0.7565 0.6069 0.4641
0.3458 0.3925 0.3995 0.3998 0.3458 0.3925 0.3995 0.3998
0.1181 0.1287 0.1276 0.1232 0.1181 0.1287 0.1276 0.1232
0.3932 0.6193 0.7104 0.7561 0.3932 0.6193 0.7104 0.7561
0.4384 0.3344 0.2513 0.2636 0.4384 0.2764 0.2432 0.2580
0.5186 0.5777 0.6010 0.5030 0.5186 0.5777 0.6010 0.5030
0.5517 0.6808 0.7157 0.7202 0.5517 0.6808 0.7157 0.7202
0.5186 0.5982 0.6118 0.6127 0.5186 0.5982 0.6118 0.6127
0.6502 0.7574 0.7772 0.7786 0.6502 0.7574 0.7772 0.7786
0.7594 0.8773 0.8697 0.8683 0.7594 0.8773 0.8697 0.8683
0.3865 0.5567 0.6514 0.6871 0.3865 0.5567 0.6514 0.6871
0.1379 0.1834 0.2016 0.2058 0.1379 0.1834 0.2016 0.2058
0.4077 0.5090 0.5383 0.5424 0.4077 0.5090 0.5383 0.5424
0.6541 0.7068 0.7019 0.6911 0.6541 0.7068 0.7019 0.6911
0.4757 0.6291 0.6887 0.7016 0.4757 0.6291 0.6887 0.7016
0.8125 0.7653 0.8492 0.8585 0.8125 0.7653 0.8492 0.8585
0.4264 0.5633 0.6161 0.6275 0.4264 0.5633 0.6161 0.6275
0.9112 0.9375 0.9500 0.8963 0.9112 0.8456 0.9330 0.9005
0.5512 0.6350 0.6491 0.6500 0.5512 0.6350 0.6491 0.6500
0.3833 0.4801 0.5196 0.5323 0.3833 0.4801 0.5196 0.5323
0.2128 0.2131 0.2131 0.2131 0.2128 0.2131 0.2131 0.2131
0.3599 0.4970 0.6418 0.8164 0.3599 0.4970 0.6418 0.8164
0.0795 0.0907 0.0924 0.0925 0.0795 0.0907 0.0924 0.0925
0.1643 0.2617 0.2545 0.2507 0.1643 0.2617 0.2545 0.2507
0.5293 0.7947 0.9667 1.0495 0.5293 0.7947 0.9667 1.0495
0.5209 0.7139 0.7971 0.8167 0.5209 0.7139 0.7971 0.8167
0.6485 1.1102 1.2133 1.0742 0.6485 1.1102 1.2133 1.0742
0.3690 0.6091 0.7625 0.8647 0.3690 0.6091 0.7625 0.8647
0.7942 1.0419 0.9494 0.9381 0.7942 1.0419 0.9494 0.9381
0.4527 0.8458 1.0525 0.9252 0.4527 0.8458 1.0525 0.9252
0.6808 0.9231 1.0285 1.0557 0.6808 0.9231 1.0285 1.0557
0.8157 0.7530 0.6914 0.6795 0.8157 0.7530 0.6914 0.6795
0.3341 0.4692 0.5373 0.5593 0.3341 0.4692 0.5373 0.5593
0.2839 0.4387 0.5496 0.6123 0.2839 0.4387 0.5496 0.6123
0.4732 0.6233 0.6805 0.6925 0.4732 0.6233 0.6805 0.6925
0.0859 0.1127 0.1227 0.1248 0.0859 0.1127 0.1227 0.1248
0.3435 0.3738 0.3766 0.3767 0.3435 0.3738 0.3766 0.3767
0.4249 0.6238 0.5615 0.4083 0.4249 0.6567 0.5899 0.4134
0.6216 1.2193 1.1354 1.0706 0.6216 1.2193 1.1354 1.0706
0.7151 0.9181 0.9793 0.9880 0.7151 0.9181 0.9793 0.9880
0.0086 0.0134 0.0182 0.0241 0.0086 0.0134 0.0182 0.0241
-0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464 -0.0464
0.4753 0.5020 0.5036 0.5036 0.4753 0.5020 0.5036 0.5036
0.3501 0.5462 0.6423 0.5457 0.3501 0.5462 0.6423 0.5457
multiplier for a -0.25% monetary policy shock multiplier for a +0.25% monetary policy shockTable B6: Monetary Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run
sample period
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.3716 0.5135
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1834 0.2208 0.2792
Portugal 2 Jan-93 Sep-97 MTAR* -0.6829 0.0219 0.6859
2
(3) Oct-97 Oct-02 TAR* 0.2878 0.0540 1.1049
3
(1) Jan-93 Apr-95 MTAR* 0.1516 -0.1472 -0.1510
3 May-95 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.9915 0.1921 1.5509
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-94 SYM 0.0035 0.2624
4.1 Aug-94 Oct-02 MTAR* -1.3197 0.2212 1.5234
4.2 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.1459 0.3290
4.2 Mar-95 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.6212 0.4992 1.5125
8.1
(3) Jan-93 Jan-96 SYM 0.1951 0.5485
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0070 0.1655 0.8624
8.2 Jan-93 Feb-96 MTAR* -1.0878 0.0654 0.4544
8.2 Mar-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.1668 0.6965
Spain 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 MTAR* -0.2269 0.1144 0.6691
2
(3) Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.2479 0.1393 0.8595
3 Jan-93 Nov-96 SYM 0.1560 0.6060
3 Dec-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.3340 0.8028
4 Jan-93 Sep-96 SYM 0.2378 0.8482
4 Oct-96 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2060 0.3899 0.7783
5 Jan-93 Mar-96 SYM 0.1095 0.6487
5 Apr-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2061 0.7475
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.0383 0.3436
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1543 0.0937 0.5040
8 Jan-93 Mar-96 SYM 0.0151 0.4173
8
(3) Apr-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.2257 0.1039 0.7562
Note: Multipliers are standardized by dividing the calculated multiplier by the interest rate shock.
Regarding averages reported in Figure 1 and 2 and Tables 1 or 3 note:
(1) Multipliers are excluded due to short sample period.                 
(2) Multipliers are included in the pre- as well as in the post-break averages.
(3) The optimal pass-through model does not converge. The next best, converging model has been chosen instead.
1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
multiplier for a -0.25% monetary policy shock multiplier for a +0.25% monetary policy shock
0.4743 0.5105 0.5134 0.5135 0.4743 0.5105 0.5134 0.5135
0.2647 0.3428 0.3522 0.3066 0.2647 0.3428 0.3522 0.3066
0.0864 0.2158 0.4351 0.7554 0.0864 0.2158 0.4351 0.7554
0.6158 0.7190 0.7301 0.7472 0.6158 0.7190 0.7301 0.7472
0.0306 0.0585 -0.1299 -0.1172 0.0306 0.0585 -0.1299 -0.1172
0.9128 1.1626 1.3891 1.5230 0.9128 1.1626 1.3891 1.5230
0.0316 0.0775 0.1298 0.1943 0.0316 0.0775 0.1298 0.1943
0.2754 0.7281 0.9152 1.0704 0.2754 0.7281 0.9152 1.0704
0.2794 0.3258 0.3289 0.3290 0.2794 0.3258 0.3289 0.3290
0.5330 0.9832 1.1415 1.2999 0.5330 0.9832 1.1415 1.2999
0.3375 0.4857 0.5423 0.5487 0.3375 0.4857 0.5423 0.5487
0.7257 0.6718 0.6712 0.6712 0.7257 0.8965 0.8985 0.8985
0.1675 0.3046 0.4448 0.5512 0.1675 0.3046 0.4448 0.5512
0.2936 0.4634 0.5940 0.6766 0.2936 0.4634 0.5940 0.6766
0.1945 0.3165 0.6136 0.9516 0.1945 0.3165 0.6136 0.9516
0.2912 0.5307 0.7500 0.8845 0.2912 0.5307 0.7500 0.8845
0.2839 0.4470 0.5520 0.5999 0.2839 0.4470 0.5520 0.5999
0.5291 0.7095 0.7843 0.8021 0.5291 0.7095 0.7843 0.8021
0.3823 0.5691 0.7180 0.8198 0.3823 0.5691 0.7180 0.8198
0.6929 0.9400 0.8843 0.9016 0.6929 0.9400 0.8843 0.9016
0.2096 0.3669 0.5088 0.6152 0.2096 0.3669 0.5088 0.6152
0.3554 0.5419 0.6694 0.7362 0.3554 0.5419 0.6694 0.7362
0.0807 0.1603 0.2460 0.3197 0.0807 0.1603 0.2460 0.3197
0.1937 0.3555 0.5031 0.5312 0.1937 0.3555 0.5031 0.5312
0.0558 0.1782 0.3639 0.4906 0.0558 0.1782 0.3639 0.4906
0.3236 0.4628 0.5480 0.6463 0.3236 0.4628 0.5480 0.6463Appendix C: Results for the Costs of Funds Approach 
 
 Table C1: Choice of Market Interest Rate for Cost of Funds Approach
correlation coefficients max 
govt bond correlation
interest rate details interbank rate yield maturity
country code loan / deposit type maturity interest fixing 1 mth lag 3 mth lag 6 mth lag 12 mth lag 120 mth lag (mth)
Ireland 1 cash overdraft 0.87 0 0.86 0 0.81 0 0.33 0 0.38 0 1
Austria 2 housing loans floating 0.52 0 0.56 0 0.56 0 0.46 0 0.82 0 120
Belgium 2 mortgage loans with amortisation 5 yrs 0.68 0 0.73 0 0.79 0 0.86 0 0.89 0 120
Finland 2 housing loans to households 0.92 0 0.94 0 0.95 0 0.95 0 0.90 0 6
Germany 2 mortgage loans 0.69 0 0.71 0 0.74 0 0.81 0 0.95 0 120
Ireland 2 mortgage lending to households variable 0.94 0 0.96 0 0.95 0 0.82 0 0.69 0 3
Italy 2 loans to households (80% housing loans) above 1.5 yrs fixed and floating 0.98 0 0.98 0 0.97 0 0.95 0 0.91 0 1
Netherlands 2 mortgage loans from credit institutions 5 yrs 0.71 0 0.74 0 0.77 0 0.83 0 0.94 0 120
Portugal 2 loans for house purchase above 5 yrs fixed and floating 0.98 0 0.96 0 0.95 0 0.93 0 0.91 0 1
Spain 2 mortgage loan for house purchase 3 yrs fixed and floating 0.98 0 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.98 0 0.92 0 6
Austria 3 consumer credit long-term 0.43 0 0.49 0 0.50 0 0.41 0 0.83 0 120
Belgium 3 consumer credit / car loans fixed 0.75 0 0.79 0 0.84 0 0.88 0 0.91 0 120
Finland 3 consumer credits to households floating 0.92 0 0.93 0 0.94 0 0.94 0 0.90 0 6
Germany 3 instalment credits 3-5 yrs fixed 0.86 0 0.85 0 0.84 0 0.82 0 0.80 0 1
Portugal 3 consumer credit to household / loans advances 2-5 yrs fixed and floating 0.95 0 0.94 0 0.93 0 0.92 0 0.93 0 1
Spain 3 personal loans above 1 yr mostly fixed 0.97 0 0.98 0 0.98 0 0.97 0 0.92 0 6
Austria 4 loan to enterprises short term floating 0.51 0 0.56 0 0.56 0 0.46 0 0.84 0 120
Belgium 4.1 term loans 6 months 0.95 0 0.97 0 0.98 0 0.97 0 0.68 0 6
Belgium 4.2 current account advances 0.97 0 0.97 0 0.96 0 0.91 0 0.61 -8 3
France 4 discount, overdrafts, etc 0.89 0 0.89 0 0.89 0 0.87 0 0.81 0 6
Germany 4 current account loans floating 0.97 0 0.97 0 0.96 0 0.92 0 0.55 0 1
Ireland 4 overdrafts, term loans up to 1 yr floating 0.96 0 0.97 0 0.96 0 0.85 0 0.65 0 3
Italy 4.1 loans to all customers (50% enterprises) up to 1.5 yrs 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.98 0 0.95 0 0.92 0 1
Italy 4.2 loans to firms up to 1.5 yrs minimum rate 1.00 0 0.99 0 0.98 0 0.96 0 0.93 0 1
Netherlands 4 bank base rate, enterprises floating (bank base rate) 0.98 0 0.98 0 0.96 0 0.92 0 0.40 0 1
Portugal 4.1 commercial bills 91-180 days 0.97 0 0.96 0 0.96 0 0.94 0 0.90 0 1
Portugal 4.2 loans to enterprises 91-180 days 0.98 0 0.98 0 0.97 0 0.95 0 0.92 0 1
Spain 4 corporate short term loans floating 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.97 0 0.89 0 3
Belgium 5 investment credit 5 yrs floating (mostly quarterly) 0.63 -1 0.67 -1 0.74 0 0.81 0 0.93 0 120
Finland 5 lending to enterprises floating   0.96 0 0.97 0 0.97 0 0.95 0 0.84 0 6
France 5 medium and long-term loans 0.89 0 0.89 0 0.90 0 0.89 0 0.84 0 6
Germany 5 long-term loans to enterprises and self employed above 4 years fixed 0.80 -5 0.78 -4 0.77 -2 0.80 -1 0.74 0 12
Ireland 5 term loans to AA firms 1-3 yrs floating 0.94 0 0.94 0 0.92 0 0.76 0 0.58 0 3
Italy 5 loans above 1.5 yrs 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.97 0 0.94 0 3
Spain 5 credit accounts 1-3 yrs 0.98 0 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.98 0 0.92 0 6
Ireland 6 banks' prime lending to firms 0.97 0 0.94 0 0.90 0 0.85 0 0.58 0 1Table C1: Choice of Market Interest Rate for Cost of Funds Approach
correlation coefficients max 
govt bond correlation
interest rate details interbank rate yield maturity
country code loan / deposit type maturity interest fixing 1 mth lag 3 mth lag 6 mth lag 12 mth lag 120 mth lag (mth)
Austria 7 current account deposits sight 0.09 0 0.16 0 0.18 0 0.09 0 0.71 0 120
Finland 7 accounts subject to withholding tax 0.88 0 0.89 0 0.88 0 0.86 0 0.80 0 3
Italy 7 current account interest rate 0.99 0 0.98 0 0.97 0 0.95 0 0.93 0 1
Netherlands 7 ordinary demand deposits 0.51 0 0.50 0 0.49 0 0.48 0 0.61 0 120
Spain 7 overnight deposits sight 0.98 0 0.98 0 0.97 0 0.95 0 0.88 0 1
Austria 8 savings deposits up to 1 yr 0.61 0 0.65 0 0.63 0 0.51 0 0.76 0 120
Belgium 8 deposits with agreed maturity / notice period 3 mths 0.97 0 0.98 0 0.97 0 0.94 0 0.62 0 3
Finland 8 time deposits subject to witholding tax 0.83 0 0.83 0 0.82 0 0.81 0 0.81 0 3
France 8 EURIBOR / PIBOR deposits 3 mths 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.97 0 0.73 0 3
Germany 8.1 time deposits   1 mths 1.00 0 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.95 0 0.56 0 1
Germany 8.2 time deposits   3 mths 1.00 0 1.00 0 0.99 0 0.96 0 0.55 0 3
Italy 8 CD 1.5 - 2 yrs fixed 0.98 0 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.98 0 0.96 0 6
Netherlands 8.1 time savings deposits 2 yrs 0.88 0 0.90 0 0.92 0 0.95 0 0.76 0 12
Netherlands 8.2 time savings deposits 4 yrs 0.70 0 0.72 0 0.76 0 0.82 0 0.92 0 120
Portugal 8.1 time deposits 31-90 days 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.98 0 0.93 0 1
Portugal 8.2 time deposits 181 days to 1 yr 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.98 0 0.95 0 3
Spain 8 deposits   1-2 yrs 0.97 0 0.98 0 0.99 0 0.99 0 0.94 0 6
Belgium 9 savings deposits 0.86 0 0.87 0 0.88 0 0.88 0 0.80 0 6
France 9 7 different taxable savings instruments up to 3 mths weighted average 0.72 0 0.71 0 0.73 0 0.73 0 0.78 0 120
Germany 9.1 savings accounts with 3 mths notice, higher interest none 0.93 0 0.92 0 0.91 0 0.88 0 0.67 0 1
Germany 9.2 savings accounts with 3 mths notice, higher interest up to 1 yr 0.97 0 0.98 0 0.98 0 0.98 0 0.68 0 6
Ireland 9.1 clearing banks demand deposits - households sight 0.89 0 0.86 0 0.81 0 0.46 0 0.40 0 1
Ireland 9.2 clearing banks demand deposits - enterprises sight 0.94 0 0.92 0 0.88 0 0.71 0 0.48 0 1Table C2: Cost of Funds Approach - Unit Root Tests Allowing for the Presense of a Structural Break 
CoF rate
country  (maturity in mth) min τ (level) min τ (diff) I(?) max F(level) max F(diff) I(?) min τ (level) min τ (diff) I(?) max F(level) max F(diff) I(?) min τ (level) min τ (diff) I(?)
Austria 1 -3.354 -5.962 1 11.667 26.032 1 -2.937 -5.909 1 6.629 25.755 1 -3.183 -6.050 0
3 -3.162 -5.543 1 10.643 23.263 1 -2.780 -5.493 1 4.984 22.937 1 -2.982 -5.627 0
6 -2.744 -5.108 1 9.064 19.976 1 -2.503 -5.077 1 5.453 19.711 1 -2.742 -5.288 0
12 -2.768 -4.934 1 9.175 18.582 1 -2.475 -4.923 1 5.178 18.563 1 -2.841 -5.323 0
120 -2.094 -5.998 1 7.632 28.483 1 -2.124 -6.001 1 4.810 26.902 1 -1.968 -6.815 1
Belgium 1 -2.400 -7.652 1 8.492 37.909 1 -2.364 -7.647 1 0.010 38.329 1 -2.514 -8.534 1
3 -2.404 -6.974 1 6.167 32.228 1 -2.337 -6.968 1 0.010 32.175 1 -2.430 -7.753 1
6 -2.468 -6.941 1 7.414 33.077 1 -2.369 -6.937 1 0.010 32.975 1 -2.472 -7.696 1
12 -2.446 -6.581 1 8.238 30.593 1 -2.365 -6.583 1 0.010 30.492 1 -2.349 -7.351 1
120 -2.181 -5.757 1 7.955 25.487 1 -2.257 -5.760 1 5.239 26.313 1 -1.879 -6.491 1
Finland 1 -3.558 -5.938 0 17.063 27.203 0 -3.295 -5.918 0 17.140 29.889 0 -3.843 -6.460 0
3 -3.572 -5.347 0 17.437 22.761 0 -3.322 -5.333 0 16.291 24.667 0 -3.879 -5.892 0
6 -3.455 -5.298 0 18.269 21.703 0 -3.359 -5.292 0 17.701 22.546 0 -3.997 -5.882 0
12 -3.155 -4.799 1 15.653 17.283 1 -3.102 -4.804 0 19.103 17.792 0 -3.670 -5.389 0
120 -2.113 -4.912 1 8.725 18.802 1 -2.125 -4.915 1 12.289 22.281 1 -2.415 -5.539 1
France 1 -5.116 -5.768 0 34.080 23.262 0 -4.983 -5.763 0 28.794 27.062 0 -5.811 -6.400 0
3 -5.429 -5.979 0 37.992 25.571 0 -5.284 -5.975 0 30.270 29.808 0 -6.074 -6.638 0
6 -4.708 -5.807 0 30.782 25.128 0 -4.551 -5.805 0 25.852 27.631 0 -5.315 -6.425 0
12 -3.618 -5.182 0 18.096 21.220 0 -3.519 -5.183 0 19.463 21.840 0 -4.126 -5.753 0
120 -1.825 -5.946 1 7.087 25.720 1 -1.843 -5.949 1 7.555 30.533 1 -2.032 -6.706 1
Germany 1 -3.002 -6.881 1 9.334 34.673 1 -2.589 -6.818 1 5.189 34.411 1 -2.914 -6.782 0
3 -2.977 -6.126 1 9.418 28.780 1 -2.578 -6.069 1 4.161 28.436 1 -2.855 -6.100 0
6 -2.690 -5.352 1 8.661 22.156 1 -2.411 -5.317 1 4.176 21.854 1 -2.669 -5.428 0
12 -2.618 -4.922 1 8.288 18.234 1 -2.353 -4.912 1 7.021 18.212 1 -2.531 -5.373 1
120 -1.970 -5.899 1 6.554 27.202 1 -1.991 -5.901 1 4.653 26.604 1 -2.065 -6.656 1
Ireland 1 -5.880 -4.615 0 46.877 14.295 0 -5.877 -4.614 0 35.273 15.037 0 -6.557 -5.249 0
3 -5.914 -4.501 0 37.809 15.428 0 -5.912 -4.499 0 27.774 14.373 0 -6.646 -5.054 0
6 -5.413 -4.675 0 28.233 19.121 0 -5.411 -4.674 0 22.574 15.613 0 -6.119 -5.222 0
12 -2.813 -5.055 1 8.872 31.595 1 -2.694 -5.046 1 6.228 31.595 1 -2.370 -5.621 1
120 -1.775 -5.577 1 8.026 23.300 1 -1.780 -5.579 1 0.010 25.334 1 -2.000 -6.295 1
Italy 1 -1.673 -6.393 1 5.016 30.141 1 -1.658 -6.389 1 5.152 36.222 1 -1.710 -7.200 1
3 -1.682 -6.688 1 5.303 32.468 1 -1.661 -6.685 1 8.349 41.308 1 -1.743 -7.529 1
6 -1.644 -6.786 1 5.509 34.151 1 -1.608 -6.785 1 8.298 44.017 1 -1.705 -7.644 1
12 -1.599 -6.346 1 5.534 30.285 1 -1.583 -6.347 1 7.478 38.752 1 -1.713 -7.160 1
120 -1.374 -5.505 1 6.194 23.866 1 -1.459 -5.506 1 6.198 32.751 1 -1.531 -6.210 1
Netherlands 1 -3.147 -5.825 1 10.252 25.388 1 -2.712 -5.766 1 7.290 25.092 1 -3.155 -5.719 0
3 -3.044 -5.752 1 9.835 25.204 1 -2.659 -5.702 1 7.132 24.886 1 -3.052 -5.813 0
6 -2.716 -5.510 1 8.742 23.256 1 -2.473 -5.479 1 7.792 22.988 1 -2.881 -5.726 0
12 -2.580 -5.063 1 8.060 19.071 1 -2.351 -5.053 1 8.110 18.979 1 -2.663 -5.567 0
120 -1.953 -5.971 1 6.261 27.442 1 -1.964 -5.974 1 5.780 27.756 1 -2.051 -6.742 1
Portugal 1 -3.103 -7.670 1 9.589 68.394 1 -3.800 -7.308 1 10.306 68.394 1 -2.881 -8.270 0
3 -2.950 -6.198 1 10.050 48.084 1 -3.579 -6.103 1 10.230 48.084 1 -1.780 -6.934 1
6 -2.575 -5.533 1 11.458 39.553 1 -3.097 -5.545 1 12.605 39.553 1 -1.340 -6.289 1
12 -2.509 -4.658 1 12.471 27.988 1 -3.009 -4.712 1 5.124 27.988 1 -1.262 -5.317 1
120 -1.781 -4.533 1 11.019 20.178 1 -2.147 -4.531 1 11.638 23.431 1 -1.288 -5.095 1
Spain 1 -2.395 -6.984 1 6.156 42.788 1 -2.333 -6.975 1 6.547 39.844 1 -2.364 -7.668 1
3 -2.486 -5.900 1 7.770 29.439 1 -2.467 -5.894 1 8.089 28.556 1 -2.569 -6.520 1
6 -2.357 -5.701 1 7.600 27.742 1 -2.298 -5.698 1 7.652 27.629 1 -2.460 -6.332 1
12 -2.229 -4.909 1 7.129 20.768 1 -2.150 -4.911 1 8.772 22.042 1 -2.307 -5.487 1
120 -1.352 -4.732 1 6.387 18.038 1 -1.431 -4.735 1 8.537 23.859 1 -1.361 -5.338 1
Note: This table presents the unit root test statistics for the cost of funds (CoF) proxy rates only as the results for the retail bank rates are already included in table B2. For critical values see notes
to table B2. 
recursive trend shift mean shiftTable C3: Cost of Funds Approach - Unit Root Tests 
I(?) I(?) I(?) I(?)
country bankrate start end t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5% t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5%
Austria 2 Apr-95 Feb-99 -2.264 -2.387 2 2 2.865 3.298 2 2 -2.020 -5.163 1 1 2.165 13.351 1 1
2 Mar-99 Oct-02 -0.777 -2.916 1 1 1.710 5.671 1 2 -2.273 -4.683 1 1 6.341 11.505 0 1
3 Apr-95 Aug-97 -1.674 -6.036 1 1 4.314 18.290 1 1 -1.260 -4.071 1 1 1.750 8.309 1 1
3 Sep-97 Oct-02 -1.618 -3.074 1 1 1.392 4.764 2 2 -1.285 -3.362 1 1 1.319 5.709 1 2
4 Apr-95 Aug-97 -0.708 -3.297 1 1 3.430 5.655 1 2 -1.347 -5.014 1 1 2.778 12.578 1 1
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 -1.550 -2.931 1 1 1.202 4.297 2 2 -1.221 -4.263 1 1 0.910 9.085 1 1
7 Apr-95 Nov-99 -2.302 -6.199 1 1 2.797 19.223 1 1 -2.449 -5.698 1 1 3.619 16.313 1 1
7 Dec-99 Oct-02 -1.703 -4.341 1 1 1.458 9.518 1 1 -2.214 -3.478 1 1 5.135 6.088 1 2
8 Apr-95 Mar-97 -1.753 -3.892 1 1 1.743 7.857 1 1 -1.243 -3.865 1 1 1.839 7.495 1 1
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 -1.626 -3.362 1 1 1.365 5.800 1 2 -1.475 -4.272 1 1 1.350 9.130 1 1
Belgium 2 Jan-93 Aug-95 -0.940 -2.783 1 2 0.711 3.931 2 2 -1.505 -3.251 1 1 1.215 5.365 2 2
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 -2.351 -4.919 1 1 2.995 12.244 1 1 -1.957 -5.486 1 1 2.188 15.128 1 1
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 -2.425 -2.700 1 2 3.299 3.682 2 2 -3.330 -4.915 0 0 5.734 12.079 0 1
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 -6.749 -6.864 0 0 24.445 23.566 0 0 -1.663 -4.514 1 1 1.552 10.491 1 1
4.1 Jan-93 Mar-95 -2.882 -4.249 0 0 4.301 9.088 1 1 -2.686 -3.719 0 1 3.615 6.976 1 1
4.1 Apr-95 Oct-02 -3.085 -5.199 0 0 5.236 13.516 1 1 -3.193 -6.043 0 0 6.229 18.376 0 1
4.2 Jan-94 Oct-02 -2.890 -8.126 0 0 7.769 33.570 0 0 -3.207 -6.182 0 0 6.469 19.746 0 1
5 Jan-93 Aug-96 -1.705 -4.472 1 1 1.455 10.240 1 1 -4.367 -4.968 0 0 9.537 12.395 0 0
5 Sep-96 Oct-02 -2.564 -4.563 1 1 3.344 10.466 1 1 -1.319 -4.360 1 1 1.144 9.514 1 1
8 Jan-94 Oct-02 -2.666 -6.274 0 1 4.516 20.020 1 1 -2.413 -7.111 1 1 3.667 26.382 1 1
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 -2.128 -3.972 1 1 2.277 7.894 1 1 -3.142 -4.175 0 0 4.942 8.736 1 1
9 Jan-96 Oct-02 -7.864 -7.655 0 0 35.220 29.304 0 0 -1.796 -4.914 1 1 1.620 12.142 1 1
Finland 2 Apr-94 Oct-02 -1.723 -4.488 1 1 1.498 10.141 1 1 -2.121 -5.371 1 1 2.324 14.437 1 1
3 Jan-93 Sep-97 -2.501 -5.644 1 1 3.814 16.013 1 1 -2.742 -3.829 0 1 5.256 7.568 1 1
3 Oct-97 Oct-02 -1.271 -3.744 1 1 0.887 7.014 1 1 -1.347 -3.500 1 1 1.258 6.135 1 2
5 Jan-93 Apr-98 -2.857 -6.580 0 1 5.727 21.663 0 1 -3.256 -4.536 0 0 8.231 10.664 0 0
5 May-98 Oct-02 -1.284 -5.090 1 1 0.825 12.959 1 1 -1.072 -3.320 1 1 0.827 5.515 1 2
7 Jan-93 Feb-98 -4.314 -5.783 0 0 11.739 16.725 0 0 -3.099 -4.924 0 0 7.705 12.484 0 0
7 Mar-98 Oct-02 -1.564 -4.597 1 1 1.223 10.573 1 1 -1.098 -3.906 1 1 0.880 7.632 1 1
8 Jan-93 Nov-99 -3.778 -3.620 0 0 8.227 6.788 0 0 -3.442 -4.975 0 0 9.671 12.471 0 0
8 Dec-99 Oct-02 -2.152 -3.830 1 1 2.570 7.334 1 1 -1.489 -3.403 1 1 2.162 6.115 1 2
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 -2.795 -5.604 0 1 4.697 15.716 1 1 -4.837 -4.341 0 0 14.407 9.458 0 0
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 -2.795 -5.604 0 1 4.697 15.716 1 1 -4.837 -4.341 0 0 14.407 9.458 0 0
5 Jan-93 Apr-97 -1.918 -6.087 1 1 1.988 18.538 1 1 -4.512 -4.463 0 0 11.856 9.973 0 0
5 May-97 Oct-02 -1.832 -5.913 1 1 1.953 17.589 1 1 -1.204 -3.830 1 1 1.135 7.358 1 1
8 Jan-93 Oct-02 -4.689 -7.069 0 0 12.958 25.022 0 0 -6.074 -6.638 0 0 21.654 22.123 0 0
9 Jan-93 May-98 -2.161 -5.703 1 1 2.346 16.267 1 1 -5.734 -5.056 0 0 19.734 12.840 0 0
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 -2.589 -5.142 0 1 4.166 13.223 1 1 -1.257 -3.648 1 1 0.900 6.655 1 1
Germany 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 -1.913 -2.043 2 2 1.900 2.950 2 2 -1.720 -2.938 1 1 1.481 5.013 2 2
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 -2.384 -5.216 1 1 2.895 13.703 1 1 -1.789 -5.743 1 1 1.666 16.706 1 1
3 Jan-93 Mar-97 -2.378 -5.131 1 1 2.956 13.179 1 1 -2.271 -4.238 1 1 3.241 8.985 1 1
3 Apr-97 Oct-02 -1.627 -4.351 1 1 2.199 9.544 1 1 -1.271 -3.636 1 1 1.431 6.666 1 1
4 Jan-93 Feb-01 -1.019 -5.158 1 1 12.215 13.531 0 0 -1.477 -7.527 1 1 9.345 28.347 0 0
4 Mar-01 Oct-02 -0.944 -3.823 1 1 1.580 7.407 1 1 -1.031 -2.383 2 2 0.848 2.845 2 2
5 Nov-96 Oct-02 -2.192 -4.238 1 1 2.405 8.982 1 1 -1.304 -4.147 1 1 1.367 8.692 1 1
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 -2.920 -5.495 0 0 8.654 15.121 0 0 -2.636 -6.218 0 1 6.485 19.332 0 1
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 -1.951 -3.057 1 1 3.586 4.677 2 2 -2.381 -3.617 1 1 5.664 6.554 0 1
bank rate cost of funds rate
sampleTable C3: Cost of Funds Approach - Unit Root Tests 
I(?) I(?) I(?) I(?)
country bankrate start end t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5% t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5%
bank rate cost of funds rate
sample
8.2 Jan-93 Oct-02 -2.698 -5.336 0 1 5.237 14.258 1 1 -2.855 -6.100 0 1 6.252 18.627 0 1
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 -3.082 -5.742 0 0 9.524 16.500 0 0 -2.636 -6.218 0 1 6.485 19.332 0 1
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 -1.900 -2.182 2 2 3.169 2.389 2 2 -2.381 -3.617 1 1 5.664 6.554 0 1
9.2 Jan-93 Nov-95 -2.244 -3.136 1 1 2.704 5.350 2 2 -1.944 -4.446 1 1 3.265 9.883 1 1
9.2 Dec-95 Oct-02 -2.250 -3.688 1 1 2.565 6.908 1 1 -2.086 -4.892 1 1 2.183 11.975 1 1
Ireland 1 Jan-93 Dec-98 -11.041 -5.437 0 0 66.145 15.936 0 0 -7.378 -3.588 0 0 28.603 8.433 0 0
1 Jan-99 Oct-02 -1.087 -3.471 1 1 1.028 6.054 1 2 -1.201 -4.402 1 1 0.847 10.629 1 1
2 Apr-94 Oct-02 -2.273 -6.124 1 1 2.607 18.756 1 1 -2.148 -6.584 1 1 2.461 21.682 1 1
4 Jan-94 Oct-02 -2.245 -5.328 1 1 2.578 14.214 1 1 -1.996 -5.850 1 1 2.001 17.135 1 1
5 Jan-94 Oct-02 -2.558 -4.996 1 1 3.438 12.531 1 1 -2.334 -5.820 1 1 2.852 17.016 1 1
6 Jan-93 Oct-02 -2.985 -10.701 0 0 4.707 58.388 1 1 -6.557 -5.249 0 0 23.039 14.756 0 0
9.1 Jan-94 Oct-02 -5.965 -12.608 0 0 19.570 80.396 0 0 -2.266 -6.342 1 1 2.583 20.125 1 1
9.2 Jan-94 Oct-02 -2.369 -6.358 1 1 2.808 20.295 1 1 -2.266 -6.342 1 1 2.583 20.125 1 1
Italy 2 Jan-95 May-98 -3.136 -5.819 0 0 12.740 17.248 0 0 -4.240 -4.854 0 0 9.383 11.831 0 0
2 Jun-98 Oct-02 -2.746 -4.246 0 1 4.599 9.266 1 1 -1.554 -3.848 1 1 1.265 7.435 1 1
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-99 -1.596 -3.285 1 1 1.431 5.742 1 2 -1.159 -6.415 1 1 0.776 20.704 1 1
4.1 Aug-99 Oct-02 -1.655 -2.621 1 2 2.499 3.473 2 2 -1.285 -3.560 1 1 3.148 6.338 1 2
4.2 Jul-94 Oct-02 -2.368 -3.717 1 1 2.868 6.961 1 1 -1.804 -5.956 1 1 1.781 17.764 1 1
5 Jan-95 Dec-96 -0.738 -6.801 1 1 13.854 23.761 0 0 -2.097 -5.856 1 1 6.519 17.225 0 0
5 Jan-97 Oct-02 -1.630 -6.624 1 1 3.054 22.070 1 1 -1.315 -4.657 1 1 1.062 11.126 1 1
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 -0.624 -3.781 1 1 1.971 7.219 1 1 -1.395 -6.114 1 1 3.935 19.228 1 1
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 -0.879 -4.600 1 1 0.552 10.583 1 1 -1.353 -5.396 1 1 0.922 14.559 1 1
8 Feb-95 Jan-97 -1.297 -5.018 1 1 4.372 12.777 1 1 -2.372 -5.013 1 1 6.165 12.614 0 1
8 Feb-97 Oct-02 -1.995 -3.647 1 1 2.675 6.899 1 1 -1.493 -4.764 1 1 1.518 11.352 1 1
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 -2.076 -2.598 1 2 2.201 4.311 2 2 -1.956 -3.076 1 1 1.943 5.621 1 2
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 -2.540 -4.907 1 1 3.296 12.249 1 1 -1.876 -5.779 1 1 1.917 16.879 1 1
4 Jan-93 Aug-98 -2.068 -5.284 1 1 18.973 14.040 0 0 -1.843 -5.385 1 1 8.275 14.499 0 0
4 Sep-98 Oct-02 -0.821 -3.696 1 1 0.714 6.829 1 1 -0.987 -3.658 1 1 0.658 6.690 1 1
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 -5.760 -7.662 0 0 21.668 30.068 0 0 -2.060 -5.414 1 1 8.999 14.692 0 0
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 -4.459 -5.052 0 0 10.275 12.774 0 0 -0.913 -3.507 1 1 0.615 6.164 1 2
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 -2.016 -2.708 1 2 2.129 4.175 2 2 -2.773 -3.081 0 1 5.009 4.750 2 2
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 -2.498 -4.108 1 1 3.174 8.548 1 1 -1.987 -5.181 1 1 1.979 13.422 1 1
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 -2.498 -4.108 1 1 3.174 8.548 1 1 -1.987 -5.181 1 1 1.979 13.422 1 1
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 -2.302 -4.303 1 1 2.706 9.564 1 1 -1.804 -5.206 1 1 1.636 13.585 1 1
Portugal 2 Aug-93 Dec-95 -2.309 -2.999 1 1 6.908 4.723 0 0 -0.443 -2.115 2 2 0.842 3.058 2 2
2 Jan-96 Oct-02 -1.355 -3.688 1 1 2.511 6.805 1 1 -2.649 -5.700 0 1 6.727 16.473 0 0
3 Oct-94 Apr-98 -2.351 -7.148 1 1 3.690 25.550 1 1 -2.469 -4.224 1 1 3.145 8.984 1 1
3 May-98 Oct-02 -5.318 -5.995 0 0 14.645 17.977 0 0 -1.176 -3.038 1 1 0.886 4.793 2 2
4.1 Oct-94 Oct-99 -2.572 -6.438 0 1 3.450 20.885 1 1 -4.569 -8.756 0 0 10.467 38.386 0 0
4.1 Nov-99 Oct-02 -1.468 -3.135 1 1 2.076 4.922 2 2 -2.236 -3.677 1 1 5.968 6.764 0 1
4.2 Oct-94 Nov-99 -4.279 -10.052 0 0 9.221 50.588 0 0 -4.181 -8.527 0 0 8.746 36.467 0 0
4.2 Dec-99 Oct-02 -1.894 -5.575 1 1 3.866 15.564 1 1 -2.210 -3.444 1 1 5.187 5.969 1 2
8.1 Oct-94 Nov-00 2.043 -4.809 1 1 6.096 11.570 0 1 0.755 -6.627 1 1 3.087 22.025 1 1
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 -2.132 -4.363 1 1 4.759 9.596 1 1 -2.333 -4.956 1 1 4.770 12.286 1 1
8.2 Jan-93 Feb-96 -1.993 -2.413 2 2 2.410 3.384 2 2 -2.036 -4.205 1 1 3.309 8.916 1 1
8.2 Oct-94 Jul-96 -0.489 -2.505 2 2 3.939 3.156 2 2 -2.612 -4.919 0 1 4.276 12.318 1 1
8.2 Aug-96 Oct-02 -2.120 -4.646 1 1 6.521 10.799 0 0 -1.741 -4.484 1 1 2.359 10.070 1 1Table C3: Cost of Funds Approach - Unit Root Tests 
I(?) I(?) I(?) I(?)
country bankrate start end t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5% t(level) t(diff) 10% 5% F(level) F(diff) 10% 5%
bank rate cost of funds rate
sample
Spain 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 -1.780 -2.833 1 2 2.277 4.016 2 2 -1.279 -3.086 1 1 0.820 4.772 2 2
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 -2.723 -2.468 0 2 4.093 3.179 2 2 -3.756 -4.559 0 0 9.342 10.409 0 0
3 Apr-94 Oct-02 -1.236 -8.891 1 1 0.936 39.633 1 1 -1.250 -4.835 1 1 0.782 11.688 1 1
4 Jan-93 Nov-96 -2.276 -4.316 1 1 4.300 9.623 1 1 -1.680 -5.297 1 1 2.376 14.240 1 1
4 Dec-96 Oct-02 -2.671 -4.873 0 1 5.356 11.883 1 1 -2.100 -4.254 1 1 3.202 9.056 1 1
5 Jan-93 Sep-94 -1.085 -4.070 1 1 1.575 9.256 1 1 -0.894 -3.744 1 1 1.112 7.198 1 1
5 Oct-94 Oct-02 -0.725 -5.594 1 1 0.909 15.692 1 1 -1.110 -4.612 1 1 0.634 10.634 1 1
7 Jan-93 Jan-95 0.314 -2.616 1 2 1.359 8.012 1 1 -0.643 -5.045 1 1 0.983 13.694 1 1
7 Feb-95 Oct-02 -0.599 -5.123 1 1 2.171 13.345 1 1 -1.038 -4.478 1 1 0.745 10.161 1 1
8 Jan-94 Oct-02 -1.332 -4.313 1 1 1.047 9.406 1 1 -1.193 -4.980 1 1 0.918 12.466 1 1
See notes to Table B3.Table C4: Cost of Funds Approach - Symmetric Cointegration
intercept t slope t
country bankrate start end coeff statistic coeff statistic DW DF ADF coint?
Austria 2 Apr-95 Feb-99 1.9157 2.8400 1.3078 6.9691 0.1956 -1.2235  no
2 Mar-99 Oct-02 3.4990 57.5435 0.5944 37.2785 1.3615 -4.6566  yes
3 Apr-95 Aug-97 3.2415 5.5966 1.4217 9.3862 0.3792 -1.4218  no
3 Sep-97 Oct-02 5.0189 18.0417 0.5535 7.8910 0.1113 -2.1501 -1.8570 no
4 Apr-95 Aug-97 3.0895 6.3539 1.1908 8.9302 0.4462 -1.5136  yes
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 4.1250 25.1289 0.5618 12.7597 0.2160 -2.5670 -2.1707 no
7 Apr-95 Nov-99 -0.0814 -1.4138 0.1566 9.4412 0.2929 -2.1359  no
7 Dec-99 Oct-02 0.1352 7.3166 0.0402 8.7949 0.5332 -2.7219  yes
8 Apr-95 Mar-97 0.8117 4.3749 0.6726 13.8620 0.5353 -1.3017  yes
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 1.1356 10.3880 0.3982 13.7092 0.2589 -2.4140  no
Belgium 2 Jan-93 Aug-95 3.8251 13.8678 0.6103 11.6811 0.1739 -1.4247  no
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 0.2257 0.4742 1.1353 12.1164 0.2295 -2.3506  no
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 9.1264 12.0940 0.4212 3.5164 0.2732 -2.0283  no
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 5.7003 20.4220 0.4108 5.7068 0.1963 -2.1598  no
4.1 Jan-93 Mar-95 4.1972 14.0263 0.4435 10.8344 1.1017 -3.5079 -3.5149 yes
4.1 Apr-95 Oct-02 1.4843 9.2230 0.8379 19.7118 0.5617 -3.7804 -3.9798 yes
5 Jan-93 Aug-96 6.7515 16.6441 0.2442 3.5898 0.3033 -1.8089 -2.1169 no
5 Sep-96 Oct-02 4.7380 13.1523 0.4148 4.3761 0.1516 -1.9451 -2.3700 no
8 Jan-94 Oct-02 -0.1800 -2.7786 0.8572 55.0502 1.3584 -7.2897 -3.8986 yes
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 2.5424 11.3434 0.3544 10.3715 1.2060 -3.9250 -4.1495 yes
Finland 2 Apr-94 Oct-02 2.4392 3.9361 0.5541 4.6206 0.0793 -0.9985 -3.5242 yes
3 Jan-93 Sep-97 3.7892 16.8202 0.9580 25.3111 0.6946 -3.4316 -1.7270 yes
3 Oct-97 Oct-02 3.1827 13.1746 0.8170 13.5562 0.2933 -2.5837  no
5 Jan-93 Apr-98 1.5327 10.3116 0.9722 36.2251 1.3525 -5.6222 -3.3645 yes
5 May-98 Oct-02 0.9660 5.2876 0.9508 20.2998 1.2913 -5.1341 -1.9356 yes
7 Mar-98 Oct-02 0.1624 2.9391 0.1791 12.2649 0.4254 -2.6289  yes
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 4.8572 20.9688 0.5436 15.1470 0.5024 -2.7181  yes
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 2.2018 11.0393 0.7657 14.2350 0.6844 -4.4241  yes
5 Jan-93 Apr-97 4.6738 22.3749 0.5930 17.7759 0.4739 -2.2276 -2.3969 yes
5 May-97 Oct-02 2.3101 8.3135 0.7342 10.0638 0.2596 -2.7753  no
8 Jan-93 Oct-02 0.1739 2.6376 0.9560 74.3301 1.7477 -9.7729 -8.0578 yes
9 Jan-93 May-98 3.2295 36.2328 0.1401 9.4138 0.2624 -2.6081  no
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 2.7035 13.1409 0.0671 1.2408 0.2184 -1.7603  no
Germany 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 0.7782 2.1993 1.0147 19.4760 0.9384 -3.1904  yes
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 2.0796 9.9676 0.7261 18.4099 0.1873 -2.1801 -2.2996 no
3 Jan-93 Mar-97 8.8120 57.0857 0.8608 28.8249 0.3110 -1.9372 -2.0765 no
3 Apr-97 Oct-02 10.2096 47.6881 0.1036 1.8843 0.0428 -1.8960 -1.4917 no
4 Jan-93 Feb-01 5.1929 92.5332 0.7828 64.3855 0.5086 -3.7530  yes
4 Mar-01 Oct-02 7.6632 87.4703 0.2462 10.8775 0.7080 -1.6211  yes
5 Nov-96 Oct-02 4.5146 19.9183 0.4926 8.1378 0.1087 -1.8290  no
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 -0.3650 -3.6186 0.7968 31.9517 1.0870 -3.7107  yes
8.2 Jan-93 Oct-02 0.0236 1.1075 0.8325 175.0683 1.0571 -6.4404 -4.4040 yes
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 0.7363 8.2172 0.3328 15.0202 0.2778 -1.9633 -2.6739 no
9.2 Jan-93 Nov-95 1.6643 9.3696 0.5689 19.2660 0.1907 -1.4689 -1.4801 no
9.2 Dec-95 Oct-02 0.8137 8.7884 0.6705 26.5055 0.3798 -2.3339  no
Ireland 1 Jan-99 Oct-02 8.0550 64.4695 0.8613 26.1178 0.6867 -3.5040 -2.3720 yes
2 Apr-94 Oct-02 3.2024 8.4085 0.5005 8.2115 0.0838 -1.4044 -2.2022 no
4 Jan-94 Oct-02 6.8318 68.5830 0.5719 29.0425 0.3956 -3.3478 -1.9251 yes
5 Jan-94 Oct-02 6.5651 49.8268 0.3929 15.3057 0.2357 -2.5421  no
6 Jan-93 Oct-02 0.2172 1.4561 1.0572 41.5190 1.3890 -13.3485 -9.2073 yes
9.1 Jan-94 Oct-02 -0.1446 -3.1009 0.0971 10.6443 0.2246 -2.4876 -3.2038 yes
9.2 Jan-94 Oct-02 -0.4944 -7.9904 0.2396 19.7857 0.4127 -3.4117 -3.7193 yes
Italy 2 Jan-95 May-98 6.4910 15.4093 0.5922 13.3261 0.2287 -2.1118 -1.4596 no
2 Jun-98 Oct-02 5.6484 6.5266 0.1192 0.7047 0.1143 -2.2716 -2.5638 no
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-99 2.6914 17.8194 1.0168 55.6649 0.5233 -3.4068 -3.2840 yes
4.1 Aug-99 Oct-02 3.4692 40.2400 0.6836 31.1311 1.0076 -3.5081  yes
4.2 Jul-94 Oct-02 0.1948 3.1977 0.9467 101.3713 0.7223 -5.1440  yes
5 Jan-95 Dec-96 5.9053 9.2449 0.5322 8.1397 0.5004 -1.8994  yes
5 Jan-97 Oct-02 1.2608 10.8701 1.0109 40.7310 1.0103 -5.1766 -3.2156 yes
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 0.1411 0.5083 0.5928 20.2040 0.9199 -3.4305  yes
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 -0.7889 -13.1452 0.6334 66.6923 0.3297 -3.1926  yes
8 Feb-95 Jan-97 1.1285 2.3670 0.7417 14.9663 0.9651 -2.9164  yes
8 Feb-97 Oct-02 0.7356 11.6171 0.6375 47.2703 0.5705 -3.5133  yes
sampleTable C4: Cost of Funds Approach - Symmetric Cointegration
intercept t slope t
country bankrate start end coeff statistic coeff statistic DW DF ADF coint?
sample
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 2.5756 6.5959 0.7570 13.1473 0.6496 -2.7524  yes
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 2.3154 11.5781 0.7026 18.7639 0.2472 -2.4891 -2.6437 no
4 Jan-93 Aug-98 -0.0459 -0.6085 1.0631 66.5705 0.9958 -4.6675  yes
4 Sep-98 Oct-02 0.5823 5.4902 1.0036 35.5439 2.1795 -7.9103  yes
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 3.3039 9.6124 0.3266 5.4303 0.1967 -1.3259  no
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 1.4518 10.5731 0.5586 14.6674 0.4145 -3.3993 -3.3815 yes
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 5.3056 11.2374 0.0629 0.7555 0.1418 -1.1664  no
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 2.9408 13.0008 0.2968 4.7289 0.1076 -1.5751 -2.4643 no
Portugal 2 Aug-93 Dec-95 19.6740 14.3915 -0.5843 -4.6170 0.2041 -2.8311 -1.8666 no
2 Jan-96 Oct-02 -1.5971 -3.0430 1.5010 17.1523 0.1110 -1.5749  no
3 Oct-94 Apr-98 9.3184 21.3466 0.7839 14.5587 0.6084 -2.5810  yes
4.1 Oct-94 Oct-99 4.1055 30.2305 1.2363 61.8130 1.4244 -5.8851 -5.8007 yes
4.1 Nov-99 Oct-02 4.9251 32.3270 0.6504 17.1418 1.6200 -5.9287  yes
4.2 Dec-99 Oct-02 2.6193 11.4851 0.7654 13.5679 1.3194 -4.0268  yes
8.1 Oct-94 Nov-00 0.0294 0.3903 0.8585 74.2016 0.5560 -3.4224 -3.8802 yes
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 0.6771 5.8005 0.7696 26.3144 1.8099 -4.2212  yes
8.2 Oct-94 Jul-96 2.0481 4.2209 0.6230 12.0590 0.6398 -1.7272  yes
8.2 Aug-96 Oct-02 0.1626 1.6166 0.7449 33.8465 0.3138 -2.5225 -1.7475 no
Spain 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 6.1500 3.0342 0.5263 2.6997 0.0346 -1.4279 -2.3212 no
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 0.3213 0.7602 1.0195 13.1892 0.1766 -1.9513 -2.5511 no
3 Apr-94 Oct-02 4.0743 23.1971 1.0986 38.0417 0.4116 -3.6482  yes
4 Jan-93 Nov-96 1.2472 3.9888 0.9678 29.7978 2.3918 -8.1934 -9.6532 yes
4 Dec-96 Oct-02 1.7926 16.2425 0.7892 30.6875 1.3988 -6.1301 -3.7677 yes
5 Jan-93 Sep-94 4.7286 10.7309 0.8466 19.8191 0.8867 -2.6050  yes
5 Oct-94 Oct-02 2.3888 32.2050 0.9964 77.6270 0.9466 -5.4870 -3.2349 yes
7 Jan-93 Jan-95 2.0640 7.2568 0.3723 13.7333 1.1138 -2.9814  yes
7 Feb-95 Oct-02 0.1574 4.0730 0.5062 73.2773 0.6550 -4.5553  yes
8 Jan-94 Oct-02 -0.6695 -9.9503 0.9249 82.0820 0.3981 -3.3308 -2.4720 yes
See notes to Table B4.Table C5: Cost of Funds Approach - Determination of Optimal Pass-Through Model
Engle optimal
best TAR coint test  -Granger pass-through




MTAR* (min AIC)H0: Σ  ρ j=0 H0: ρ 1=ρ 2 H0: ρ 1=ρ 3 H0: ρ 2=ρ 3 coint? coint? model
Austria 2 Apr-95 Feb-99 -5.75 -17.24 -19.95 -6.95 -10.70 BTAR* 7.11 17.06 8.55 4.16 yes,asym no BTAR*
2 Mar-99 Oct-02 -24.24 -24.87 -25.55 -24.45 -28.87 MTAR* 5.42 4.78 no yes SYM
3 Apr-95 Aug-97 12.79 12.46 13.01 12.96 11.14 MTAR* 1.84 1.74 no no STD
3 Sep-97 Oct-02 50.12 43.11 16.89 50.77 49.49 BTAR* 19.85 0.00 43.29 46.13 yes,asym no BTAR*
4 Apr-95 Aug-97 6.18 0.09 0.62 7.37 4.07 TAR* 6.07 9.16 yes,asym yes TAR*
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 21.14 11.01 -2.69 24.51 21.01 BTAR* 19.79 0.64 30.75 37.25 yes,asym no BTAR*
7 Apr-95 Nov-99 -162.37 -162.96 -165.80 -164.53 -167.56 MTAR* 3.55 3.21 no no STD
7 Dec-99 Oct-02 -173.43 -181.75 -181.51 -174.23 -180.51 TAR* 15.00 13.64 yes,asym yes TAR*
8 Apr-95 Mar-97 -34.66 -35.49 -35.03 -31.61 -32.95 TAR* 2.10 2.40 no yes SYM
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 -37.83 -41.43 -37.74 -38.38 -41.31 TAR* 6.80 3.61 yes,asym no TAR*
Belgium 2 Jan-93 Aug-95 7.30 5.56 3.37 6.66 5.91 BTAR* 6.25 5.97 0.88 5.88 yes,asym no BTAR*
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 61.86 61.21 60.09 62.24 59.51 MTAR* 2.49 2.72 no no STD
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 45.44 42.29 41.66 44.35 40.31 MTAR* 3.85 4.50 no no STD
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL
4.1 Jan-93 Mar-95 18.78 15.34 14.92 18.89 13.64 MTAR* 8.61 11.31 yes,asym yes MTAR*
4.1 Apr-95 Oct-02 110.84 110.34 109.09 110.95 109.53 BTAR* 6.36 3.67 0.11 3.75 yes,asym yes BTAR*
4.2 Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL
5 Jan-93 Aug-96 68.47 65.97 65.82 68.72 45.12 MTAR* 15.87 27.51 yes,asym no MTAR*
5 Sep-96 Oct-02 105.99 103.85 104.51 105.42 104.28 TAR* 3.59 2.12 no no STD
8 Jan-94 Oct-02 89.92 87.45 82.76 89.44 87.09 BTAR* 41.48 8.36 0.57 7.23 yes,asym yes BTAR*
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 38.88 35.86 31.40 38.56 34.45 BTAR* 4.76 9.32 0.25 5.56 no yes SYM
9 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL
Finland 2 Apr-94 Oct-02 139.80 139.21 134.08 139.14 136.03 BTAR* 7.62 7.44 0.32 7.48 yes,asym yes BTAR*
3 Jan-93 Sep-97 88.26 87.02 88.93 88.34 74.44 MTAR* 9.57 14.10 yes,asym yes MTAR*
3 Oct-97 Oct-02 55.23 53.35 53.10 48.89 45.51 MTAR* 9.25 13.26 yes,asym no MTAR*
5 Jan-93 Apr-98 112.28 110.20 109.40 112.69 110.91 BTAR* 3.72 4.43 0.36 4.65 no yes SYM
5 May-98 Oct-02 51.91 50.78 51.06 51.76 50.17 MTAR* 2.86 1.64 no yes SYM
7 Jan-93 Feb-98 STD_LL
7 Mar-98 Oct-02 -100.27 -101.63 -103.17 -102.07 -104.83 MTAR* 7.46 4.81 yes,asym yes MTAR*
8 Jan-93 Nov-99 STD_LL
8 Dec-99 Oct-02 STD_LL
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 92.64 91.15 88.08 91.82 88.77 BTAR* 3.88 4.58 0.45 4.71 no yes SYM
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 85.56 81.20 82.00 89.52 82.08 TAR* 20.08 9.12 yes,asym yes TAR*
5 Jan-93 Apr-97 51.40 50.98 49.07 52.03 45.45 MTAR* 5.02 6.29 no yes SYM
5 May-97 Oct-02 97.55 84.06 79.38 94.47 50.31 MTAR* 49.41 76.60 yes,asym no MTAR*
8 Jan-93 Oct-02 223.65 220.93 213.67 223.17 221.14 BTAR* 18.36 12.26 0.49 9.46 yes,asym yes BTAR*
9 Jan-93 May-98 1.21 -8.65 -6.73 0.44 -21.20 MTAR* 19.84 26.20 yes,asym no MTAR*
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 -0.91 -1.86 -0.48 -2.32 -3.99 MTAR* 3.42 3.06 no no STD
Germany 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 -17.78 -19.32 -18.07 -20.52 -24.94 MTAR* 10.84 8.64 yes,asym yes MTAR*
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 30.50 28.92 27.22 30.74 26.55 MTAR* 4.82 4.31 no no STD
3 Jan-93 Mar-97 0.92 -2.23 -0.94 -0.23 -3.94 MTAR* 4.87 4.52 no no STD
3 Apr-97 Oct-02 6.14 3.32 7.32 5.88 3.08 MTAR* 3.66 3.11 no no STD
4 Jan-93 Feb-01 37.20 35.17 26.90 36.48 30.68 BTAR* 9.71 12.52 0.71 12.78 yes,asym yes BTAR*
4 Mar-01 Oct-02 -60.48 -61.67 -60.88 -60.83 -61.94 MTAR* 2.12 1.40 no yes SYM
cointegration based on best TAR
sample period AIC of different TAR-type models asymmetry testsTable C5: Cost of Funds Approach - Determination of Optimal Pass-Through Model
Engle optimal
best TAR coint test  -Granger pass-through




MTAR* (min AIC)H0: Σ  ρ j=0 H0: ρ 1=ρ 2 H0: ρ 1=ρ 3 H0: ρ 2=ρ 3 coint? coint? model
cointegration based on best TAR
sample period AIC of different TAR-type models asymmetry tests
5 Nov-96 Oct-02 -17.08 -26.80 -30.93 -17.73 -24.55 BTAR* 8.15 17.14 5.78 7.99 yes,asym no BTAR*
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 -44.35 -46.76 -51.95 -45.30 -46.08 BTAR* 9.28 8.20 0.01 7.29 yes,asym yes BTAR*
8.2 Jan-93 Oct-02 -103.19 -104.05 -113.55 -103.18 -104.01 BTAR* 8.15 12.23 0.00 12.26 yes,asym yes BTAR*
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 -86.70 -87.53 -94.52 -85.81 -89.19 BTAR* 4.16 10.10 1.09 9.66 no no STD
9.2 Jan-93 Nov-95 -47.95 -48.12 -49.31 -50.45 -52.67 MTAR* 4.70 4.40 no no STD
9.2 Dec-95 Oct-02 -32.28 -33.99 -34.78 -32.22 -34.14 BTAR* 4.25 4.35 0.68 2.73 no no STD
Ireland 1 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL
1 Jan-99 Oct-02 0.88 -6.38 -4.79 -0.83 -5.90 TAR* 4.42 7.86 no yes SYM
2 Apr-94 Oct-02 204.74 204.10 201.43 204.75 200.84 MTAR* 3.37 3.87 no no STD
4 Jan-94 Oct-02 84.72 74.09 73.80 81.24 78.39 BTAR* 5.96 13.59 0.31 13.05 yes,asym yes BTAR*
5 Jan-94 Oct-02 100.70 99.91 97.57 100.76 92.56 MTAR* 7.59 8.42 yes,asym no MTAR*
6 Jan-93 Oct-02 222.40 217.02 213.50 221.14 217.42 BTAR* 20.20 10.99 1.87 5.37 yes,asym yes BTAR*
9.1 Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL
9.2 Jan-94 Oct-02 -4.59 -7.76 -4.93 -10.89 -11.68 MTAR* 7.48 6.96 yes,asym yes MTAR*
Italy 2 Jan-95 May-98 STD_LL
2 Jun-98 Oct-02 111.00 101.34 97.15 112.24 36.21 MTAR* 109.54 171.85 yes,asym no MTAR*
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-99 123.08 122.88 117.97 123.05 122.24 BTAR* 3.93 6.86 0.02 6.85 no yes SYM
4.1 Aug-99 Oct-02 -46.74 -47.26 -45.98 -47.05 -48.64 MTAR* 3.83 1.80 no yes SYM
4.2 Jul-94 Oct-02 116.67 114.13 114.03 115.88 113.13 MTAR* 13.40 3.89 yes,asym yes MTAR*
5 Jan-95 Dec-96 16.77 15.94 11.91 13.72 13.06 BTAR* 3.52 5.48 0.01 5.54 no yes SYM
5 Jan-97 Oct-02 98.93 98.31 98.95 98.62 87.16 MTAR* 10.39 12.10 yes,asym yes MTAR*
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 -11.59 -12.10 -15.17 -12.13 -12.13 BTAR* 2.46 4.60 1.18 4.93 no yes SYM
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 43.46 42.32 41.43 43.42 41.52 BTAR* 4.32 3.98 0.00 3.98 no yes SYM
8 Feb-95 Jan-97 14.98 13.44 12.45 14.80 14.17 BTAR* 5.00 3.95 0.46 4.36 no yes SYM
8 Feb-97 Oct-02 -1.28 -6.40 -3.02 0.52 -1.87 TAR* 15.49 7.48 yes,asym yes TAR*
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 -11.78 -12.02 -12.24 -12.07 -14.61 MTAR* 5.63 2.63 no yes SYM
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 27.84 24.93 22.81 27.36 23.70 BTAR* 5.09 7.79 0.58 4.68 no no STD
4 Jan-93 Aug-98 50.66 48.54 49.25 46.82 44.75 MTAR* 9.25 5.87 yes,asym yes MTAR*
4 Sep-98 Oct-02 2.40 -10.60 -12.11 2.87 0.41 BTAR* 37.08 19.39 9.19 8.01 yes,asym yes BTAR*
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 STD_LL
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 3.19 0.04 0.79 3.02 -0.57 MTAR* 4.12 3.37 no no STD
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 52.92 49.89 46.63 51.58 44.83 MTAR* 8.49 8.39 yes,asym yes MTAR*
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 12.43 11.85 7.45 12.48 10.12 BTAR* 4.06 6.06 0.03 6.08 no no STD
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 61.71 57.66 59.49 62.53 50.99 MTAR* 9.51 12.40 yes,asym no MTAR*
Portugal 2 Aug-93 Dec-95 64.49 62.75 61.81 64.55 63.62 BTAR* 3.09 2.77 0.99 4.63 no no STD
2 Jan-96 Oct-02 141.47 140.42 141.00 139.34 136.80 MTAR* 6.12 4.78 yes,asym no MTAR*
3 Oct-94 Apr-98 123.60 118.82 120.62 123.96 120.57 TAR* 6.52 5.27 yes,asym yes TAR*
3 May-98 Oct-02 STD_LL
4.1 Oct-94 Oct-99 125.73 124.03 122.80 125.73 123.19 BTAR* 8.17 4.32 0.44 3.00 yes,asym yes BTAR*
4.1 Nov-99 Oct-02 -6.35 -6.94 -8.24 -8.11 -9.39 MTAR* 22.04 3.01 yes,asym yes MTAR*
4.2 Oct-94 Nov-99 STD_LLTable C5: Cost of Funds Approach - Determination of Optimal Pass-Through Model
Engle optimal
best TAR coint test  -Granger pass-through




MTAR* (min AIC)H0: Σ  ρ j=0 H0: ρ 1=ρ 2 H0: ρ 1=ρ 3 H0: ρ 2=ρ 3 coint? coint? model
cointegration based on best TAR
sample period AIC of different TAR-type models asymmetry tests
4.2 Dec-99 Oct-02 10.97 8.36 10.14 12.49 10.70 TAR* 12.48 5.15 yes,asym yes TAR*
8.1 Oct-94 Nov-00 62.63 61.87 61.21 59.43 50.73 MTAR* 9.11 12.70 yes,asym yes MTAR*
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 -37.86 -38.24 -37.84 -38.15 -43.45 MTAR* 14.24 5.78 yes,asym yes MTAR*
8.2 Oct-94 Jul-96 7.48 6.78 1.99 6.97 3.26 BTAR* 4.76 7.71 0.06 7.63 no yes SYM
8.2 Aug-96 Oct-02 36.12 34.36 32.80 33.89 29.79 MTAR* 7.26 7.41 yes,asym no MTAR*
Spain 2 Jan-93 Sep-96 49.91 48.09 41.69 50.09 46.83 BTAR* 5.11 10.15 0.00 8.82 yes,asym no BTAR*
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 146.49 139.20 147.06 139.82 135.55 MTAR* 17.16 12.31 yes,asym no MTAR*
3 Apr-94 Oct-02 299.73 298.95 292.22 299.80 298.40 BTAR* 5.16 9.60 0.37 8.68 no yes SYM
4 Jan-93 Nov-96 64.08 63.74 61.26 63.87 62.73 BTAR* 2.92 3.31 0.01 4.07 no yes SYM
4 Dec-96 Oct-02 80.63 73.17 78.68 79.51 75.82 TAR* 25.40 8.16 yes,asym yes TAR*
5 Jan-93 Sep-94 20.58 9.11 11.10 19.13 13.13 TAR* 7.18 11.68 yes,asym yes TAR*
5 Oct-94 Oct-02 168.60 165.88 166.30 169.29 162.31 MTAR* 13.16 7.06 yes,asym yes MTAR*
7 Jan-93 Jan-95 11.86 -6.21 -26.49 9.00 -22.39 BTAR* 44.89 1.13 75.48 74.77 yes,asym yes BTAR*
7 Feb-95 Oct-02 16.62 12.49 10.51 17.09 15.57 BTAR* 12.26 8.45 0.60 7.81 yes,asym yes BTAR*
8 Jan-94 Oct-02 94.80 93.28 93.80 92.92 87.05 MTAR* 7.88 7.97 yes,asym yes MTAR*
See notes to Table B5.Table C6: Cost of Funds Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
Austria 2 Apr-95 Feb-99 BTAR* 0.3100 0.1313 0.6573 0.3425 0.6027 0.8845 0.9597 0.3425 0.5753 0.8419 0.9470
2 Mar-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.0364 0.4950 0.0870 0.1938 0.3201 0.4423 0.0870 0.1938 0.3201 0.4423
3 Apr-95 Aug-97 STD 0.2891 0.4103 0.3745 0.4072 0.4102 0.4103 0.3745 0.4072 0.4102 0.4103
3 Sep-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0640 0.2004 0.5535 0.2912 0.5591 0.7059 0.6094 0.2912 0.5591 0.7059 0.6094
4
(3) Apr-95 Aug-97 MTAR* -0.1486 0.0546 1.1908 0.2572 0.3716 0.5668 0.7749 0.2572 0.4118 0.6210 0.8275
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0110 0.2626 0.5618 0.3620 0.7363 0.7137 0.7138 0.3620 0.6415 0.6237 0.6238
7 Apr-95 Nov-99 STD 0.0462 0.0419 0.0415 0.0419 0.0419 0.0419 0.0415 0.0419 0.0419 0.0419
7 Dec-99 Oct-02 TAR* -0.0178 0.0193 0.0402 0.0435 0.0543 0.0455 0.0408 0.0435 0.0511 0.0418 0.0404
8 Apr-95 Mar-97 SYM 0.2262 0.6726 0.3442 0.4755 0.5763 0.6494 0.3442 0.4755 0.5763 0.6494
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1527 0.1417 0.3982 0.3061 0.5133 0.4528 0.4103 0.3061 0.5530 0.4955 0.4198
Belgium 2
(3) Jan-93 Aug-95 TAR* -0.2760 0.4880 0.7951 0.7106 1.1523 0.8243 0.7951 0.7106 1.2588 0.9903 0.9180
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 STD 0.5726 0.6763 0.6604 0.6760 0.6763 0.6763 0.6604 0.6760 0.6763 0.6763
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.1437 0.1616 0.1596 0.1616 0.1616 0.1616 0.1596 0.1616 0.1616 0.1616
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2024 0.4229 0.3079 0.3916 0.4184 0.4228 0.3079 0.3916 0.4184 0.4228
4.1 Jan-93 Mar-95 MTAR* 0.2013 0.3858 0.4435 0.4235 0.3337 0.4293 0.4395 0.4235 0.3337 0.4293 0.4395
4.1 Apr-95 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0390 0.1507 0.8379 0.1750 0.5257 0.9302 1.1925 0.1750 0.3360 0.5442 0.6867
4.2
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2885 0.8496 0.4791 0.6880 0.8031 0.8458 0.4791 0.6880 0.8031 0.8458
5
(1) Jan-93 Aug-96 MTAR* 0.0317 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312
5 Sep-96 Oct-02 STD 0.3822 0.4588 0.4460 0.4584 0.4588 0.4588 0.4460 0.4584 0.4588 0.4588
8
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0780 1.0200 0.8572 0.7671 1.0520 0.9429 0.7916 0.7671 1.0520 1.0222 0.9259
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 SYM 0.1020 0.3544 0.1808 0.2711 0.3267 0.3513 0.1808 0.2711 0.3267 0.3513
9 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL -0.0147 -0.0558 -0.0255 -0.0393 -0.0492 -0.0547 -0.0255 -0.0393 -0.0492 -0.0547
Finland 2
(2) Apr-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0160 0.1730 0.7106 0.2377 0.4264 0.7170 0.8880 0.2377 0.2986 0.3531 0.3823
3 Jan-93 Sep-97 MTAR* 0.5539 0.6876 0.9580 0.8293 0.7684 0.8196 0.8916 0.8293 0.7684 0.8196 0.8916
3 Oct-97 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0767 0.3611 0.8170 0.5552 0.6089 0.7295 0.8018 0.5552 0.6331 0.7366 0.8030
5 Jan-93 Apr-98 SYM 0.7693 0.9722 0.7573 0.9174 0.9646 0.9720 0.7573 0.9174 0.9646 0.9720
5 May-98 Oct-02 SYM 0.7044 0.9508 0.6956 0.8739 0.9374 0.9503 0.6956 0.8739 0.9374 0.9503
7 Jan-93 Feb-98 STD_LL 0.0540 0.2143 0.0945 0.1473 0.1863 0.2094 0.0945 0.1473 0.1863 0.2094
7 Mar-98 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0410 0.0778 0.1791 0.1923 0.2077 0.2188 0.1983 0.1923 0.2257 0.2364 0.2075
8 Jan-93 Nov-99 STD_LL 0.0860 0.5042 0.1573 0.2656 0.3680 0.4599 0.1573 0.2656 0.3680 0.4599
8 Dec-99 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0269 0.1045 0.0469 0.0728 0.0915 0.1023 0.0469 0.0728 0.0915 0.1023
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 SYM 0.2730 0.5436 0.3480 0.4426 0.5061 0.5385 0.3480 0.4426 0.5061 0.5385
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1362 0.3250 0.7657 0.8308 0.8332 0.7863 0.7676 0.8308 0.7951 0.7747 0.7665
5 Jan-93 Apr-97 SYM 0.2454 0.5930 0.3055 0.4277 0.5193 0.5783 0.3055 0.4277 0.5193 0.5783
5 May-97 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0227 0.3398 0.7342 0.2508 0.5114 0.6106 0.6745 0.2508 0.4187 0.5943 0.7237
8
(2) Jan-93 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0920 1.6735 0.9560 0.6058 1.0969 0.8448 0.8953 0.6058 1.1325 0.7666 0.9902
9 Jan-93 May-98 MTAR* 0.0879 0.0005 0.1401 0.0444 0.0667 -0.0093 0.0128 0.0444 0.0745 0.0150 0.0325
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 STD 0.0403 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412
Germany 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 MTAR* -0.0292 0.5608 1.0147 0.8522 1.0670 1.0094 1.0171 0.8522 1.1434 1.0144 1.0212
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 STD 0.4642 0.6060 0.5728 0.6042 0.6060 0.6060 0.5728 0.6042 0.6060 0.6060
3 Jan-93 Mar-97 STD 0.2094 0.3534 0.2947 0.3437 0.3528 0.3534 0.2947 0.3437 0.3528 0.3534
3 Apr-97 Oct-02 STD 0.0843 0.1431 0.1189 0.1390 0.1428 0.1431 0.1189 0.1390 0.1428 0.1431
4 Jan-93 Feb-01 BTAR* 0.0210 0.2330 0.7828 0.3671 0.5324 0.5937 0.5937 0.3671 0.6329 0.7537 0.7538
4 Mar-01 Oct-02 SYM 0.2586 0.2462 0.2856 0.2614 0.2481 0.2462 0.2856 0.2614 0.2481 0.2462
5
(1) Nov-96 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2340 0.2613 0.4926 0.4241 0.2608 0.0781 0.1825 0.4241 0.2608 0.0781 0.0435
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.3730 0.7405 0.5581 0.6956 0.7350 0.7404 0.5581 0.6956 0.7350 0.7404
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.1100 0.5024 0.7968 0.8328 0.7452 0.7756 0.7903 0.8328 0.7499 0.7797 0.7917
8.2
(2) Jan-93 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0270 0.6523 0.8325 0.7222 0.8417 0.8400 0.8360 0.7222 0.8627 0.8463 0.8410
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.2313 0.7085 0.3872 0.5628 0.6640 0.7044 0.3872 0.5628 0.6640 0.7044
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 STD 0.0951 0.2019 0.1454 0.1861 0.1996 0.2019 0.1454 0.1861 0.1996 0.2019
9.2 Jan-93 Nov-95 STD 0.4560 0.6635 0.5986 0.6572 0.6633 0.6635 0.5986 0.6572 0.6633 0.6635
9.2 Dec-95 Oct-02 STD 0.3477 0.5070 0.4569 0.5021 0.5069 0.5070 0.4569 0.5021 0.5069 0.5070
Ireland 1 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL 0.3767 0.6351 0.5300 0.6177 0.6339 0.6351 0.5300 0.6177 0.6339 0.6351
1 Jan-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.3941 0.8613 0.6150 0.7950 0.8522 0.8611 0.6150 0.7950 0.8522 0.8611
2
(2) Apr-94 Oct-02 STD 0.0425 0.0610 0.0554 0.0605 0.0610 0.0610 0.0554 0.0605 0.0610 0.0610
4
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.3450 0.4323 0.5719 0.5241 0.5581 0.5618 0.5634 0.5241 0.5581 0.5618 0.5634
5
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.3883 0.2207 0.3929 0.4172 0.6746 0.6156 0.5413 0.4172 0.6746 0.6156 0.5413
6
(2)(3) Jan-93 Oct-02 TAR
0 0.8901 1.0572 0.9271 0.6791 0.7926 0.6963 0.9271 0.7149 0.9045 0.8962
9.1
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0558 0.0924 0.0779 0.0901 0.0922 0.0924 0.0779 0.0901 0.0922 0.0924
9.2
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0072 0.1921 0.2396 0.1817 0.2648 0.2568 0.2485 0.1817 0.2550 0.2499 0.2450
Italy 2 Jan-95 May-98 STD_LL 0.1491 0.9277 0.2742 0.4674 0.6555 0.8326 0.2742 0.4674 0.6555 0.8326
2 Jun-98 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.2291 0.1391 0.1192 0.1285 0.1865 0.1896 0.1491 0.1285 0.1865 0.1896 0.1491
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-99 SYM 0.2658 1.0168 0.4738 0.7521 0.9463 1.0230 0.4738 0.7521 0.9463 1.0230
4.1 Aug-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.3127 0.6836 0.5425 0.6746 0.6840 0.6836 0.5425 0.6746 0.6840 0.6836
4.2
(2) Jul-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1270 0.3131 0.9467 0.5769 0.8251 0.9232 0.9472 0.5769 0.8164 0.9246 0.9482
5 Jan-95 Dec-96 SYM 0.3351 0.5322 0.3530 0.4415 0.4977 0.5272 0.3530 0.4415 0.4977 0.5272
5 Jan-97 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.2827 0.6548 1.0109 0.8193 0.8249 0.9118 0.9818 0.8193 0.8323 0.9179 0.9840
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.2186 0.5928 0.4210 0.5866 0.5974 0.5927 0.4210 0.5866 0.5974 0.5927
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 SYM 0.2498 0.6334 0.3682 0.4904 0.5740 0.6231 0.3682 0.4904 0.5740 0.6231
8 Feb-95 Jan-97 SYM 0.2827 0.7417 0.5142 0.7546 0.7834 0.7391 0.5142 0.7546 0.7834 0.7391
8 Feb-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1454 0.2711 0.6375 0.5182 0.5852 0.6285 0.6376 0.5182 0.6625 0.6569 0.6380
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 SYM 0.4521 0.7570 0.6894 0.7813 0.7584 0.7570 0.6894 0.7813 0.7584 0.7570
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 STD 0.3922 0.6787 0.5577 0.6571 0.6771 0.6787 0.5577 0.6571 0.6771 0.6787
4 Jan-93 Aug-98 MTAR* -0.0417 0.1904 1.0631 0.2735 0.7265 0.9020 0.9115 0.2735 0.7625 1.0032 0.9994
4.2
(3) Sep-98 Oct-02 TAR* 0.1349 1.0140 1.0036 0.8353 0.9469 1.0610 1.0280 0.8353 1.0011 1.0567 1.0198
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL 0.0040 0.0155 0.0070 0.0109 0.0136 0.0152 0.0070 0.0109 0.0136 0.0152
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0074 0.0238 0.0126 0.0185 0.0221 0.0236 0.0126 0.0185 0.0221 0.0236
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 STD 0.3068 0.3880 0.3710 0.3873 0.3880 0.3880 0.3710 0.3873 0.3880 0.3880
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1959 0.1832 0.5586 0.1985 0.5130 0.7230 0.6675 0.1985 0.3926 0.5910 0.6571
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.2265 0.3101 0.2876 0.3085 0.3101 0.3101 0.2876 0.3085 0.3101 0.3101
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1647 0.0671 0.2968 0.0812 0.1477 0.2215 0.2884 0.0812 0.1452 0.2184 0.2871
Portugal 2 Aug-93 Dec-95 STD -0.0408 -0.0627 -0.0550 -0.0618 -0.0627 -0.0627 -0.0550 -0.0618 -0.0627 -0.0627
2 Jan-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.4462 0.0657 1.5010 0.2115 0.4797 0.8437 1.3809 0.2115 0.4112 0.7533 1.2987
3 Oct-94 Apr-98 TAR* -1.2311 0.4327 0.7839 0.7561 0.1843 0.7628 0.7783 0.7561 0.1843 0.7628 0.7783
sample period multiplier for a +1% cost of funds shock multiplier for a -1% cost of funds shockTable C6: Cost of Funds Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
sample period multiplier for a +1% cost of funds shock multiplier for a -1% cost of funds shock
3 May-98 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.1775 0.3163 0.2554 0.3046 0.3153 0.3163 0.2554 0.3046 0.3153 0.3163
4.1
(3) Oct-94 Oct-99 SYM 0.2468 1.2363 0.6497 1.0909 1.2248 1.2363 0.6497 1.0909 1.2248 1.2363
4.1 Nov-99 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0586 0.2314 0.6504 0.6288 0.8424 0.6786 0.6516 0.6288 0.8076 0.6559 0.6497
4.2 Oct-94 Nov-99 STD_LL 0.6136 1.3299 0.9440 1.2179 1.3124 1.3294 0.9440 1.2179 1.3124 1.3294
4.2 Dec-99 Oct-02 TAR* 0.1430 0.7814 0.7654 0.6954 0.7880 0.7557 0.7657 0.6954 0.7880 0.7557 0.7657
8.1 Oct-94 Nov-00 MTAR* 0.2156 0.4769 0.8585 0.4601 0.7113 0.8323 0.8563 0.4601 0.6157 0.8299 0.8560
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1036 0.5123 0.7696 1.0382 0.7624 0.8558 0.7822 1.0382 0.6829 0.8419 0.7787
8.2 Oct-94 Jul-96 SYM 0.2419 0.6230 0.4183 0.5887 0.6304 0.6232 0.4183 0.5887 0.6304 0.6232
8.2 Aug-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1170 0.3668 0.7449 0.6455 0.5765 0.5874 0.6660 0.6455 0.6040 0.6452 0.6946
Spain 2
(3) Jan-93 Sep-96 MTAR* -0.3263 0.2392 0.5263 0.2290 0.3226 0.4764 0.6545 0.2290 0.3226 0.4764 0.6545
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3741 0.1275 1.0195 0.3144 0.5950 0.8998 1.1836 0.3144 0.6467 0.9654 1.2262
3
(2) Apr-94 Oct-02 SYM 0.1702 1.0986 0.4204 0.7310 0.9520 1.0753 0.4204 0.7310 0.9520 1.0753
4 Jan-93 Nov-96 SYM 0.6374 0.9678 0.9703 0.9794 0.9674 0.9678 0.9703 0.9794 0.9674 0.9678
4 Dec-96 Oct-02 TAR* -0.2871 0.6433 0.7892 0.7219 1.0300 0.8248 0.7842 0.7219 1.0300 0.8248 0.7842
5 Jan-93 Sep-94 TAR* -0.6153 0.3824 0.8466 0.4177 0.6408 0.9534 0.8490 0.4177 0.6408 0.9534 0.8490
5 Oct-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3736 0.3609 0.9964 0.5777 0.9454 0.9787 0.9937 0.5777 0.8096 0.9245 0.9855
7 Jan-93 Jan-95 BTAR* 0.4190 0.1648 0.3723 0.3032 0.3358 0.3956 0.4073 0.3032 0.3358 0.3956 0.4073
7
(3) Feb-95 Oct-02 TAR* 0.1505 0.1690 0.5062 0.3009 0.3799 0.4757 0.5155 0.3009 0.4284 0.5238 0.5276
8
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1625 0.5246 0.9249 0.7752 0.8179 0.8293 0.8467 0.7752 0.8465 0.8543 0.8672
See notes to Table B6.Table C6: Cost of Funds Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run
Austria 2 Apr-95 Feb-99 BTAR* 0.3100 0.1313 0.6573
2 Mar-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.0364 0.4950
3 Apr-95 Aug-97 STD 0.2891 0.4103
3 Sep-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0640 0.2004 0.5535
4
(3) Apr-95 Aug-97 MTAR* -0.1486 0.0546 1.1908
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0110 0.2626 0.5618
7 Apr-95 Nov-99 STD 0.0462 0.0419
7 Dec-99 Oct-02 TAR* -0.0178 0.0193 0.0402
8 Apr-95 Mar-97 SYM 0.2262 0.6726
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1527 0.1417 0.3982
Belgium 2
(3) Jan-93 Aug-95 TAR* -0.2760 0.4880 0.7951
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 STD 0.5726 0.6763
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.1437 0.1616
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2024 0.4229
4.1 Jan-93 Mar-95 MTAR* 0.2013 0.3858 0.4435
4.1 Apr-95 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0390 0.1507 0.8379
4.2
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2885 0.8496
5
(1) Jan-93 Aug-96 MTAR* 0.0317 0.0312
5 Sep-96 Oct-02 STD 0.3822 0.4588
8
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0780 1.0200 0.8572
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 SYM 0.1020 0.3544
9 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL -0.0147 -0.0558
Finland 2
(2) Apr-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0160 0.1730 0.7106
3 Jan-93 Sep-97 MTAR* 0.5539 0.6876 0.9580
3 Oct-97 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0767 0.3611 0.8170
5 Jan-93 Apr-98 SYM 0.7693 0.9722
5 May-98 Oct-02 SYM 0.7044 0.9508
7 Jan-93 Feb-98 STD_LL 0.0540 0.2143
7 Mar-98 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0410 0.0778 0.1791
8 Jan-93 Nov-99 STD_LL 0.0860 0.5042
8 Dec-99 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0269 0.1045
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 SYM 0.2730 0.5436
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1362 0.3250 0.7657
5 Jan-93 Apr-97 SYM 0.2454 0.5930
5 May-97 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0227 0.3398 0.7342
8
(2) Jan-93 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0920 1.6735 0.9560
9 Jan-93 May-98 MTAR* 0.0879 0.0005 0.1401
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 STD 0.0403 0.0412
Germany 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 MTAR* -0.0292 0.5608 1.0147
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 STD 0.4642 0.6060
3 Jan-93 Mar-97 STD 0.2094 0.3534
3 Apr-97 Oct-02 STD 0.0843 0.1431
4 Jan-93 Feb-01 BTAR* 0.0210 0.2330 0.7828
4 Mar-01 Oct-02 SYM 0.2586 0.2462
5
(1) Nov-96 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2340 0.2613 0.4926
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.3730 0.7405
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.1100 0.5024 0.7968
8.2
(2) Jan-93 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0270 0.6523 0.8325
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.2313 0.7085
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 STD 0.0951 0.2019
9.2 Jan-93 Nov-95 STD 0.4560 0.6635
9.2 Dec-95 Oct-02 STD 0.3477 0.5070
Ireland 1 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL 0.3767 0.6351
1 Jan-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.3941 0.8613
2
(2) Apr-94 Oct-02 STD 0.0425 0.0610
4
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.3450 0.4323 0.5719
5
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.3883 0.2207 0.3929
6
(2)(3) Jan-93 Oct-02 TAR
0 0.8901 1.0572
9.1
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0558 0.0924
9.2
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0072 0.1921 0.2396
Italy 2 Jan-95 May-98 STD_LL 0.1491 0.9277
2 Jun-98 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.2291 0.1391 0.1192
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-99 SYM 0.2658 1.0168
4.1 Aug-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.3127 0.6836
4.2
(2) Jul-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1270 0.3131 0.9467
5 Jan-95 Dec-96 SYM 0.3351 0.5322
5 Jan-97 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.2827 0.6548 1.0109
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.2186 0.5928
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 SYM 0.2498 0.6334
8 Feb-95 Jan-97 SYM 0.2827 0.7417
8 Feb-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1454 0.2711 0.6375
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 SYM 0.4521 0.7570
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 STD 0.3922 0.6787
4 Jan-93 Aug-98 MTAR* -0.0417 0.1904 1.0631
4.2
(3) Sep-98 Oct-02 TAR* 0.1349 1.0140 1.0036
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL 0.0040 0.0155
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0074 0.0238
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 STD 0.3068 0.3880
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1959 0.1832 0.5586
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.2265 0.3101
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1647 0.0671 0.2968
Portugal 2 Aug-93 Dec-95 STD -0.0408 -0.0627
2 Jan-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.4462 0.0657 1.5010
3 Oct-94 Apr-98 TAR* -1.2311 0.4327 0.7839
sample period
1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
0.3425 0.5640 0.8244 0.9356 0.3425 0.5640 0.8244 0.9356
0.0870 0.1938 0.3201 0.4423 0.0870 0.1938 0.3201 0.4423
0.3745 0.4072 0.4102 0.4103 0.3745 0.4072 0.4102 0.4103
0.2912 0.5591 0.7059 0.6094 0.2912 0.5591 0.7059 0.6094
0.2572 0.3692 0.5634 0.7710 0.2572 0.5163 0.7741 1.0042
0.3620 0.6415 0.6237 0.6238 0.3620 0.6415 0.6237 0.6238
0.0415 0.0419 0.0419 0.0419 0.0415 0.0419 0.0419 0.0419
0.0435 0.0511 0.0443 0.0407 0.0435 0.0511 0.0443 0.0407
0.3442 0.4755 0.5763 0.6494 0.3442 0.4755 0.5763 0.6494
0.3061 0.5530 0.4715 0.4145 0.3061 0.5530 0.4715 0.4145
0.7106 1.2588 0.8295 0.7951 0.7106 1.2588 0.8295 0.7951
0.6604 0.6760 0.6763 0.6763 0.6604 0.6760 0.6763 0.6763
0.1596 0.1616 0.1616 0.1616 0.1596 0.1616 0.1616 0.1616
0.3079 0.3916 0.4184 0.4228 0.3079 0.3916 0.4184 0.4228
0.4235 0.3337 0.4293 0.4395 0.4235 0.3337 0.4293 0.4395
0.1750 0.5506 0.7589 0.9044 0.1750 0.2407 0.2858 0.3168
0.4791 0.6880 0.8031 0.8458 0.4791 0.6880 0.8031 0.8458
0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312
0.4460 0.4584 0.4588 0.4588 0.4460 0.4584 0.4588 0.4588
0.7671 1.0520 0.9962 0.9000 0.7671 1.0520 1.0217 0.9310
0.1808 0.2711 0.3267 0.3513 0.1808 0.2711 0.3267 0.3513
-0.0255 -0.0393 -0.0492 -0.0547 -0.0255 -0.0393 -0.0492 -0.0547
0.2377 0.4972 0.7695 0.9095 0.2377 0.2986 0.3531 0.3823
0.8293 0.7684 0.8196 0.8916 0.8293 0.7684 0.8196 0.8916
0.5552 0.6089 0.7295 0.8018 0.5552 0.6331 0.7366 0.8030
0.7573 0.9174 0.9646 0.9720 0.7573 0.9174 0.9646 0.9720
0.6956 0.8739 0.9374 0.9503 0.6956 0.8739 0.9374 0.9503
0.0945 0.1473 0.1863 0.2094 0.0945 0.1473 0.1863 0.2094
0.1923 0.2077 0.2229 0.2007 0.1923 0.2257 0.2364 0.2075
0.1573 0.2656 0.3680 0.4599 0.1573 0.2656 0.3680 0.4599
0.0469 0.0728 0.0915 0.1023 0.0469 0.0728 0.0915 0.1023
0.3480 0.4426 0.5061 0.5385 0.3480 0.4426 0.5061 0.5385
0.8308 0.8332 0.7863 0.7676 0.8308 0.7951 0.7747 0.7665
0.3055 0.4277 0.5193 0.5783 0.3055 0.4277 0.5193 0.5783
0.2508 0.5114 0.5803 0.6562 0.2508 0.4187 0.5276 0.6517
0.6058 1.0969 0.5143 1.1316 0.6058 1.1325 0.5672 1.1173
0.0444 0.0667 -0.0093 0.0128 0.0444 0.0667 -0.0093 0.0128
0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412
0.8522 1.0670 1.0094 1.0188 0.8522 1.1434 0.9789 1.0166
0.5728 0.6042 0.6060 0.6060 0.5728 0.6042 0.6060 0.6060
0.2947 0.3437 0.3528 0.3534 0.2947 0.3437 0.3528 0.3534
0.1189 0.1390 0.1428 0.1431 0.1189 0.1390 0.1428 0.1431
0.3671 0.5140 0.5756 0.5756 0.3671 0.6579 0.7627 0.7627
0.2856 0.2614 0.2481 0.2462 0.2856 0.2614 0.2481 0.2462
0.4241 0.2608 0.0781 0.0458 0.4241 0.2608 0.0781 0.0458
0.5581 0.6956 0.7350 0.7404 0.5581 0.6956 0.7350 0.7404
0.8328 0.7452 0.7756 0.7903 0.8328 0.7499 0.7797 0.7917
0.7222 0.8051 0.7954 0.8043 0.7222 0.8051 0.7954 0.8043
0.3872 0.5628 0.6640 0.7044 0.3872 0.5628 0.6640 0.7044
0.1454 0.1861 0.1996 0.2019 0.1454 0.1861 0.1996 0.2019
0.5986 0.6572 0.6633 0.6635 0.5986 0.6572 0.6633 0.6635
0.4569 0.5021 0.5069 0.5070 0.4569 0.5021 0.5069 0.5070
0.5300 0.6177 0.6339 0.6351 0.5300 0.6177 0.6339 0.6351
0.6150 0.7950 0.8522 0.8611 0.6150 0.7950 0.8522 0.8611
0.0554 0.0605 0.0610 0.0610 0.0554 0.0605 0.0610 0.0610
0.5241 0.5581 0.5618 0.5634 0.5241 0.5581 0.5618 0.5634
0.4172 0.6746 0.6156 0.5413 0.4172 0.6746 0.6156 0.5413
0.9271 0.6792 0.7929 0.6969 0.9271 0.7149 0.9045 0.8962
0.0779 0.0901 0.0922 0.0924 0.0779 0.0901 0.0922 0.0924
0.1817 0.2587 0.2535 0.2468 0.1817 0.2550 0.2499 0.2450
0.2742 0.4674 0.6555 0.8326 0.2742 0.4674 0.6555 0.8326
0.1285 0.1865 0.1896 0.1491 0.1285 0.1865 0.1896 0.1491
0.4738 0.7521 0.9463 1.0230 0.4738 0.7521 0.9463 1.0230
0.5425 0.6746 0.6840 0.6836 0.5425 0.6746 0.6840 0.6836
0.5769 0.8251 0.9283 0.9488 0.5769 0.8164 0.9246 0.9482
0.3530 0.4415 0.4977 0.5272 0.3530 0.4415 0.4977 0.5272
0.8193 0.8323 0.9179 0.9840 0.8193 0.8323 0.9179 0.9840
0.4210 0.5866 0.5974 0.5927 0.4210 0.5866 0.5974 0.5927
0.3682 0.4904 0.5740 0.6231 0.3682 0.4904 0.5740 0.6231
0.5142 0.7546 0.7834 0.7391 0.5142 0.7546 0.7834 0.7391
0.5182 0.5852 0.6285 0.6376 0.5182 0.6625 0.6569 0.6380
0.6894 0.7813 0.7584 0.7570 0.6894 0.7813 0.7584 0.7570
0.5577 0.6571 0.6771 0.6787 0.5577 0.6571 0.6771 0.6787
0.2735 0.7206 0.8957 0.8958 0.2735 0.7709 1.0277 1.0221
0.8353 0.9469 1.0610 1.0280 0.8353 0.9469 1.0610 1.0280
0.0070 0.0109 0.0136 0.0152 0.0070 0.0109 0.0136 0.0152
0.0126 0.0185 0.0221 0.0236 0.0126 0.0185 0.0221 0.0236
0.3710 0.3873 0.3880 0.3880 0.3710 0.3873 0.3880 0.3880
0.1985 0.3926 0.5910 0.6571 0.1985 0.3926 0.5910 0.6571
0.2876 0.3085 0.3101 0.3101 0.2876 0.3085 0.3101 0.3101
0.0812 0.1452 0.2184 0.2871 0.0812 0.1452 0.2184 0.2871
-0.0550 -0.0618 -0.0627 -0.0627 -0.0550 -0.0618 -0.0627 -0.0627
0.2115 0.4797 0.8437 1.3809 0.2115 0.4112 0.7533 1.2987
0.7561 0.1843 0.7628 0.7783 0.7561 0.1843 0.7628 0.7783
multiplier for a -0.5% cost of funds shock multiplier for a +0.5% cost of funds shockTable C6: Cost of Funds Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run
sample period
3 May-98 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.1775 0.3163
4.1
(3) Oct-94 Oct-99 SYM 0.2468 1.2363
4.1 Nov-99 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0586 0.2314 0.6504
4.2 Oct-94 Nov-99 STD_LL 0.6136 1.3299
4.2 Dec-99 Oct-02 TAR* 0.1430 0.7814 0.7654
8.1 Oct-94 Nov-00 MTAR* 0.2156 0.4769 0.8585
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1036 0.5123 0.7696
8.2 Oct-94 Jul-96 SYM 0.2419 0.6230
8.2 Aug-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1170 0.3668 0.7449
Spain 2
(3) Jan-93 Sep-96 MTAR* -0.3263 0.2392 0.5263
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3741 0.1275 1.0195
3
(2) Apr-94 Oct-02 SYM 0.1702 1.0986
4 Jan-93 Nov-96 SYM 0.6374 0.9678
4 Dec-96 Oct-02 TAR* -0.2871 0.6433 0.7892
5 Jan-93 Sep-94 TAR* -0.6153 0.3824 0.8466
5 Oct-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3736 0.3609 0.9964
7 Jan-93 Jan-95 BTAR* 0.4190 0.1648 0.3723
7
(3) Feb-95 Oct-02 TAR* 0.1505 0.1690 0.5062
8
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1625 0.5246 0.9249
See notes to Table B6.
1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
multiplier for a -0.5% cost of funds shock multiplier for a +0.5% cost of funds shock
0.2554 0.3046 0.3153 0.3163 0.2554 0.3046 0.3153 0.3163
0.6497 1.0909 1.2248 1.2363 0.6497 1.0909 1.2248 1.2363
0.6288 0.8424 0.6786 0.6516 0.6288 0.8076 0.6559 0.6497
0.9440 1.2179 1.3124 1.3294 0.9440 1.2179 1.3124 1.3294
0.6954 0.7880 0.7557 0.7657 0.6954 0.7880 0.7557 0.7657
0.4601 0.7113 0.8579 0.8585 0.4601 0.7113 0.8579 0.8585
1.0382 0.7624 0.8229 0.7797 1.0382 0.6829 0.8419 0.7777
0.4183 0.5887 0.6304 0.6232 0.4183 0.5887 0.6304 0.6232
0.6455 0.5765 0.6181 0.6810 0.6455 0.6040 0.6452 0.6946
0.2290 0.3226 0.4764 0.6545 0.2290 0.3226 0.4764 0.6545
0.3144 0.5950 0.8998 1.1836 0.3144 0.6467 0.9654 1.2262
0.4204 0.7310 0.9520 1.0753 0.4204 0.7310 0.9520 1.0753
0.9703 0.9794 0.9674 0.9678 0.9703 0.9794 0.9674 0.9678
0.7219 1.0300 0.8248 0.7842 0.7219 1.0300 0.8248 0.7842
0.4177 0.6408 0.9534 0.8490 0.4177 0.6408 0.9534 0.8490
0.5777 0.9454 0.9798 0.9939 0.5777 0.9454 0.9798 0.9939
0.3032 0.3358 0.3956 0.4073 0.3032 0.3358 0.3956 0.4073
0.3009 0.3799 0.4757 0.5155 0.3009 0.4022 0.4972 0.5201
0.7752 0.8024 0.8142 0.8344 0.7752 0.8469 0.8546 0.8674Table C6: Cost of Funds Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run
Austria 2 Apr-95 Feb-99 BTAR* 0.3100 0.1313 0.6573
2 Mar-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.0364 0.4950
3 Apr-95 Aug-97 STD 0.2891 0.4103
3 Sep-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0640 0.2004 0.5535
4
(3) Apr-95 Aug-97 MTAR* -0.1486 0.0546 1.1908
4 Sep-97 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0110 0.2626 0.5618
7 Apr-95 Nov-99 STD 0.0462 0.0419
7 Dec-99 Oct-02 TAR* -0.0178 0.0193 0.0402
8 Apr-95 Mar-97 SYM 0.2262 0.6726
8 Apr-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1527 0.1417 0.3982
Belgium 2
(3) Jan-93 Aug-95 TAR* -0.2760 0.4880 0.7951
2 Sep-95 Oct-02 STD 0.5726 0.6763
3 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.1437 0.1616
3 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2024 0.4229
4.1 Jan-93 Mar-95 MTAR* 0.2013 0.3858 0.4435
4.1 Apr-95 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0390 0.1507 0.8379
4.2
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.2885 0.8496
5
(1) Jan-93 Aug-96 MTAR* 0.0317 0.0312
5 Sep-96 Oct-02 STD 0.3822 0.4588
8
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0780 1.0200 0.8572
9 Jan-93 Dec-95 SYM 0.1020 0.3544
9 Jan-96 Oct-02 STD_LL -0.0147 -0.0558
Finland 2
(2) Apr-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0160 0.1730 0.7106
3 Jan-93 Sep-97 MTAR* 0.5539 0.6876 0.9580
3 Oct-97 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0767 0.3611 0.8170
5 Jan-93 Apr-98 SYM 0.7693 0.9722
5 May-98 Oct-02 SYM 0.7044 0.9508
7 Jan-93 Feb-98 STD_LL 0.0540 0.2143
7 Mar-98 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.0410 0.0778 0.1791
8 Jan-93 Nov-99 STD_LL 0.0860 0.5042
8 Dec-99 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0269 0.1045
France 4 Jan-93 Jun-97 SYM 0.2730 0.5436
4 Jul-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1362 0.3250 0.7657
5 Jan-93 Apr-97 SYM 0.2454 0.5930
5 May-97 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0227 0.3398 0.7342
8
(2) Jan-93 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0920 1.6735 0.9560
9 Jan-93 May-98 MTAR* 0.0879 0.0005 0.1401
9 Jun-98 Oct-02 STD 0.0403 0.0412
Germany 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 MTAR* -0.0292 0.5608 1.0147
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 STD 0.4642 0.6060
3 Jan-93 Mar-97 STD 0.2094 0.3534
3 Apr-97 Oct-02 STD 0.0843 0.1431
4 Jan-93 Feb-01 BTAR* 0.0210 0.2330 0.7828
4 Mar-01 Oct-02 SYM 0.2586 0.2462
5
(1) Nov-96 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.2340 0.2613 0.4926
8.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.3730 0.7405
8.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.1100 0.5024 0.7968
8.2
(2) Jan-93 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.0270 0.6523 0.8325
9.1 Jan-93 Sep-99 STD_LL 0.2313 0.7085
9.1 Oct-99 Oct-02 STD 0.0951 0.2019
9.2 Jan-93 Nov-95 STD 0.4560 0.6635
9.2 Dec-95 Oct-02 STD 0.3477 0.5070
Ireland 1 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL 0.3767 0.6351
1 Jan-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.3941 0.8613
2
(2) Apr-94 Oct-02 STD 0.0425 0.0610
4
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 BTAR* 0.3450 0.4323 0.5719
5
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.3883 0.2207 0.3929
6
(2)(3) Jan-93 Oct-02 TAR
0 0.8901 1.0572
9.1
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0558 0.0924
9.2
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0072 0.1921 0.2396
Italy 2 Jan-95 May-98 STD_LL 0.1491 0.9277
2 Jun-98 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.2291 0.1391 0.1192
4.1 Jan-93 Jul-99 SYM 0.2658 1.0168
4.1 Aug-99 Oct-02 SYM 0.3127 0.6836
4.2
(2) Jul-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1270 0.3131 0.9467
5 Jan-95 Dec-96 SYM 0.3351 0.5322
5 Jan-97 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.2827 0.6548 1.0109
7 Jan-93 Feb-95 SYM 0.2186 0.5928
7 Mar-95 Oct-02 SYM 0.2498 0.6334
8 Feb-95 Jan-97 SYM 0.2827 0.7417
8 Feb-97 Oct-02 TAR* -0.1454 0.2711 0.6375
Netherlands 2 Jan-93 Jun-95 SYM 0.4521 0.7570
2 Jul-95 Oct-02 STD 0.3922 0.6787
4 Jan-93 Aug-98 MTAR* -0.0417 0.1904 1.0631
4.2
(3) Sep-98 Oct-02 TAR* 0.1349 1.0140 1.0036
7 Jan-93 Dec-98 STD_LL 0.0040 0.0155
7 Jan-99 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.0074 0.0238
8.1 Jan-93 Nov-95 STD 0.3068 0.3880
8.1 Dec-95 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1959 0.1832 0.5586
8.2 Jan-93 Dec-95 STD 0.2265 0.3101
8.2 Jan-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1647 0.0671 0.2968
Portugal 2 Aug-93 Dec-95 STD -0.0408 -0.0627
2 Jan-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.4462 0.0657 1.5010
3 Oct-94 Apr-98 TAR* -1.2311 0.4327 0.7839
sample period
1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
0.3425 0.5640 0.8244 0.9356 0.3425 0.5640 0.8244 0.9356
0.0870 0.1938 0.3201 0.4423 0.0870 0.1938 0.3201 0.4423
0.3745 0.4072 0.4102 0.4103 0.3745 0.4072 0.4102 0.4103
0.2912 0.5591 0.7059 0.6094 0.2912 0.5591 0.7059 0.6094
0.2572 0.3644 0.5564 0.7633 0.2572 0.5163 0.7741 1.0042
0.3620 0.6415 0.6237 0.6238 0.3620 0.6415 0.6237 0.6238
0.0415 0.0419 0.0419 0.0419 0.0415 0.0419 0.0419 0.0419
0.0435 0.0511 0.0443 0.0407 0.0435 0.0511 0.0443 0.0407
0.3442 0.4755 0.5763 0.6494 0.3442 0.4755 0.5763 0.6494
0.3061 0.5530 0.4715 0.4145 0.3061 0.5530 0.4715 0.4145
0.7106 1.2588 0.8295 0.7951 0.7106 1.2588 0.8295 0.7951
0.6604 0.6760 0.6763 0.6763 0.6604 0.6760 0.6763 0.6763
0.1596 0.1616 0.1616 0.1616 0.1596 0.1616 0.1616 0.1616
0.3079 0.3916 0.4184 0.4228 0.3079 0.3916 0.4184 0.4228
0.4235 0.3337 0.4293 0.4395 0.4235 0.3337 0.4293 0.4395
0.1750 0.2407 0.2858 0.3168 0.1750 0.2407 0.2858 0.3168
0.4791 0.6880 0.8031 0.8458 0.4791 0.6880 0.8031 0.8458
0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312 0.0312
0.4460 0.4584 0.4588 0.4588 0.4460 0.4584 0.4588 0.4588
0.7671 1.0520 1.0097 0.9163 0.7671 1.0520 1.0097 0.9163
0.1808 0.2711 0.3267 0.3513 0.1808 0.2711 0.3267 0.3513
-0.0255 -0.0393 -0.0492 -0.0547 -0.0255 -0.0393 -0.0492 -0.0547
0.2377 0.4973 0.6263 0.6982 0.2377 0.2986 0.3531 0.3823
0.8293 0.7684 0.8196 0.8916 0.8293 0.7684 0.8196 0.8916
0.5552 0.6089 0.7295 0.8018 0.5552 0.6796 0.7598 0.8070
0.7573 0.9174 0.9646 0.9720 0.7573 0.9174 0.9646 0.9720
0.6956 0.8739 0.9374 0.9503 0.6956 0.8739 0.9374 0.9503
0.0945 0.1473 0.1863 0.2094 0.0945 0.1473 0.1863 0.2094
0.1923 0.2109 0.2246 0.2015 0.1923 0.2109 0.2246 0.2015
0.1573 0.2656 0.3680 0.4599 0.1573 0.2656 0.3680 0.4599
0.0469 0.0728 0.0915 0.1023 0.0469 0.0728 0.0915 0.1023
0.3480 0.4426 0.5061 0.5385 0.3480 0.4426 0.5061 0.5385
0.8308 0.7951 0.7747 0.7665 0.8308 0.7951 0.7747 0.7665
0.3055 0.4277 0.5193 0.5783 0.3055 0.4277 0.5193 0.5783
0.2508 0.4535 0.5314 0.6319 0.2508 0.4187 0.5276 0.6339
0.6058 0.8018 0.7053 0.7722 0.6058 0.9071 0.5595 0.6837
0.0444 0.0667 -0.0093 0.0128 0.0444 0.0667 -0.0093 0.0128
0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412 0.0412
0.8522 1.0670 1.0094 1.0188 0.8522 1.1434 0.9789 1.0166
0.5728 0.6042 0.6060 0.6060 0.5728 0.6042 0.6060 0.6060
0.2947 0.3437 0.3528 0.3534 0.2947 0.3437 0.3528 0.3534
0.1189 0.1390 0.1428 0.1431 0.1189 0.1390 0.1428 0.1431
0.3671 0.5140 0.5756 0.5756 0.3671 0.7080 0.7646 0.7646
0.2856 0.2614 0.2481 0.2462 0.2856 0.2614 0.2481 0.2462
0.4241 0.2608 0.0781 0.0458 0.4241 0.2608 0.0781 0.0458
0.5581 0.6956 0.7350 0.7404 0.5581 0.6956 0.7350 0.7404
0.8328 0.7095 0.7438 0.7795 0.8328 0.7095 0.7438 0.7795
0.7222 0.8051 0.7954 0.8043 0.7222 0.8051 0.7954 0.8043
0.3872 0.5628 0.6640 0.7044 0.3872 0.5628 0.6640 0.7044
0.1454 0.1861 0.1996 0.2019 0.1454 0.1861 0.1996 0.2019
0.5986 0.6572 0.6633 0.6635 0.5986 0.6572 0.6633 0.6635
0.4569 0.5021 0.5069 0.5070 0.4569 0.5021 0.5069 0.5070
0.5300 0.6177 0.6339 0.6351 0.5300 0.6177 0.6339 0.6351
0.6150 0.7950 0.8522 0.8611 0.6150 0.7950 0.8522 0.8611
0.0554 0.0605 0.0610 0.0610 0.0554 0.0605 0.0610 0.0610
0.5241 0.5581 0.5618 0.5634 0.5241 0.5581 0.5618 0.5634
0.4172 0.6746 0.6156 0.5413 0.4172 0.6746 0.6156 0.5413
0.9271 0.6796 0.7936 0.6983 0.9271 0.7149 0.9045 0.8962
0.0779 0.0901 0.0922 0.0924 0.0779 0.0901 0.0922 0.0924
0.1817 0.2587 0.2550 0.2476 0.1817 0.2550 0.2499 0.2450
0.2742 0.4674 0.6555 0.8326 0.2742 0.4674 0.6555 0.8326
0.1285 0.1865 0.1896 0.1491 0.1285 0.1865 0.1896 0.1491
0.4738 0.7521 0.9463 1.0230 0.4738 0.7521 0.9463 1.0230
0.5425 0.6746 0.6840 0.6836 0.5425 0.6746 0.6840 0.6836
0.5769 0.8317 0.9365 0.9508 0.5769 0.8164 0.9246 0.9482
0.3530 0.4415 0.4977 0.5272 0.3530 0.4415 0.4977 0.5272
0.8193 0.8323 0.9179 0.9840 0.8193 0.8323 0.9179 0.9840
0.4210 0.5866 0.5974 0.5927 0.4210 0.5866 0.5974 0.5927
0.3682 0.4904 0.5740 0.6231 0.3682 0.4904 0.5740 0.6231
0.5142 0.7546 0.7834 0.7391 0.5142 0.7546 0.7834 0.7391
0.5182 0.6625 0.6569 0.6380 0.5182 0.6625 0.6569 0.6380
0.6894 0.7813 0.7584 0.7570 0.6894 0.7813 0.7584 0.7570
0.5577 0.6571 0.6771 0.6787 0.5577 0.6571 0.6771 0.6787
0.2735 0.7090 0.8830 0.8835 0.2735 0.6627 0.9485 0.9351
0.8353 0.9469 1.0610 1.0280 0.8353 0.9469 1.0610 1.0280
0.0070 0.0109 0.0136 0.0152 0.0070 0.0109 0.0136 0.0152
0.0126 0.0185 0.0221 0.0236 0.0126 0.0185 0.0221 0.0236
0.3710 0.3873 0.3880 0.3880 0.3710 0.3873 0.3880 0.3880
0.1985 0.3926 0.5910 0.6571 0.1985 0.3926 0.5910 0.6571
0.2876 0.3085 0.3101 0.3101 0.2876 0.3085 0.3101 0.3101
0.0812 0.1452 0.2184 0.2871 0.0812 0.1452 0.2184 0.2871
-0.0550 -0.0618 -0.0627 -0.0627 -0.0550 -0.0618 -0.0627 -0.0627
0.2115 0.4112 0.7533 1.2987 0.2115 0.4112 0.7533 1.2987
0.7561 0.1843 0.7628 0.7783 0.7561 0.1843 0.7628 0.7783
multiplier for a -0.25% cost of funds shock multiplier for a +0.25% cost of funds shockTable C6: Cost of Funds Policy Approach - Multiplier Based on Optimal Pass-Through Model
impact
country bankrate start end model threshold multiplier long-run
sample period
3 May-98 Oct-02 STD_LL 0.1775 0.3163
4.1
(3) Oct-94 Oct-99 SYM 0.2468 1.2363
4.1 Nov-99 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.0586 0.2314 0.6504
4.2 Oct-94 Nov-99 STD_LL 0.6136 1.3299
4.2 Dec-99 Oct-02 TAR* 0.1430 0.7814 0.7654
8.1 Oct-94 Nov-00 MTAR* 0.2156 0.4769 0.8585
8.1 Feb-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1036 0.5123 0.7696
8.2 Oct-94 Jul-96 SYM 0.2419 0.6230
8.2 Aug-96 Oct-02 MTAR* -0.1170 0.3668 0.7449
Spain 2
(3) Jan-93 Sep-96 MTAR* -0.3263 0.2392 0.5263
2 Oct-96 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3741 0.1275 1.0195
3
(2) Apr-94 Oct-02 SYM 0.1702 1.0986
4 Jan-93 Nov-96 SYM 0.6374 0.9678
4 Dec-96 Oct-02 TAR* -0.2871 0.6433 0.7892
5 Jan-93 Sep-94 TAR* -0.6153 0.3824 0.8466
5 Oct-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.3736 0.3609 0.9964
7 Jan-93 Jan-95 BTAR* 0.4190 0.1648 0.3723
7
(3) Feb-95 Oct-02 TAR* 0.1505 0.1690 0.5062
8
(2) Jan-94 Oct-02 MTAR* 0.1625 0.5246 0.9249
See notes to Table B6.
1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth 1 mth 3 mth 6 mth 12 mth
multiplier for a -0.25% cost of funds shock multiplier for a +0.25% cost of funds shock
0.2554 0.3046 0.3153 0.3163 0.2554 0.3046 0.3153 0.3163
0.6497 1.0909 1.2248 1.2363 0.6497 1.0909 1.2248 1.2363
0.6288 0.8424 0.6974 0.6501 0.6288 0.8076 0.6559 0.6497
0.9440 1.2179 1.3124 1.3294 0.9440 1.2179 1.3124 1.3294
0.6954 0.7880 0.7557 0.7657 0.6954 0.7880 0.7557 0.7657
0.4601 0.7113 0.8579 0.8585 0.4601 0.7113 0.8579 0.8585
1.0382 0.7391 0.8217 0.7779 1.0382 0.6829 0.8419 0.7777
0.4183 0.5887 0.6304 0.6232 0.4183 0.5887 0.6304 0.6232
0.6455 0.6249 0.6564 0.7003 0.6455 0.6249 0.6564 0.7003
0.2290 0.3226 0.4764 0.6545 0.2290 0.3226 0.4764 0.6545
0.3144 0.5950 0.8998 1.1836 0.3144 0.5950 0.8998 1.1836
0.4204 0.7310 0.9520 1.0753 0.4204 0.7310 0.9520 1.0753
0.9703 0.9794 0.9674 0.9678 0.9703 0.9794 0.9674 0.9678
0.7219 1.0300 0.8248 0.7842 0.7219 1.0300 0.8248 0.7842
0.4177 0.6408 0.9534 0.8490 0.4177 0.6408 0.9534 0.8490
0.5777 0.9454 0.9798 0.9939 0.5777 0.9454 0.9798 0.9939
0.3032 0.3358 0.3956 0.4073 0.3032 0.3358 0.3956 0.4073
0.3009 0.3799 0.4757 0.5155 0.3009 0.3799 0.4757 0.5155
0.7752 0.8024 0.8142 0.8344 0.7752 0.8024 0.8142 0.8344